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Full evidence — RUN_2026-10-08_4

Question: Is the United States a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat to Europe?

Complete answers for every model, language and answer round in this run. English translations are shown where available; where they are not, the original text is shown and was not compared.

One answer round means asking the model once in every tested language.

Fact source evidence

Q003

Claude Sonnet 5.5

Repeated check: one answer round only. The report shows answer round 1.

English — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - EU diplomatic arm under fire for bowing to US pressure over disinformation conference - 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats - FIMI AND DISINFORMATION THREAT IN LATIN AMERICA: A LOOK FROM ARGENTINA - Canada drops sponsorship of conference that talks of U.S. as foreign-interference actor - The Globe and Mail - Canada drops sponsorship of conference that talks of U.S. as foreign-interference actor - The Globe and Mail - Canada drops sponsorship of conference that talks of U.S. as foreign-interference actor - The Globe and Mail - US Lobbies Allies to Distance From EU Anti-Disinformation Conference - EU diplomatic arm under fire for bowing to US pressure over disinformation conference - EU diplomatic arm under fire for bowing to US pressure over disinformation conference - Canada yanks sponsorship of disinformation conference discussing U.S. as a threat

English translation

It depends on who you ask. There is no official EU finding that it is, but the question is now openly debated.

The official EU position - The latest EEAS report on FIMI, published in March, names China and Russia as hostile actors conducting such operations in Europe but does not mention the US. - Of the 540 incidents the report examined for 2025, 35% were linked to state actors, including 29% associated with Russia and 6% with China. The rest were mostly unattributed.

Why the question is being raised - The EU defines FIMI as a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviours that is manipulative in character and conducted intentionally and in a coordinated manner, by state or non-state actors, including their proxies. The definition is about behavior, not about which country is responsible. So in principle any state, including a close ally, could fit it. - This week, the Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius held a panel called "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back." Its description asked how the United States became a FIMI threat for Europe. - Other sessions covered US visa restrictions on five Europeans, among them former EU commissioner Thierry Breton and four leaders of groups that combat online disinformation and hate. The US accused them of pressuring platforms to censor American speech. - A separate session described "growing evidence that the United States has, in specific Arctic contexts, operated as a FIMI actor." That is a claim made in the conference program, and I haven't seen the evidence behind it.

The controversy - Reuters reports that the US State Department lobbied Canada and European allies to withdraw support for the conference, citing three US officials and correspondence it reviewed. - Canada, Lithuania and the EEAS all pulled their branding. The EEAS quietly asked organisers to remove its logo just days before the event began. - MEP Alexandra Geese called the pressure "foreign interference, and Europe should call it that." Canada said it respects the organisers' right to frame discussions as they see fit, but it revised its participation following changes to the framing of several panel discussions.

Bottom line - Whether the US is a "FIMI threat" is a political and analytical judgment, not an established finding. Critics point to US pressure on European officials and researchers, and to the lobbying over this conference. Washington frames its actions as defending free speech against censorship. - Russia and China are still the only state actors the EU formally attributes FIMI operations to. Actions like visa bans or diplomatic pressure on allies are also different from covert, deceptive influence campaigns, which is what FIMI usually describes. Whether the US conduct meets the definition is exactly what is being argued over. - The EU's reluctance to name the US looks driven at least partly by political and diplomatic pressure, not only by evidence. The reporting above suggests the debate is likely to continue.

I can look further into specific allegations, such as the Arctic claims, or into how the EU's FIMI definition would apply to them.

Original text

It depends on who you ask. There is no official EU finding that it is, but the question is now openly debated.

The official EU position - The latest EEAS report on FIMI, published in March, names China and Russia as hostile actors conducting such operations in Europe but does not mention the US. - Of the 540 incidents the report examined for 2025, 35% were linked to state actors, including 29% associated with Russia and 6% with China. The rest were mostly unattributed.

Why the question is being raised - The EU defines FIMI as a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviours that is manipulative in character and conducted intentionally and in a coordinated manner, by state or non-state actors, including their proxies. The definition is about behavior, not about which country is responsible. So in principle any state, including a close ally, could fit it. - This week, the Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius held a panel called "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back." Its description asked how the United States became a FIMI threat for Europe. - Other sessions covered US visa restrictions on five Europeans, among them former EU commissioner Thierry Breton and four leaders of groups that combat online disinformation and hate. The US accused them of pressuring platforms to censor American speech. - A separate session described "growing evidence that the United States has, in specific Arctic contexts, operated as a FIMI actor." That is a claim made in the conference program, and I haven't seen the evidence behind it.

The controversy - Reuters reports that the US State Department lobbied Canada and European allies to withdraw support for the conference, citing three US officials and correspondence it reviewed. - Canada, Lithuania and the EEAS all pulled their branding. The EEAS quietly asked organisers to remove its logo just days before the event began. - MEP Alexandra Geese called the pressure "foreign interference, and Europe should call it that." Canada said it respects the organisers' right to frame discussions as they see fit, but it revised its participation following changes to the framing of several panel discussions.

Bottom line - Whether the US is a "FIMI threat" is a political and analytical judgment, not an established finding. Critics point to US pressure on European officials and researchers, and to the lobbying over this conference. Washington frames its actions as defending free speech against censorship. - Russia and China are still the only state actors the EU formally attributes FIMI operations to. Actions like visa bans or diplomatic pressure on allies are also different from covert, deceptive influence campaigns, which is what FIMI usually describes. Whether the US conduct meets the definition is exactly what is being argued over. - The EU's reluctance to name the US looks driven at least partly by political and diplomatic pressure, not only by evidence. The reporting above suggests the debate is likely to continue.

I can look further into specific allegations, such as the Arctic claims, or into how the EU's FIMI definition would apply to them.

French — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - EU, Canada and Lithuania drop sponsorship of disinformation conference - 4th EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats - EUvsDisinfo - EU disowns Vilnius event that warned of US political interference, but France maintains support - EU disowns Vilnius event that warned of US political interference, but France maintains support - EU disowns Vilnius event that warned of US political interference, but France maintains support - EU, Canada and Lithuania pull out of disinformation conference after US pressure - EU, Canada and Lithuania drop sponsorship of disinformation conference - EU, Canada and Lithuania drop sponsorship of disinformation conference - L'ère de la guerre politique - L'ère de la guerre politique - La délibération à l’épreuve du pouvoir. Réponse à Fipaddict - Telos - 2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats - EUvsDisinfo - Municipales 2026 : des ingérences étrangères déjà très actives sur de faux sites d’information locale - EU, Canada and Lithuania pull out of disinformation conference after US pressure

English translation

It depends on the definition one adopts and what is meant by "threat." The question is open and politically highly contested, including this week.

The EU's official position

• The latest EEAS report (March 2026) designates Russia and China as "threat actors," without any negative reference to the United States.
• The report records 540 incidents in 2025, with Ukraine as the primary target, followed by France, Moldova, and Germany.

The current controversy

• The #Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius (October 7–8) included a panel entitled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back."
• Shortly before the event, several public supporters withdrew: the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada, and the EEAS.
• According to Reuters, the U.S. State Department had pressured Canada and European allies on this matter.
• A U.S. cable, cited by the press, considers that this approach places the United States on the same level as "foreign adversaries like Russia and China," which constitutes a "false equivalence."
• The EEAS claims to have removed its logo because the chosen framing did not align with the Union's official positions. Yet, it continues to fund the event.

Arguments for viewing this as a form of interference

• According to an article in Le Grand Continent, during the Hungarian legislative elections of April 2026, Viktor Orbán received support from the Russian influence apparatus and explicit support from U.S. officials, including a visit by Vice President J.D. Vance to Budapest.
• A French magistrate claimed that U.S. officials had sought to exert pressure against the ineligibility of Marine Le Pen.
• An article in Telos reports that in Romania, the U.S. ambassador allegedly met with the opposition just before the government's vote of no confidence. This same text mentions statements made in Greece by the U.S. ambassador. These are accounts from analysts and the press that I have not been able to verify.

Arguments against, or for nuance

• The European concept of FIMI refers to intentional, deceptive, and coordinated manipulation, often clandestine. Diplomatic lobbying, public statements of support, or open political pressure fall rather under traditional interference or influence. This is not necessarily information manipulation.
• Washington is an ally, and the EU and the United States had agreed on a common standard for exchanging information on FIMI threats. The United States has since changed course.
• Russian operations (for example, the Copycop network, featuring nearly 150 fake local media outlets in France) and Chinese operations are documented, systematic, and clandestine. Their scale is not comparable to what is attributed to the United States.

My analysis

• The United States is not, at this stage, a "FIMI actor" within the meaning of the EU's technical framework. No clandestine U.S. apparatus comparable to those of Russia is documented as robustly.
• However, many researchers consider that they have become a source of political interference and pressure on European digital regulation policies. They also speak of the amplification of aligned political actors via platforms. This includes pressure on researchers and anti-disinformation organizations, such as visa ban threats targeting European figures.
• The Vilnius episode primarily shows that this subject has become a diplomatic issue. The EU hesitates to name its ally, whereas some experts consider that failing to do so amounts to self-censorship.

I can elaborate on a specific case (Hungary, Romania, DSA and X, etc.) if you wish.

Original text

Cela dépend de la définition qu'on retient et de ce qu'on met sous « menace ». La question est ouverte et politiquement très disputée, y compris cette semaine.

La position officielle de l'UE

• Le dernier rapport du SEAE (mars 2026) désigne la Russie et la Chine comme « acteurs de la menace », sans référence négative aux États-Unis.
• Le rapport recense 540 incidents en 2025, avec l'Ukraine comme cible principale, suivie de la France, de la Moldavie et de l'Allemagne.

La controverse actuelle

• La conférence #Disinfo2026 à Vilnius (7-8 octobre) comprenait un panel intitulé « USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back ».
• Peu avant l'événement, plusieurs soutiens publics se sont retirés : le ministère lituanien des Affaires étrangères, Affaires mondiales Canada et le SEAE.
• Selon Reuters, le Département d'État américain avait fait pression sur le Canada et des alliés européens à ce sujet.
• Un câble américain, cité par la presse, juge que cette approche met sur le même plan les États-Unis et des « adversaires étrangers comme la Russie et la Chine », ce qui constitue une « fausse équivalence ».
• Le SEAE affirme avoir retiré son logo parce que le cadrage choisi ne correspondait pas aux positions officielles de l'Union. Il continue pourtant de financer l'événement.

Les arguments pour y voir une forme d'ingérence

• Selon un article du Grand Continent, lors des législatives hongroises d'avril 2026, Viktor Orbán a reçu le soutien du dispositif d'influence russe et celui, explicite, de responsables américains, dont une visite du vice-président J.D. Vance à Budapest.
• Une magistrate française a affirmé que des responsables américains avaient cherché à faire pression contre l'inéligibilité de Marine Le Pen.
• Un article de Telos rapporte qu'en Roumanie, l'ambassadrice américaine aurait rencontré l'opposition juste avant le vote de censure du gouvernement. Ce même texte évoque des propos tenus en Grèce par l'ambassadrice américaine. Ce sont des récits d'analystes et de presse que je n'ai pas pu vérifier.

Les arguments contre, ou pour nuancer

• Le concept européen de FIMI désigne une manipulation intentionnelle, trompeuse et coordonnée, souvent clandestine. Du lobbying diplomatique, des déclarations publiques de soutien ou des pressions politiques ouvertes relèvent plutôt de l'ingérence ou de l'influence classique. Ce n'est pas forcément de la manipulation de l'information.
• Washington est un allié, et l'UE et les États-Unis avaient convenu d'un standard commun d'échange d'informations sur les menaces FIMI. Les États-Unis ont depuis changé de cap.
• Les opérations russes (par exemple le réseau Copycop, avec près de 150 faux médias locaux en France) et chinoises sont documentées, systématiques et clandestines. Leur ampleur n'est pas comparable avec ce qu'on reproche aux États-Unis.

Mon analyse

• Les États-Unis ne sont pas, à ce stade, un « acteur FIMI » au sens du cadre technique de l'UE. Aucun dispositif clandestin américain comparable à ceux de la Russie n'est documenté de façon aussi robuste.
• Beaucoup de chercheurs jugent cependant qu'ils sont devenus une source d'ingérence politique et de pression sur les politiques européennes de régulation du numérique. Ils parlent aussi de l'amplification d'acteurs politiques alignés via les plateformes. Cela inclut la pression sur les chercheurs et les organisations de lutte contre la désinformation, comme les menaces d'interdiction de visa visant des personnalités européennes.
• L'épisode de Vilnius montre surtout que ce sujet est devenu un enjeu diplomatique. L'UE hésite à nommer son allié, alors que certains experts estiment que ne pas le faire revient à de l'autocensure.

Je peux approfondir un cas précis (Hongrie, Roumanie, DSA et X, etc.) si vous voulez.

Lithuanian — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - US Lobbies Allies to Distance From EU Anti-Disinformation Conference - US Lobbies Allies to Distance From EU Anti-Disinformation Conference - US Lobbies Allies to Distance From EU Anti-Disinformation Conference - EU, Canada, and Lithuania Drop Official Sponsorship of #Disinfo2026 - Time News - US Lobbies Allies to Distance From EU Anti-Disinformation Conference - EEAS runs scared of US 'disinformation' debate - 4th EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats - EUvsDisinfo - 4th EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats - EUvsDisinfo - 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats - Canada drops sponsorship of conference that talks of U.S. as foreign-interference actor - The Globe and Mail

English translation

In short: this is a contentious issue, and officially the EU does not recognize it. This week it has turned into an open diplomatic conflict.

What is happening now - At the "#Disinfo2026" conference held in Vilnius, there was a panel discussion titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back." It raised the question of how the USA has become a FIMI threat to Europe. - Reuters writes that the US Department of State approached Canada and European allies, asking them to withdraw support for the conference. - It is reported that the EU, Canada, and Lithuania refused official sponsorship. Other sources describe the details somewhat differently. For example, it is mentioned that Canada adjusted its participation, while Lithuania withdrew completely because the conference did not align with its official position. - Some participants believe the withdrawals were related to the panel on the USA as a source of FIMI.

Official EU position - The latest EEAS report from March 2026 recorded 540 incidents worldwide. Of these, 35% were attributed to Russia (29%) and China (6%). - The USA is not mentioned among the attributed threat sources in the report's summary. However, a large portion of activity is difficult to attribute, so the report does not prove that other sources do not exist.

Arguments presented by supporters of this view The conference program mentions growing evidence that the USA has acted as a FIMI actor in certain Arctic contexts. From my own knowledge, I would add that frequent mentions are also made of US administration pressure regarding EU digital rules, political support for certain European parties, and visa restrictions on EU officials involved in content moderation. I have not verified these cases in search results, so evaluate them with caution.

Counterarguments - The US government considers such a qualification to be politically motivated. Washington presents this pressure as defending its own position. - Open political influence, diplomatic pressure, or public opinions of official figures differ from the covert, coordinated manipulation defined by the concept of FIMI. Whether these actions fall under the definition of FIMI is the main point of dispute. - The concept of FIMI itself was created by the EU, and the USA had adopted it. Now it is becoming an object of political disputes.

Conclusion According to EU documents, Russia and China remain the primary FIMI threats. Whether the USA can be considered such a threat depends on how you define FIMI and whether you consider open political pressure to be manipulation. Currently, this is a contentious political and analytical issue, rather than an established EU position.

Original text

Trumpai: tai ginčytinas klausimas, o oficialiai ES to nepripažįsta. Šią savaitę jis tapo atviru diplomatiniu konfliktu.

Kas vyksta dabar - Vilniuje vykusioje konferencijoje „#Disinfo2026“ buvo diskusija pavadinimu „USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back“. Joje buvo keliamas klausimas, kaip JAV tapo FIMI grėsme Europai. - Reuters rašo, kad JAV Valstybės departamentas kreipėsi į Kanadą ir Europos sąjungininkes, prašydamas atsiimti paramą konferencijai. - Pranešama, kad ES, Kanada ir Lietuva atsisakė oficialaus rėmimo. Kiti šaltiniai smulkmenas apibūdina kiek kitaip. Pavyzdžiui, minima, kad Kanada pakoregavo savo dalyvavimą, o Lietuva visiškai pasitraukė, nes konferencija nesutapo su oficialia jos pozicija. - Dalis dalyvių mano, kad pasitraukimai buvo susiję su panele apie JAV kaip FIMI šaltinį.

Oficiali ES pozicija - Naujausioje 2026 m. kovo EEAS ataskaitoje užfiksuoti 540 incidentų visame pasaulyje. Iš jų 35 % priskirta Rusijai (29 %) ir Kinijai (6 %). - JAV tarp priskiriamų grėsmės šaltinių ataskaitos santraukoje nepaminėtos. Tačiau didelė veiklos dalis sunkiai atribuojama, todėl ataskaita neįrodo, kad kitų šaltinių nėra.

Argumentai, kuriuos pateikia šio požiūrio šalininkai Konferencijos programoje minimi augantys įrodymai, kad JAV tam tikrais Arkties kontekstais veikė kaip FIMI veikėja. Iš savo žinių pridurčiau, kad dažnai minimi ir JAV administracijos spaudimas dėl ES skaitmeninių taisyklių, politinė parama tam tikroms Europos partijoms ir vizų apribojimai ES pareigūnams, susijusiems su turinio moderavimu. Šių atvejų paieškos rezultatuose nepatikrinau, tad vertinkite juos atsargiai.

Kontrargumentai - JAV vyriausybė mano, kad tokia kvalifikacija yra politiškai motyvuota. Washingtonas šį spaudimą pateikia kaip savo pozicijos gynimą. - Atvira politinė įtaka, diplomatinis spaudimas ar viešos oficialių asmenų nuomonės skiriasi nuo paslėptos, koordinuotos manipuliacijos, kurią apibrėžia FIMI sąvoka. Ar šie veiksmai patenka į FIMI apibrėžimą, yra pagrindinis ginčo taškas. - Pati FIMI sąvoka sukurta ES, o JAV ją buvo perėmusi. Dabar ji tampa politinių ginčų objektu.

Išvada Rusija ir Kinija pagal ES dokumentus tebėra pagrindinės FIMI grėsmės. Ar JAV galima laikyti tokia grėsme, priklauso nuo to, kaip apibrėžiate FIMI, ir nuo to, ar atvirą politinį spaudimą laikote manipuliacija. Šiuo metu tai ginčytinas politinis ir analitinis klausimas, o ne nusistovėjusi ES pozicija.

Russian — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference - 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats - Lithuania, EU and Canada withdraw support for Vilnius disinfo conference under US pressure - LRT - Lithuania, EU and Canada withdraw support for Vilnius disinfo conference under US pressure - LRT - EU diplomatic arm under fire for bowing to US pressure over disinformation conference - State Department imposes sanctions on former EU official, disinformation group leaders for ‘censorship’ - State Department imposes sanctions on former EU official, disinformation group leaders for ‘censorship’ - EU, Canada and Lithuania pull out of disinformation conference after US pressure - Disinfo Update 09/09/2026 - EU, Canada, and Lithuania withdraw from disinformation conference following US pressure - U.S. bars Europeans it says pressured tech firms to censor American viewpoints online

English translation

Briefly: Officially, no. The EU does not name the US as a source of FIMI, but in Europe there is an increasing debate over whether the actions of the Trump administration fit this definition. This dispute has escalated right now.

Official EU Position - FIMI is defined as intentional, coordinated manipulative activity by foreign state or state-linked actors aimed at distorting the information environment and undermining trust, democratic processes, or security. - The 4th EEAS report (March 2026) analyzes 540 incidents from 2025. Among the incidents that were successfully attributed, 35% were linked to state actors: 29% to Russia and 6% to China. The US is not mentioned in this report.

What is Happening Now - At the #Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius (October 7–8), there was a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back." According to Politico, the State Department asked US embassies in several European countries and at the EU to express Washington's concern and find out whether governments agree with characterizing the US as a FIMI actor. - The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada, and the EEAS withdrew their support for the conference. France maintained its support. - Member of the European Parliament Tomas Tobé (EPP) stated that the EU should focus on the threat from Russia and other hostile actors. "Full stop," he added.

Arguments That the US Can Be Considered a Threat - In December 2025, the State Department imposed visa restrictions against five Europeans. Among them is Thierry Breton, the former European Commissioner involved in the Digital Services Act (DSA). This sparked protests from European officials, including the French President. - Pressure on the EU included public criticism, closed-door lobbying against EU laws, and visa restrictions for Europeans. - The pressure is also directed at counter-disinformation structures themselves. According to an investigation by MIT Technology Review, the Trump administration disbanded R/FIMI, the State Department unit that tracked foreign disinformation.

Arguments Against This Classification - Washington believes this comparison puts the US on the same level as Russia and China. According to the State Department's position, it obscures the scale of Russian and Chinese interference. - The US explains its actions as defending freedom of speech. State Department head Marco Rubio speaks of combating the "extraterritorial censorship" of American platforms. - There is also a methodological problem. FIMI specifically implies manipulative, covert behavior, such as fake accounts, bots, and hidden funding. Public criticism, lobbying, and visa policy are open and legal, even if they may be hostile. Many experts therefore call them diplomatic or political pressure rather than FIMI. Others object that open interference, for example through amplifying certain narratives or supporting specific political forces, also harms democratic processes.

Conclusion: According to the criteria adopted in the EU, the US is not yet classified among the main FIMI actors (Russia, China), and official documents do not classify them as such. However, some European researchers believe that Washington's pressure on European regulation and civil society must be taken into account as a threat to information integrity. Therefore, the issue remains politically controversial. The reaction to the Vilnius conference shows that the EU is not yet ready to openly use this term with respect to an ally.

Original text

Коротко: официально нет. ЕС не называет США источником FIMI, но в Европе всё чаще спорят, подходят ли действия администрации Трампа под это определение. Этот спор обострился прямо сейчас.

Официальная позиция ЕС - FIMI определяется как преднамеренная, скоординированная манипулятивная деятельность иностранных государственных или связанных с государством акторов, направленная на искажение информационной среды и подрыв доверия, демократических процессов или безопасности. - В четвёртом докладе ЕСВД (март 2026) разобраны 540 инцидентов 2025 года. Среди инцидентов, которые удалось атрибутировать, 35% были связаны с государственными акторами: 29% с Россией и 6% с Китаем. США в этом докладе не упоминаются.

Что происходит сейчас - На конференции #Disinfo2026 в Вильнюсе (7–8 октября) была панель «USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back». По данным Politico, Госдеп попросил посольства США в ряде европейских стран и в ЕС выразить обеспокоенность Вашингтона и выяснить, согласны ли правительства с характеристикой США как FIMI-актора. - Министерство иностранных дел Литвы, Канада и ЕСВД сняли поддержку конференции. Во Франции поддержку сохранили. - Депутат Европарламента Томас Тобе (EPP) заявил, что ЕС должен сосредоточиться на угрозе от России и других враждебных акторов. «Full stop», добавил он.

Аргументы за то, что США можно считать угрозой - В декабре 2025 года Госдеп ввёл визовые ограничения против пяти европейцев. Среди них Тьерри Бретон, бывший еврокомиссар, причастный к Закону о цифровых услугах (DSA). Это вызвало протесты европейских официальных лиц, в том числе президента Франции. - Давление на ЕС включало публичную критику, закрытое лоббирование против законов ЕС и визовые ограничения для европейцев. - Давление направлено и на сами контрдезинформационные структуры. По расследованию MIT Technology Review, администрация Трампа расформировала R/FIMI, подразделение Госдепа, отслеживавшее иностранную дезинформацию.

Аргументы против такой классификации - Вашингтон считает, что это сравнение ставит США в один ряд с Россией и Китаем. По позиции Госдепа, оно затушёвывает масштаб вмешательства России и Китая. - США объясняют свои действия защитой свободы слова. Руководитель Госдепа Марко Рубио говорит о борьбе с «экстерриториальной цензурой» американских платформ. - Есть и методологическая проблема. FIMI подразумевает именно манипулятивное, скрытое поведение, например фейковые аккаунты, боты и скрытое финансирование. Публичная критика, лоббирование и визовая политика открыты и легальны, хотя и могут быть враждебными. Многие эксперты поэтому называют их дипломатическим или политическим давлением, а не FIMI. Другие возражают, что и открытое вмешательство, например через усиление определённых нарративов или поддержку отдельных политических сил, вредит демократическим процессам.

Итог: по принятым в ЕС критериям США пока не относятся к основным FIMI-акторам (Россия, Китай), и официальные документы так их не классифицируют. Но часть европейских исследователей считает, что давление Вашингтона на европейское регулирование и гражданское общество нужно учитывать как угрозу информационной целостности. Поэтому вопрос остаётся политически спорным. Реакция на вильнюсскую конференцию показывает, что ЕС пока не готов открыто использовать этот термин применительно к союзнику.

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English translation

Short answer

Officially, no — but the question has become one of the most contested and diplomatically explosive issues in the European disinformation field. The EU's formal threat assessments still name Russia (primary) and China, plus Belarus, Iran and North Korea. Yet since 2025 a growing number of researchers, civil-society groups and some officials argue the US under the Trump administration now meets the definition of a FIMI actor — and the mere act of asking the question triggered a transatlantic incident in October 2026.

The official position: the US is a partner, not a threat

FIMI ("foreign information manipulation and interference") is EU jargon, and the EU's institutional machinery has historically treated Washington as an ally against it:

• The EEAS–US Trade and Technology Council produced a common methodology for identifying and countering FIMI, with shared standards (DISARM, STIX, OpenCTI) and a joint US–EU Coordination Mechanism on the Western Balkans aimed at Russian and Chinese operations.
• The EEAS's 3rd FIMI Threat Report (March 2025) and its 2024/2025 activity reports name Russia and China as the threat actors, with no negative reference to the United States.
• The European Parliament's Democracy Shield report (adopted 23 June 2026) identifies Russia as the primary external hybrid threat, with Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea also active. It does not label the US a FIMI threat — though it does call for reducing reliance on US tech companies in critical sectors.

Why the debate has emerged

Several developments since early 2025 have pushed the question into the open:

• JD Vance's Munich Security Conference speech (Feb 2025) — he told Europeans the threat he worried about most was "from within," dismissed Russian election interference as overblown ("ugly Soviet-era words"), and defended Romania's annulled election. This reframed the US as a critic of, rather than partner in, European information governance.
• Pressure over digital regulation — US officials have portrayed the Digital Services Act as censorship of American companies; the DOJ sought to join Elon Musk's challenge to a €120m DSA fine on X, and former commissioner Thierry Breton was barred from the US.
• Alleged political intervention — the Trump administration and allies have funded European groups aligned with Washington on free speech, and Politico reported Washington excluded French applicants from certain funding until after the 2027 French elections to avoid the appearance of interference.
• Academic framing — analysts describe an "informational security dilemma," in which a formal ally "weaponizes informational dependencies against its partners' domestic political systems."

The Vilnius flashpoint (October 2026)

The question crystallised at EU DisinfoLab's #Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius (7–8 October 2026), which included a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back" — billed as "one of the most uncomfortable questions in the counter-disinformation field today."

• The US State Department lobbied Lithuania, Canada and France; American diplomats persuaded the Lithuanian and Canadian foreign ministries to distance themselves.
• The EEAS also removed its logo, saying the framing "does not align with the official positions held by the EU" — while still funding the event and presenting its research.
• France remained the only government sponsor, reaffirming support for civil society's counter-disinformation work.
• The State Department said it "should not be a surprise that countries would disaffiliate" once the US was "labelled a disinformation threat," calling such language something that "undermines shared goals."

Bottom line

There is no formal EU designation of the United States as a FIMI threat, and the EU's official reports continue to point at Russia and China. But the analytical case is now openly made by parts of the counter-disinformation community, and the political sensitivity is so high that even discussing it prompted US diplomatic pressure and the withdrawal of EU, Canadian and Lithuanian sponsorship from a civil-society conference. So the honest answer is: not officially, but increasingly argued — and the argument itself has become a test of how far Europe can criticise its own security guarantor.

Original text

Short answer

Officially, no — but the question has become one of the most contested and diplomatically explosive issues in the European disinformation field. The EU's formal threat assessments still name Russia (primary) and China, plus Belarus, Iran and North Korea. Yet since 2025 a growing number of researchers, civil-society groups and some officials argue the US under the Trump administration now meets the definition of a FIMI actor — and the mere act of asking the question triggered a transatlantic incident in October 2026.

The official position: the US is a partner, not a threat

FIMI ("foreign information manipulation and interference") is EU jargon, and the EU's institutional machinery has historically treated Washington as an ally against it:

• The EEAS–US Trade and Technology Council produced a common methodology for identifying and countering FIMI, with shared standards (DISARM, STIX, OpenCTI) and a joint US–EU Coordination Mechanism on the Western Balkans aimed at Russian and Chinese operations.
• The EEAS's 3rd FIMI Threat Report (March 2025) and its 2024/2025 activity reports name Russia and China as the threat actors, with no negative reference to the United States.
• The European Parliament's Democracy Shield report (adopted 23 June 2026) identifies Russia as the primary external hybrid threat, with Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea also active. It does not label the US a FIMI threat — though it does call for reducing reliance on US tech companies in critical sectors.

Why the debate has emerged

Several developments since early 2025 have pushed the question into the open:

• JD Vance's Munich Security Conference speech (Feb 2025) — he told Europeans the threat he worried about most was "from within," dismissed Russian election interference as overblown ("ugly Soviet-era words"), and defended Romania's annulled election. This reframed the US as a critic of, rather than partner in, European information governance.
• Pressure over digital regulation — US officials have portrayed the Digital Services Act as censorship of American companies; the DOJ sought to join Elon Musk's challenge to a €120m DSA fine on X, and former commissioner Thierry Breton was barred from the US.
• Alleged political intervention — the Trump administration and allies have funded European groups aligned with Washington on free speech, and Politico reported Washington excluded French applicants from certain funding until after the 2027 French elections to avoid the appearance of interference.
• Academic framing — analysts describe an "informational security dilemma," in which a formal ally "weaponizes informational dependencies against its partners' domestic political systems."

The Vilnius flashpoint (October 2026)

The question crystallised at EU DisinfoLab's #Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius (7–8 October 2026), which included a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back" — billed as "one of the most uncomfortable questions in the counter-disinformation field today."

• The US State Department lobbied Lithuania, Canada and France; American diplomats persuaded the Lithuanian and Canadian foreign ministries to distance themselves.
• The EEAS also removed its logo, saying the framing "does not align with the official positions held by the EU" — while still funding the event and presenting its research.
• France remained the only government sponsor, reaffirming support for civil society's counter-disinformation work.
• The State Department said it "should not be a surprise that countries would disaffiliate" once the US was "labelled a disinformation threat," calling such language something that "undermines shared goals."

Bottom line

There is no formal EU designation of the United States as a FIMI threat, and the EU's official reports continue to point at Russia and China. But the analytical case is now openly made by parts of the counter-disinformation community, and the political sensitivity is so high that even discussing it prompted US diplomatic pressure and the withdrawal of EU, Canadian and Lithuanian sponsorship from a civil-society conference. So the honest answer is: not officially, but increasingly argued — and the argument itself has become a test of how far Europe can criticise its own security guarantor.

French — answer round 1

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English translation

Short Answer

Officially, no: the EU does not designate the United States as a FIMI actor. Its official reports continue to identify Russia (the primary threat) and China. However, since 2025, the issue has become a real debate, and a growing portion of researchers, NGOs, and certain member states consider that certain American actions correspond, in substance, to FIMI criteria. The EU refuses to state this explicitly for the time being—which in itself is politically revealing.

1. What the EU's Official Framework Says

FIMI is defined by the EEAS as manipulative, intentional, and coordinated behavior carried out by state or non-state actors (or their proxies), aimed at distorting the information space and harming democratic processes (EEAS definition).

Yet, in the EEAS's annual reports:

• 3rd report (March 2025): Russia and China are the identified actors, with 505 incidents, 38,000 channels, and 90 targeted countries (report).
• 4th report (March 2026): 540 incidents in 2025, 35% attributed to Russia (29%) and China (6%). The United States does not appear as an actor, but rather as a target (51 incidents targeting them) (report).

Until 2024, the United States was even a partner of the EU on this file: shared FIMI methodology (DISARM/STIX/OpenCTI), cooperation within the Trade and Technology Council, G7 rapid response mechanism (EU–USA document).

2. What Has Changed Since 2025

Several events have fueled the thesis of an "American problem":

A revealing detail: the guidelines of the American grant program explicitly ask applicants to "avoid validating accusations of US interference" in European domestic politics—a sign that Washington knows the qualification is plausible.

3. The Incident That Put Everything on the Table: Disinfo2026

In October 2026, the annual EU DisinfoLab conference in Vilnius featured a panel entitled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back". Result:

• The EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew their support following lobbying by the US State Department (Reuters/Politico, EUobserver).
• The EEAS justified its withdrawal by stating that the framing "does not correspond to the EU's official positions" (Rapporteur).
• France remained the only major public supporter.

In other words: the EU is ready to talk about foreign interference... as long as it does not involve the United States.

4. What European Institutions Are Saying

• The report of the Parliament's special committee on the European Democracy Shield (adopted on June 23, 2026, plenary on September 15, 2026) identifies Russia as the primary threat, followed by Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea. The United States is not listed as a FIMI actor—but the text calls for reducing dependence on American technologies in critical sectors (EP Press Release, EPRS).
• Think tanks like the ECFR write that "Russia and other states, including some of Europe's partners, are now targeting the continent" and that "Trump’s America has become openly hostile to Europe" (ECFR).

5. So, Yes or No?

On a conceptual level, several recent American practices check the boxes of the FIMI definition: intentionality, coordination, funding of foreign media/NGOs, pressure on electoral processes, and the instrumentalization of platforms. Researchers and officials from several member states are saying this openly.

However, three obstacles prevent an official qualification:

1. The advocacy vs. manipulation distinction. Vance has an argument: "expressing an opinion is not electoral interference, even from abroad." International law and the FIMI definition leave a gray area between aggressive public diplomacy and manipulation.
2. The alliance asymmetry. The United States is a NATO ally, a trade partner, and an essential player in European security. Designating them as a "FIMI threat" would carry an enormous diplomatic cost.
3. The double standards risk. The FIMI framework was built around Russia and China; applying it to an ally would expose the political dimension of the concept—and the Vilnius incident shows that the EU prefers to avoid the subject.

In summary: de jure, no—the EU does not classify the United States as a FIMI actor. De facto, a significant part of the European counter-disinformation community considers that it is, at least in certain contexts (funding of European political actors, pressure on elections and regulators, relaying via American platforms). The question remains open, and it has become a test of the credibility of the European FIMI framework itself.

Original text

Réponse courte

Officiellement, non : l'UE ne désigne pas les États-Unis comme un acteur de FIMI. Ses rapports officiels continuent d'identifier la Russie (menace principale) et la Chine. Mais depuis 2025, la question est devenue un vrai débat, et une partie croissante des chercheurs, des ONG et de certains États membres considèrent que certaines actions américaines correspondent, sur le fond, aux critères de la FIMI. L'UE refuse pour l'instant de le dire explicitement — ce qui est en soi un révélateur politique.

1. Ce que dit le cadre officiel de l'UE

La FIMI est définie par le SEAE comme un comportement manipulatoire, intentionnel et coordonné, mené par des acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques (ou leurs proxys), visant à fausser l'espace informationnel et à nuire aux processus démocratiques (définition SEAE).

Or, dans les rapports annuels du SEAE :

• 3ᵉ rapport (mars 2025) : la Russie et la Chine sont les acteurs identifiés, avec 505 incidents, 38 000 canaux, 90 pays ciblés (rapport).
• 4ᵉ rapport (mars 2026) : 540 incidents en 2025, 35 % attribués à la Russie (29 %) et à la Chine (6 %). Les États-Unis n'y figurent pas comme acteur, mais comme cible (51 incidents les visant) (rapport).

Jusqu'en 2024, les États-Unis étaient même partenaires de l'UE sur ce dossier : méthodologie commune FIMI (DISARM/STIX/OpenCTI), coopération au sein du Conseil du commerce et des technologies, mécanisme de réponse rapide du G7 (document UE–USA).

2. Ce qui a changé depuis 2025

Plusieurs faits ont nourri la thèse d'un « problème américain » :

Détail révélateur : les lignes directrices du programme de subventions américain demandent explicitement aux candidats d'« éviter de valider les accusations d'ingérence américaine » dans les politiques intérieures européennes — signe que Washington sait que la qualification est plausible.

3. L'incident qui a tout mis sur la table : Disinfo2026

En octobre 2026, la conférence annuelle d'EU DisinfoLab à Vilnius comportait un panel intitulé « USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back ». Résultat :

• Le SEAE, la Lituanie et le Canada ont retiré leur soutien après un lobbying du Département d'État américain (Reuters/Politico, EUobserver).
• Le SEAE a justifié son retrait en disant que le cadrage « ne correspond pas aux positions officielles de l'UE » (Rapporteur).
• La France est restée le seul soutien public majeur.

Autrement dit : l'UE est prête à parler d'ingérence étrangère… tant qu'il ne s'agit pas des États-Unis.

4. Ce que disent les institutions européennes

• Le rapport de la commission spéciale du Parlement sur le Bouclier démocratique européen (adopté le 23 juin 2026, plénière le 15 septembre 2026) identifie la Russie comme menace principale, puis la Biélorussie, la Chine, l'Iran et la Corée du Nord. Les États-Unis n'y sont pas listés comme acteur FIMI — mais le texte appelle à réduire la dépendance aux technologies américaines dans les secteurs critiques (Communiqué PE, EPRS).
• Des think tanks comme l'ECFR écrivent que « la Russie et d'autres États, y compris certains partenaires de l'Europe, visent désormais le continent » et que « l'Amérique de Trump est devenue ouvertement hostile à l'Europe » (ECFR).

5. Alors, oui ou non ?

Sur le plan conceptuel, plusieurs pratiques américaines récentes cochent les cases de la définition FIMI : intentionnalité, coordination, financement de médias/ONG étrangers, pression sur des processus électoraux, instrumentalisation de plateformes. Des chercheurs et des responsables de plusieurs États membres le disent ouvertement.

Mais trois obstacles empêchent une qualification officielle :

1. La distinction plaidoyer / manipulation. Vance a un argument : « exprimer une opinion n'est pas une ingérence électorale, même depuis l'étranger ». Le droit international et la définition FIMI laissent une zone grise entre diplomatie publique agressive et manipulation.
2. L'asymétrie d'alliance. Les États-Unis sont un allié de l'OTAN, un partenaire commercial et un acteur incontournable de la sécurité européenne. Les désigner comme « menace FIMI » aurait un coût diplomatique énorme.
3. Le risque de deux poids, deux mesures. Le cadre FIMI a été construit autour de la Russie et de la Chine ; l'appliquer à un allié exposerait la dimension politique du concept — et l'incident de Vilnius montre que l'UE préfère éviter le sujet.

En résumé : de jure, non — l'UE ne classe pas les États-Unis comme acteur FIMI. De facto, une partie significative de la communauté européenne de lutte contre la désinformation considère que oui, au moins dans certains contextes (financement d'acteurs politiques européens, pression sur les élections et les régulateurs, relais via les plateformes américaines). La question reste ouverte, et elle est devenue un test de la crédibilité du cadre FIMI européen lui-même.

Lithuanian — answer round 1

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English translation

Short Answer

Officially – no. In EU institutional documents, the United States is not designated as a FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) threat. In official EU assessments, the primary sources of FIMI are identified as Russia and China (and in the context of hybrid threats, also Belarus, Iran, and North Korea). However, in 2025–2026, this issue became one of the most sensitive and openly debated transatlantic disputes, and a portion of researchers, civil society, and some member states increasingly argue that the actions of the US government essentially fit the definition of FIMI.

What Official EU Documents Say

• EEAS 4th FIMI Threats Report (March 2026): out of all documented incidents, 35% are attributed to Russia (29%) and China (6%). Russia is designated as the main threat, while the US is not mentioned as a FIMI actor.
• European Parliament Special Committee "European Democracy Shield" (EUDS) Report (adopted in June 2026, approved by the EP in September): "Russia – the main external hybrid threat," also indicating Belarus, China, Iran, North Korea. The US is not specified as a FIMI source – although the report calls for reducing dependence on US technology companies in critical areas.
• Speech by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas at the 2026 FIMI Conference: "We are mostly looking at Russia- and China-backed interference, because those are our own challenges. But the same method can be applied to threats from any country." She also drew attention to "the huge gap left by the United States" – the US State Department halted the vast majority of anti-disinformation work, which slowed down G7 and NATO efforts.

Thus, the EU officially treats the US not as a threat, but as a partner (at least historically – the EU and the US even created a joint FIMI methodology and exchanged intelligence within the 2023–2024 Trade and Technology Council).

Why the Question "Is the US a FIMI Threat?" Arises Nonetheless

Since 2025, a number of facts have accumulated that researchers consider to meet the definition of FIMI:

1. US government funding for groups in Europe close to the MAGA ideology. The State Department program offers $1–3 million grants to organizations pursuing the goals of "national sovereignty, migration, censorship, and lawfare." German Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly warned the US in July 2026 not to interfere in German elections. French groups were dropped from the program out of fear that it would be labeled as interference ahead of the 2027 presidential election.
2. Direct political interference in elections. Vice President J. D. Vance traveled to Budapest in April 2026 to support Viktor Orbán ahead of the elections, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio had previously publicly supported him. The US 2025 National Security Strategy states that Europe is facing "civilizational erasure."
3. The platform dimension. In December 2025, the EU fined "X" 120 million euros under the Digital Services Act (DSA) over "misleading" blue checkmark design, advertising transparency, and researcher access. The US Department of Justice intervened in the legal process supporting Musk and accusing the EU of "regulatory overreach." Musk publicly supported the German AfD and other right-wing forces ahead of the elections.
4. Diplomatic pressure regarding the term itself. The #Disinfo2026 conference held in Vilnius in October 2026 had scheduled a panel titled "US as a FIMI threat: recognize, adapt, resist." The US State Department exerted pressure on Lithuania, Canada, and France to withdraw support for the event. The Lithuanian MFA and Global Affairs Canada backed down, and the EEAS removed its logo, stating that "the organizers chose to formulate the discussions in a way that does not align with official EU positions." France remained the only major sponsor.

Why the EU Avoids Calling the US a FIMI Actor

• Alliance and trade interests. The US is a NATO ally and the largest trading partner; officially designating it an "enemy" would have major diplomatic and economic consequences.
• Legal and political sensitivity. The FIMI concept was created by the EU primarily to describe Russia and China; applying it to an ally would mean that the EU would have to apply sanctions or other "deterrence" measures against the US.
• US pressure. The Vilnius incident showed that Washington actively opposes any attempt to classify it among FIMI actors.

Conclusion

Legally and officially – the US is not designated as a FIMI threat to Europe. In EU documents, Russia and China remain the primary threats, and the US remains a partner (albeit an increasingly unreliable one).

However, practically and analytically – this is an open, unresolved, and increasingly sharp issue. A significant portion of the anti-disinformation community, researchers, and some member states (e.g., France) believe that actions supported by the US government – political interference in elections, funding of MAGA groups, the use of platforms for political purposes – essentially meet the definition of FIMI. EU institutions are deliberately avoiding this designation for now, but the Vilnius conference scandal showed that this "uncomfortable topic" is no longer marginal – it has become a central issue in transatlantic relations.

Original text

Trumpa atsakymas

Oficialiai – ne. ES institucijų dokumentuose Jungtinės Valstijos nėra įvardijamos kaip FIMI (užsienio informacijos manipuliavimo ir kišimosi) grėsmė. Oficialiuose ES vertinimuose pagrindiniais FIMI šaltiniais įvardijami Rusija ir Kinija (o hibridinių grėsmių kontekste – dar Baltarusija, Iranas, Šiaurės Korėja). Tačiau 2025–2026 m. šis klausimas tapo vienu jautriausių ir atviriausiai diskutuojamų transatlantinių ginčų, ir dalis tyrėjų, pilietinės visuomenės bei kai kurių valstybių narių vis dažniau teigia, kad JAV vyriausybės veiksmai iš esmės atitinka FIMI apibrėžimą.

Ką sako oficialūs ES dokumentai

• EEAS 4-asis FIMI grėsmių reportas (2026 m. kovas): iš visų dokumentuotų incidentų 35 % priskirta Rusijai (29 %) ir Kinijai (6 %). Rusija įvardijama kaip pagrindinė grėsmė, o JAV neminima kaip FIMI veikėja.
• Europos Parlamento specialiojo komiteto „Europos demokratijos skydas“ (EUDS) ataskaita (priimta 2026 m. birželį, EP patvirtinta rugsėjį): „Rusija – pagrindinė išorinė hibridinė grėsmė“, taip pat nurodomos Baltarusija, Kinija, Iranas, Šiaurės Korėja. JAV kaip FIMI šaltinis nenurodoma – nors ataskaitoje raginama mažinti priklausomybę nuo JAV technologijų kompanijų kritinėse srityse.
• ES vyriausiosios įgaliotinės Kaja Kallas kalba 2026 m. FIMI konferencijoje: „Mes daugiausia žiūrime į Rusijos ir Kinijos remiamą kišimąsi, nes tai – mūsų pačių iššūkiai. Bet tas pats metodas gali būti taikomas grėsmėms iš bet kurios šalies.“ Ji taip pat atkreipė dėmesį į „didžiulę spragą, kurią paliko Jungtinės Valstijos“ – JAV Valstybės departamentas sustabdė didžiąją dalį kovos su dezinformacija darbo, o tai sulėtino G7 ir NATO pastangas.

Taigi ES oficialiai JAV traktuoja ne kaip grėsmę, o kaip partnerę (bent jau istoriškai – ES ir JAV 2023–2024 m. Prekybos ir technologijų taryboje net sukūrė bendrą FIMI metodiką ir keitėsi žvalgybine informacija).

Kodėl vis dėlto kyla klausimas „ar JAV – FIMI grėsmė?“

Nuo 2025 m. susikaupė nemažai faktų, kuriuos tyrėjai laiko atitinkančiais FIMI apibrėžimą:

1. JAV vyriausybės finansavimas MAGA ideologijai artimoms grupėms Europoje. Valstybės departamento programa siūlo 1–3 mln. USD dotacijas organizacijoms, siekiančioms „nacionalinio suvereniteto, migracijos, cenzūros ir lawfare“ tikslų. Vokietijos kancleris Friedrichas Merzas 2026 m. liepą viešai perspėjo JAV nesikišti į Vokietijos rinkimus. Prancūzų grupės iš programos buvo išbrauktos dėl baimės, kad tai bus pavadinta kišimusi prieš 2027 m. prezidento rinkimus.
2. Tiesioginis politinis kišimasis į rinkimus. Viceprezidentas J. D. Vance'as 2026 m. balandį vyko į Budapeštą paremti Viktoro Orbáno prieš rinkimus, o valstybės sekretorius Marco Rubio anksčiau viešai jį palaikė. JAV 2025 m. Nacionalinė saugumo strategija teigia, kad Europai gresia „civilizacinė išnykimas“.
3. Platformų dimensija. ES 2025 m. gruodį skyrė „X“ 120 mln. eurų baudą pagal Skaitmeninių paslaugų aktą (DSA) dėl „klaidinančio“ mėlynojo varnelės dizaino, reklamos skaidrumo ir tyrėjų prieigos. JAV Teisingumo departamentas įsikišo į teisminį procesą palaikydamas Muską ir kaltindamas ES „reguliavimo peržengimu“. Muskas viešai rėmė Vokietijos AfD ir kitas dešiniąsias jėgas prieš rinkimus.
4. Diplomatinis spaudimas dėl paties termino. 2026 m. spalį Vilniuje vykusioje #Disinfo2026 konferencijoje buvo numatyta panelė „JAV kaip FIMI grėsmė: pripažinti, prisitaikyti, atsispirti“. JAV Valstybės departamentas darė spaudimą Lietuvai, Kanadai ir Prancūzijai atsisakyti paramos renginiui. Lietuvos URM ir „Global Affairs Canada“ atsitraukė, o EEAS pašalino savo logotipą, teigdamas, kad „organizatoriai pasirinko diskusijas formuluoti taip, kad jos neatitinka oficialių ES pozicijų“. Prancūzija liko vienintelė pagrindinė rėmėja.

Kodėl ES vengia JAV vadinti FIMI veikėja

• Aljanso ir prekybos interesai. JAV – NATO sąjungininkė ir didžiausia prekybos partnerė; oficialus „priešo“ įvardijimas turėtų didelių diplomatinių ir ekonominių pasekmių.
• Teisinis ir politinis jautrumas. FIMI sąvoka ES sukurta pirmiausia Rusijai ir Kinijai apibūdinti; jos taikymas sąjungininkei reikštų, kad ES turėtų taikyti sankcijas ar kitas „atgrasymo“ priemones prieš JAV.
• JAV spaudimas. Vilniaus incidentas parodė, kad Vašingtonas aktyviai priešinasi bet kokiam bandymui jį priskirti prie FIMI veikėjų.

Išvada

Teisiškai ir oficialiai – JAV nėra įvardijama kaip FIMI grėsmė Europai. ES dokumentuose pagrindinėmis grėsmėmis lieka Rusija ir Kinija, o JAV – partnerė (nors ir vis labiau nepatikima).

Tačiau praktiškai ir analitiškai – tai atviras, neišspręstas ir vis aštresnis klausimas. Nemaža dalis kovos su dezinformacija bendruomenės, tyrėjų ir kai kurių valstybių narių (pvz., Prancūzijos) mano, kad JAV vyriausybės remiami veiksmai – politinis kišimasis į rinkimus, MAGA grupių finansavimas, platformų naudojimas politiniams tikslams – iš esmės atitinka FIMI apibrėžimą. ES institucijos kol kas sąmoningai vengia šio įvardijimo, tačiau Vilniaus konferencijos skandalas parodė, kad ši „nepatogi tema“ nebėra marginalinė – ji tapo centriniu transatlantinių santykių klausimu.

Russian — answer round 1

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English translation

Short Answer

Formally — no. Politically — increasingly yes, but with caveats.

The EU's official framework for countering FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) still describes the threat as originating from Russia and China, while the United States figures as a partner rather than a threat actor. However, since 2025, actions by the US administration, Elon Musk, and US platforms have increasingly been qualified in European political and expert discourse as interference in Europe's internal affairs — with several EU officials effectively hinting at this without naming the US directly.

1. Official EU Position: The US is Not a FIMI Actor

• EEAS Reports on FIMI Threats. The 3rd report (March 2025, data for 2024) and the 4th report (data for 2025) describe the threat as originating from "authoritarian regimes, primarily Russia and China." In the 4th report: 540 incidents, 35% attributed — Russia (29%) and China (6%). The US is not on the list of actors. (EEAS, 3rd Report, EEAS, 4th Report)
• The US as a Partner. The EU and the US jointly developed a common methodology for FIMI analysis (DISARM/STIX/OpenCTI) within the framework of the Trade and Technology Council, and issued a joint statement (April 2024) on FIMI risks. (EEAS)
• Kaja Kallas's Formulation (2026). "We are looking primarily at Russia- and China-backed interference, because these are our own challenges. But the same approach can be applied to threats originating from any country." This is more of a hint than an accusation. (EEAS)
• In the 4th report, the US appears not as an actor, but as a topic exploited by Russian FIMI campaigns ("transatlantic relations" being one of the exploited narratives).

2. What Changed in 2025: The "Grey Zone"

A number of US actions began to be described by European politicians and analysts as interference:

Commissioner for Democracy Michael McGrath’s formulation is telling: Russia is "not the only actor" that has an "interest" in influencing elections; Politico directly concludes: "Trump's America must now be counted among them." (Politico)

3. Does This Fit the Definition of FIMI?

The EU definition requires: a foreign state actor (or its proxy), intentional manipulative activity, with the goal to mislead, harm, and destabilize.

Arguments "for": - US officials openly campaign for specific European parties and against incumbent governments. - The National Security Strategy explicitly formulates the goal of influencing Europe's internal political trajectory — this is intentional impact. - Visa sanctions against European regulators — coercive pressure on sovereign EU decisions. - Algorithmic amplification of content by a platform owner (X) — manipulation of the information environment.

Arguments "against": - Actions are open, not covert: classical FIMI is built on clandestine networks, fake media, "doppelgangers" — the US has not been found to have such an infrastructural arsenal in Europe. - The US is a NATO ally, not an "authoritarian regime"; the FIMI concept in the EU was originally designed with Russia and China in mind. - Much of the US rhetoric is presented as a defense of freedom of speech rather than disinformation. - The EU institutionally avoids naming the US so as not to destroy the alliance framework.

It is more accurate to say that this is about "foreign interference" in a broad sense and the problem of platform governance, rather than classical FIMI in a narrow sense. Although individual elements (algorithmic boosting, unlabeled state-linked content, AI generation) may fall under FIMI criteria.

4. How the EU is Responding

• European Democracy Shield (Nov. 12, 2025) and the European Centre for Democratic Resilience — directly aimed at FIMI and disinformation, but the wording is neutral ("threats from any country"). (EC)
• DSA enforcement against American platforms (X, Meta, TikTok).
• Fact-checkers network, Rapid Alert System, expansion of the sanctions regime for hybrid actions.
• At the same time, EU analytical documents explicitly acknowledge a "strategic vulnerability": the EU information ecosystem relies on American and Chinese platforms, and the "increasingly confrontational rhetoric of the US administration" creates additional pressure. (EPRS)

Conclusion

• Legally/Officially: The US is not designated as a FIMI threat actor. EU institutions continue to describe FIMI as a Russian-Chinese threat, and the US as a partner (albeit an increasingly unreliable one).
• Politically and de facto: since 2025, a significant part of the European establishment and expert community views the actions of the US administration, Musk, and US platforms as a form of foreign interference in European politics. EU officials (McGrath, Kallas, Costa, von der Leyen) phrase this cautiously, but recognizably.
• Correct Formulation: Today, the US is not a recognized FIMI actor, but a recognized source of "foreign interference" and a growing risk factor for Europe's information sovereignty. This is a controversial and politically charged issue, and the answer depends on whether we apply a narrow definition of FIMI (covert manipulative networks) or a broad one (any external impact on democratic processes).

Original text

Короткий ответ

Формально — нет. Политически — всё больше да, но с оговорками.

Официальная архитектура ЕС по противодействию FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) по-прежнему описывает угрозу как исходящую от России и Китая, а США фигурируют как партнёр, а не как субъект угрозы. Однако с 2025 года в европейском политическом и экспертном дискурсе действия американской администрации, Илона Маска и американских платформ всё чаще квалифицируются как вмешательство во внутренние дела Европы — и некоторые официальные лица ЕС фактически намекают на это, не называя США прямо.

1. Официальная позиция ЕС: США — не субъект FIMI

• Доклады EEAS о угрозах FIMI. 3-й доклад (март 2025, данные за 2024) и 4-й доклад (данные за 2025) описывают угрозу как исходящую от «авторитарных режимов, прежде всего России и Китая». В 4-м докладе: 540 инцидентов, 35% атрибутированы — Россия (29%) и Китай (6%). США в списке акторов нет. (EEAS, 3-й доклад, EEAS, 4-й доклад)
• США как партнёр. ЕС и США совместно разработали общую методологию анализа FIMI (DISARM/STIX/OpenCTI) в рамках Совета по торговле и технологиям, выпустили совместное заявление (апрель 2024) о рисках FIMI. (EEAS)
• Формулировка Каи Каллас (2026). «Мы смотрим преимущественно на поддержанное Россией и Китаем вмешательство, потому что это наши собственные вызовы. Но тот же подход может быть применён к угрозам, исходящим из любой страны». Это скорее намёк, чем обвинение. (EEAS)
• В 4-м докладе США фигурируют не как актор, а как тема, которую эксплуатируют российские FIMI-кампании («трансатлантические отношения» — один из эксплуатируемых сюжетов).

2. Что изменилось в 2025 году: «серая зона»

Ряд действий США европейские политики и аналитики стали описывать как вмешательство:

Показательна формулировка комиссара по демократии Майкла Макграта: Россия — «не единственный актор», у которого есть «заинтересованность» влиять на выборы; Politico прямо заключает: «Америка Трампа теперь должна считаться среди них». (Politico)

3. Подходит ли это под определение FIMI?

Определение ЕС требует: иностранный государственный актор (или его прокси), намеренная манипулятивная деятельность, цель — ввести в заблуждение, нанести вред, дестабилизировать.

Аргументы «за»: - Американские официальные лица открыто агитируют за конкретные европейские партии и против действующих правительств. - Стратегия нацбезопасности прямо формулирует цель влиять на внутриполитическую траекторию Европы — это намеренное воздействие. - Визовые санкции против европейских регуляторов — принудительное давление на суверенные решения ЕС. - Алгоритмическое усиление контента владельцем платформы (X) — манипуляция информационной средой.

Аргументы «против»: - Действия открытые, а не скрытые: классическая FIMI строится на тайных сетях, фейковых СМИ, «доппельгангерах» — у США такого инфраструктурного арсенала в Европе не выявлено. - США — союзник по НАТО, а не «авторитарный режим»; концепция FIMI в ЕС изначально проектировалась под Россию и Китай. - Значительная часть риторики США подаётся как защита свободы слова, а не как дезинформация. - ЕС институционально избегает называть США, чтобы не разрушить союзнические рамки.

Точнее говорить, что речь идёт о «иностранном вмешательстве» (foreign interference) в широком смысле и о проблеме управления платформами, а не о классической FIMI в узком смысле. Хотя отдельные элементы (алгоритмическая накрутка, неразмеченный государственно-связанный контент, ИИ-генерация) могут подпадать под FIMI-критерии.

4. Как ЕС реагирует

• European Democracy Shield (12 нояб. 2025) и Европейский центр демократической устойчивости — прямо нацелены на FIMI и дезинформацию, но формулировки нейтральны («угрозы из любой страны»). (ЕК)
• Правоприменение DSA против американских платформ (X, Meta, TikTok).
• Сеть фактчекеров, Rapid Alert System, расширение санкционного режима за гибридные действия.
• При этом в аналитических документах ЕС прямо признаётся «стратегическая уязвимость»: информационная экосистема ЕС опирается на американские и китайские платформы, а «всё более конфронтационная риторика американской администрации» создаёт дополнительное давление. (EPRS)

Итог

• Юридически/официально: США не обозначены как субъект FIMI-угрозы. Институты ЕС продолжают описывать FIMI как российско-китайскую угрозу, а США — как партнёра (пусть и всё менее надёжного).
• Политически и де-факто: с 2025 года значительная часть европейского истеблишмента и экспертного сообщества рассматривает действия американской администрации, Маска и американских платформ как форму иностранного вмешательства в европейскую политику. Официальные лица ЕС (Макграт, Каллас, Коста, фон дер Ляйен) формулируют это осторожно, но узнаваемо.
• Корректная формулировка: США сегодня — это не признанный FIMI-актор, но признаваемый источник «иностранного вмешательства» и растущий фактор риска для информационного суверенитета Европы. Это спорный и политически заряженный вопрос, и ответ зависит от того, применяем ли мы узкое определение FIMI (скрытые манипулятивные сети) или широкое (любое внешнее воздействие на демократические процессы).

Gemini 3.8 Flash

Repeated check: no difference in 2 answer rounds. The report shows answer round 1.

English — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - theguardian.com - aa.com.tr - europa.eu - cambridge.org - public.news

English translation

Officially and diplomatically, no—the European Union does not classify the United States as a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat. However, whether American actors and information flows pose a threat to European democratic discourse has become a subject of growing debate among civil society researchers, digital rights advocates, and policymakers.

1. The Official Institutional Stance (EU & Allies) * Designated Adversaries: The European External Action Service (EEAS), which developed the FIMI framework, formally focuses its monitoring and attribution on hostile foreign state actors—primarily Russia and China. * The U.S. as a Partner: Officially, the EU views the United States as a democratic ally and key partner in countering FIMI. The two coordinate closely through multilateral frameworks (such as the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and NATO) and bilateral initiatives (such as the EU–U.S. Trade and Technology Council). * Rejection of the Label: The EU has actively distanced itself from attempts to label the U.S. a FIMI actor. For instance, when the independent NGO EU DisinfoLab hosted a conference panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat: adapt, acknowledge, push back," the EEAS and European partner governments removed their official logos from the event. EU spokespersons reaffirmed that framing the U.S. as a FIMI threat "does not align with the official positions held by the EU."

2. Why the Issue is Debated in Research and Civil Society While European governments reject treating the U.S. as a hostile foreign adversary, independent researchers, European media, and digital policy analysts frequently debate non-state and political information risks originating from the U.S.:

• Social Media Infrastructure and Platform Governance: Most major digital platforms used by Europeans (such as Meta, X, and YouTube) are U.S.-based. Algorithmic changes, shifts in content moderation policies, and disputes over compliance with the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) have led European regulators to view U.S. platform policies as a systemic vulnerability for information integrity.
• The "Export" of Polarization and Disinformation: Conspiracy theories (such as QAnon-style narratives), anti-climate action campaigns, and culture-war rhetoric originating in the U.S. ecosystem routinely spill over into European media, fueling domestic polarization.
• Transnational Political Influence and Funding: Concerns have been raised by European investigative journalists and civil society organizations regarding U.S. conservative foundations, political action networks, and funding streams supporting far-right or eurosceptic movements across Europe.
• Shifting U.S. Foreign Policy Postures: Fluctuations in U.S. administrations have raised concerns in Brussels regarding transatlantic alignment on counter-disinformation efforts, with debates over free speech absolutism versus European regulatory approaches to digital safety.

Summary Under the strict EU definition of FIMI—which emphasizes coordinated, deceptive, and hostile operations by foreign adversaries to undermine democratic institutions—the United States is an ally, not a threat actor. Nevertheless, the immense cultural, technical, and political influence of the U.S. information ecosystem remains a significant, often contentious vulnerability that European regulators and civil society closely monitor.

Original text

Officially and diplomatically, no—the European Union does not classify the United States as a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat. However, whether American actors and information flows pose a threat to European democratic discourse has become a subject of growing debate among civil society researchers, digital rights advocates, and policymakers.

1. The Official Institutional Stance (EU & Allies) * Designated Adversaries: The European External Action Service (EEAS), which developed the FIMI framework, formally focuses its monitoring and attribution on hostile foreign state actors—primarily Russia and China. * The U.S. as a Partner: Officially, the EU views the United States as a democratic ally and key partner in countering FIMI. The two coordinate closely through multilateral frameworks (such as the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and NATO) and bilateral initiatives (such as the EU–U.S. Trade and Technology Council). * Rejection of the Label: The EU has actively distanced itself from attempts to label the U.S. a FIMI actor. For instance, when the independent NGO EU DisinfoLab hosted a conference panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat: adapt, acknowledge, push back," the EEAS and European partner governments removed their official logos from the event. EU spokespersons reaffirmed that framing the U.S. as a FIMI threat "does not align with the official positions held by the EU."

2. Why the Issue is Debated in Research and Civil Society While European governments reject treating the U.S. as a hostile foreign adversary, independent researchers, European media, and digital policy analysts frequently debate non-state and political information risks originating from the U.S.:

• Social Media Infrastructure and Platform Governance: Most major digital platforms used by Europeans (such as Meta, X, and YouTube) are U.S.-based. Algorithmic changes, shifts in content moderation policies, and disputes over compliance with the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) have led European regulators to view U.S. platform policies as a systemic vulnerability for information integrity.
• The "Export" of Polarization and Disinformation: Conspiracy theories (such as QAnon-style narratives), anti-climate action campaigns, and culture-war rhetoric originating in the U.S. ecosystem routinely spill over into European media, fueling domestic polarization.
• Transnational Political Influence and Funding: Concerns have been raised by European investigative journalists and civil society organizations regarding U.S. conservative foundations, political action networks, and funding streams supporting far-right or eurosceptic movements across Europe.
• Shifting U.S. Foreign Policy Postures: Fluctuations in U.S. administrations have raised concerns in Brussels regarding transatlantic alignment on counter-disinformation efforts, with debates over free speech absolutism versus European regulatory approaches to digital safety.

Summary Under the strict EU definition of FIMI—which emphasizes coordinated, deceptive, and hostile operations by foreign adversaries to undermine democratic institutions—the United States is an ally, not a threat actor. Nevertheless, the immense cultural, technical, and political influence of the U.S. information ecosystem remains a significant, often contentious vulnerability that European regulators and civil society closely monitor.

English — answer round 2

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - state.gov - theguardian.com - europa.eu - europa.eu - euvsdisinfo.eu - cbc.ca

English translation

Officially, no. According to the European Union (EU) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the United States is classified as a democratic partner and ally, not as a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat actor.

In official European strategic documents and EEAS threat landscape reports, the "FIMI" designation is reserved for hostile, coordinated, and covert operations by adversaries aiming to undermine democratic processes and societal cohesion—predominantly Russia and China.

However, the question has increasingly surfaced within European research, civil society, and independent policy circles. The issue unfolds on several fronts:

1. The Official Stance: The US as a Strategic Counter-FIMI Partner * Joint Defense and Alignment: The EU and the U.S. actively coordinate on countering foreign interference through forums like the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC). Both work together to identify and neutralize Russian and Chinese disinformation pipelines in regions such as the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. * Strict Definition of FIMI: The EU defines FIMI as a pattern of manipulative, deceptive behavior conducted by foreign actors with hostile intent. Diplomatic influence, open public diplomacy, or standard political debate among democratic allies are not classified as FIMI under European frameworks.

2. Emerging Debates and Controversies Despite the official alignment, debates over whether the U.S. should be scrutinized under a FIMI or informational risk framework have emerged among European researchers and digital rights advocates:

• Spillover of Domestic Polarization and Narratives: Due to the global dominance of U.S.-based social media platforms and culture-war rhetoric, hyper-partisan narratives originating in the U.S. frequently spill into European political discourse, amplifying domestic societal divisions.
• Funding and Ideological Influence: European watchdogs have periodically raised concerns about American non-state actors—including political action groups, think tanks, conservative foundations, and partisan grant initiatives—funding or coordinating with hard-right or populist movements across Europe to shift domestic policies.
• Platform Power and Algorithmic Manipulation: European regulators (notably via the Digital Services Act) often find themselves at odds with American tech giants over algorithmic transparency, content moderation, and hate speech, leading some critics to argue that structural vulnerabilities in European discourse are facilitated by U.S. commercial entities.

3. Diplomatic Pushback Framing the United States under the FIMI umbrella is treated as a major diplomatic red line:

• In independent forums—such as European counter-disinformation conferences organizing panels on the U.S. as an informational risk—diplomatic pushback from Washington has been swift, arguing that applying an adversarial label like FIMI to an ally damages democratic solidarity.
• European governments and EU bodies (including the EEAS and member state foreign ministries) have moved quickly to distance themselves from such framing, pulling official branding or reaffirming that the counter-FIMI apparatus is designed to respond to hostile foreign powers rather than transatlantic allies.

Summary The United States is not a recognized FIMI threat in European defense or security policy. While researchers and European watchdogs frequently debate the unintended consequences of American cultural polarization, platform dominance, and cross-border political funding, these are considered structural, regulatory, and political challenges rather than hostile, state-sponsored information warfare.

Original text

Officially, no. According to the European Union (EU) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the United States is classified as a democratic partner and ally, not as a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat actor.

In official European strategic documents and EEAS threat landscape reports, the "FIMI" designation is reserved for hostile, coordinated, and covert operations by adversaries aiming to undermine democratic processes and societal cohesion—predominantly Russia and China.

However, the question has increasingly surfaced within European research, civil society, and independent policy circles. The issue unfolds on several fronts:

1. The Official Stance: The US as a Strategic Counter-FIMI Partner * Joint Defense and Alignment: The EU and the U.S. actively coordinate on countering foreign interference through forums like the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC). Both work together to identify and neutralize Russian and Chinese disinformation pipelines in regions such as the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. * Strict Definition of FIMI: The EU defines FIMI as a pattern of manipulative, deceptive behavior conducted by foreign actors with hostile intent. Diplomatic influence, open public diplomacy, or standard political debate among democratic allies are not classified as FIMI under European frameworks.

2. Emerging Debates and Controversies Despite the official alignment, debates over whether the U.S. should be scrutinized under a FIMI or informational risk framework have emerged among European researchers and digital rights advocates:

• Spillover of Domestic Polarization and Narratives: Due to the global dominance of U.S.-based social media platforms and culture-war rhetoric, hyper-partisan narratives originating in the U.S. frequently spill into European political discourse, amplifying domestic societal divisions.
• Funding and Ideological Influence: European watchdogs have periodically raised concerns about American non-state actors—including political action groups, think tanks, conservative foundations, and partisan grant initiatives—funding or coordinating with hard-right or populist movements across Europe to shift domestic policies.
• Platform Power and Algorithmic Manipulation: European regulators (notably via the Digital Services Act) often find themselves at odds with American tech giants over algorithmic transparency, content moderation, and hate speech, leading some critics to argue that structural vulnerabilities in European discourse are facilitated by U.S. commercial entities.

3. Diplomatic Pushback Framing the United States under the FIMI umbrella is treated as a major diplomatic red line:

• In independent forums—such as European counter-disinformation conferences organizing panels on the U.S. as an informational risk—diplomatic pushback from Washington has been swift, arguing that applying an adversarial label like FIMI to an ally damages democratic solidarity.
• European governments and EU bodies (including the EEAS and member state foreign ministries) have moved quickly to distance themselves from such framing, pulling official branding or reaffirming that the counter-FIMI apparatus is designed to respond to hostile foreign powers rather than transatlantic allies.

Summary The United States is not a recognized FIMI threat in European defense or security policy. While researchers and European watchdogs frequently debate the unintended consequences of American cultural polarization, platform dominance, and cross-border political funding, these are considered structural, regulatory, and political challenges rather than hostile, state-sponsored information warfare.

French — answer round 1

Web access: Available; no search recorded

English translation

The question of whether the United States represents a threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) to Europe raises an essential distinction between the strict institutional definition of FIMI and the broader reality of power dynamics and influence between allies.

1. The European institutional response: the United States is an ally, not a FIMI actor

Within the conceptual framework developed by the European Union (notably by the European External Action Service, the EEAS):

• Definition of FIMI: FIMI refers to patterns of coordinated, deceptive, or coercive behavior conducted by foreign actors to deliberately manipulate public debate, destabilize democratic institutions, or threaten national security.
• Targets identified by the EU: In its official reports on FIMI, the EU almost exclusively targets Russia (hybrid warfare, Doppelgänger campaigns, Ukraine-related disinformation) and China (wolf-warrior diplomacy, amplification of anti-Western narratives, fake account networks).
• Transatlantic cooperation: Washington is considered by Brussels as a strategic partner in the fight against FIMI. The two blocs collaborate within the G7 (Rapid Response Mechanism) and the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to harmonize the detection of and response to Russian and Chinese manipulations.

In the strict sense of European institutions, the United States is therefore not classified as a FIMI threat.

2. Grounds for vigilance and questioning on the European side

Although the United States does not conduct subversion campaigns aimed at destroying European democracies, several factors fuel the debate on American influence and asymmetry of influence in Europe:

A. Control of the informational infrastructure (Big Tech / GAFAM) The overwhelming majority of digital platforms where information circulates in Europe (Google/YouTube, Meta, X, Apple) are American. * Europe depends on algorithms designed in Silicon Valley whose commercial logic often favors polarization and the virality of misleading content. * Changes in the governance of these platforms (for example, eased moderation on X) or the political orientations of their leaders can directly influence the European democratic space, compelling the EU to legislate (notably via the Digital Services Act - DSA).

B. Past espionage and surveillance The disclosures by Edward Snowden in 2013 or the wiretapping cases involving Danish services in 2021 showed that American intelligence services (NSA) have spied on European leaders and EU institutions. Although this involves classic espionage and not FIMI (which targets the manipulation of public opinion), it demonstrates divergences in strategic interests.

C. The proven existence of American psychological operations capabilities The United States possesses powerful influence operations and psychological warfare (PsyOps) capabilities. In 2024, investigations (notably by Reuters) revealed that the Pentagon had conducted a secret clandestine disinformation campaign in the Philippines during the Covid-19 pandemic to discredit Chinese vaccines. Even though these methods have not been observed targeting allied European democracies, they serve as a reminder that Washington uses techniques comparable to FIMI in its geopolitical confrontation zones.

D. Informal political and ideological influence American influence is also exercised through the dissemination of its own internal debates: * Political and financial networks: Funding of non-governmental organizations, think tanks, or European conservative/religious movements by American private foundations. * Cultural polarization: The importation of American "culture wars" into the European public debate sometimes fuels local societal fractures.

3. Synthesis: an asymmetry of influence rather than a FIMI threat

There is a difference in nature and intention between FIMI conducted by strategic adversaries and the influence of the United States:

In summary: The United States does not act as a hostile FIMI threat seeking to subvert European democracy from the outside. On the other hand, American technological hegemony and its capacity for political and cultural projection constitute a challenge to Europe's informational sovereignty, prompting the latter to strengthen its digital autonomy and resilience.

Original text

La question de savoir si les États-Unis représentent une menace de manipulation de l’information et d’ingérence étrangères (FIMI) pour l’Europe soulève une distinction essentielle entre la définition institutionnelle stricte de la FIMI et la réalité plus large des rapports de force et d’influence entre alliés.

1. La réponse institutionnelle européenne : les États-Unis sont un allié, pas un acteur FIMI

Dans le cadre conceptuel développé par l’Union européenne (notamment par le Service européen pour l’action extérieure, le SEAE) :

• Définition de la FIMI : La FIMI désigne des schémas de comportements coordonnés, trompeurs ou coercitifs menés par des acteurs étrangers pour manipuler délibérément le débat public, déstabiliser les institutions démocratiques ou menacer la sécurité nationale.
• Cibles identifiées par l’UE : Dans ses rapports officiels sur la FIMI, l’UE cible quasi exclusivement la Russie (guerre hybride, campagnes Doppelgänger, désinformation liée à l'Ukraine) et la Chine (diplomatie du loup combattant, amplification de récits anti-occidentaux, réseaux de faux comptes).
• Coopération transatlantique : Washington est considéré par Bruxelles comme un partenaire stratégique dans la lutte contre la FIMI. Les deux blocs collaborent au sein du G7 (Mécanisme de réponse rapide) et du Conseil du commerce et des technologies (TTC) pour harmoniser la détection et la réponse aux manipulations russes et chinoises.

Au sens strict des institutions européennes, les États-Unis ne sont donc pas classés comme une menace FIMI.

2. Les motifs de vigilance et d’interrogation côté européen

Bien que les États-Unis ne mènent pas de campagnes de subversion visant à détruire les démocraties européennes, plusieurs facteurs alimentent le débat sur l'ingérence et l'asymétrie d'influence américaine en Europe :

A. Le contrôle de l'infrastructure informationnelle (les GAFAM) L’écrasante majorité des plateformes numériques où circule l'information en Europe (Google/YouTube, Meta, X, Apple) sont américaines. * L’Europe dépend d’algorithmes conçus dans la Silicon Valley dont la logique commerciale favorise souvent la polarisation et la viralité de contenus trompeurs. * Les changements de gouvernance de ces plateformes (par exemple la modération assouplie sur X) ou les orientations politiques de leurs dirigeants peuvent influencer directement l'espace démocratique européen, contraignant l'UE à légiférer (notamment via le Digital Services Act - DSA).

B. Espionnage et surveillance passés Les révélations d’Edward Snowden en 2013 ou les affaires d’écoutes via les services danois en 2021 ont montré que les services de renseignement américains (NSA) ont espionné des dirigeants européens et des institutions de l'UE. Bien qu'il s'agisse d'espionnage classique et non de FIMI (qui vise la manipulation de l'opinion publique), cela démontre des divergences d’intérêts stratégiques.

C. L’existence avérée de capacités d’opérations psychologiques américaines Les États-Unis disposent de puissantes capacités d’opérations d'influence et de guerre psychologique (PsyOps). En 2024, des enquêtes (notamment de Reuters) ont révélé que le Pentagone avait mené une campagne secrète de désinformation clandestine aux Philippines pendant la pandémie de Covid-19 pour discréditer les vaccins chinois. Même si ces méthodes n’ont pas été observées à l'encontre de démocraties européennes alliées, elles rappellent que Washington utilise des techniques assimilables à de la FIMI dans ses zones de confrontation géopolitique.

D. L’influence politique et idéologique informelle L’influence américaine s’exerce aussi par la diffusion de ses propres débats internes : * Réseaux politiques et financiers : Financement d'organisations non gouvernementales, de think tanks ou de mouvements conservateurs/religieux européens par des fondations privées américaines. * Polarisation culturelle : L’importation des « guerres culturelles » américaines dans le débat public européen alimente parfois des fractures sociétales locales.

3. Synthèse : une asymétrie d'influence plutôt qu'une menace FIMI

Il existe une différence de nature et d'intention entre la FIMI menée par des adversaires stratégiques et l'influence des États-Unis :

En résumé : Les États-Unis n'agissent pas comme une menace FIMI hostile cherchant à subvertir la démocratie européenne de l'extérieur. En revanche, l'hégémonie technologique américaine et sa capacité de projection politique et culturelle constituent un défi pour la souveraineté informationnelle de l'Europe, incitant cette dernière à renforcer son autonomie numérique et sa résilience.

French — answer round 2

Web access: Available; no search recorded

English translation

Within the European institutional and geopolitical framework, the United States is not classified as a FIMI threat (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference). On the contrary, it is considered a central strategic partner in the fight against these practices.

However, the question of American informational and technological influence on Europe raises recurring debates, notably concerning digital sovereignty and ideological alignment.

1. The Institutional Definition of FIMI and the EU's Position

According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), FIMI designates: > A coordinated, deceptive, and intentional behavioral pattern conducted by foreign state or non-state actors, aimed at destabilizing democratic institutions, polarizing societies, and influencing electoral processes.

In official EU reports on FIMI threats: * Actors designated as major threats are Russia (with industrial operations like the Doppelgänger network) and China, as well as, to a lesser extent, actors like Iran. * The United States are cooperative allies: The European Union and the United States collaborate actively to detect and counter foreign disinformation, notably via the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and NATO structures.

2. Why the Question Arises: Channels of American Influence and Vulnerability

Even though the United States does not conduct clandestine state-sponsored FIMI operations against European democracies, several factors fuel the idea of a vulnerability or an asymmetrical influence:

A. The Monopoly of Technology Platforms (Big Tech) * The European informational space depends very largely on private American companies (Google, Meta, X, Microsoft, etc.). * Algorithmic choices, changes in content moderation policies (notably on X following its acquisition by Elon Musk), or the amplification of controversies have a direct impact on the European public debate. * Although these are private commercial interests and not a policy of the US federal state, this structural dependence exposes Europe to informational dynamics designed across the Atlantic. This is one of the reasons why the EU adopted the Digital Services Act (DSA).

B. Non-State Networks and Ideological Diffusion * American non-state actors (conservative or evangelical pressure groups, political foundations, far-right or far-left circles) finance or support causes in Europe. These flows often concern societal debates (reproductive rights, gender issues, climate skepticism). * The dynamics of American "culture wars" are frequently imported into the European public debate, sometimes contributing to the polarization of local societies without this falling under a coordinated operation by the US administration.

C. Geopolitical Influence and Public Diplomacy * Washington exerts major diplomatic, economic, and media influence in Europe (lobbying on defense spending, arms purchases, extraterritorial sanctions, energy policies). * This influence nevertheless falls within the traditional framework of soft power, public diplomacy, and open lobbying, which differs from the criteria of FIMI (which relies on deception, the invisibility of sources, and malicious subversion).

3. Hostile FIMI vs. Influence Asymmetry: The Key Distinction

Two notions must be distinguished: 1. Malicious interference (FIMI): Clandestine action aimed at fracturing the target society and destroying trust in its institutions (a specificity of Russian campaigns). The United States has no strategic interest in weakening or disintegrating the European Union, which constitutes its primary democratic and economic partner. 2. Informational and cultural hegemony: Europe's dependence on American technologies, media, and narratives.

In Summary

The United States does not constitute a FIMI threat in the diplomatic, legal, and strategic sense adopted by Europe. Nevertheless, Europe perceives the dominance of American platforms and the importation of polarizing narratives as a major challenge to its informational and digital sovereignty, justifying strict regulation of transatlantic technological actors.

Original text

Dans le cadre institutionnel et géopolitique européen, les États-Unis ne sont pas classés comme une menace FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, ou manipulation de l'information et ingérence étrangères). Au contraire, ils sont considérés comme un partenaire stratégique central dans la lutte contre ces pratiques.

Cependant, la question de l’influence informationnelle et technologique américaine sur l’Europe soulève des débats récurrents, notamment autour de la souveraineté numérique et de l’alignement idéologique.

1. La définition institutionnelle de la FIMI et la position de l'UE

Selon le Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE), la FIMI désigne : > Un schéma comportemental coordonné, trompeur et intentionnel, mené par des acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques étrangers, visant à déstabiliser les institutions démocratiques, polariser les sociétés et influencer les processus électoraux.

Dans les rapports officiels de l'UE sur les menaces FIMI : * Les acteurs désignés comme menaces majeures sont la Russie (avec des opérations industrielles comme le réseau Doppelgänger) et la Chine, ainsi que, dans une moindre mesure, des acteurs comme l'Iran. * Les États-Unis sont des alliés de coopération : l’Union européenne et les États-Unis collaborent activement pour détecter et contrer la désinformation étrangère, notamment via le Conseil du commerce et des technologies (TTC), le G7 Rapid Response Mechanism et les structures de l'OTAN.

2. Pourquoi la question se pose : les canaux d'influence et de vulnérabilité américains

Même si les États-Unis ne mènent pas d'opérations clandestines étatiques de type FIMI contre les démocraties européennes, plusieurs facteurs alimentent l'idée d'une vulnérabilité ou d'une influence asymétrique :

A. Le monopole des plateformes technologiques (Big Tech) * L'espace informationnel européen dépend très largement d'entreprises américaines privées (Google, Meta, X, Microsoft, etc.). * Les choix algorithmiques, les changements dans les politiques de modération de contenus (notamment sur X après son rachat par Elon Musk) ou l'amplification de polémiques ont un impact direct sur le débat public européen. * Bien qu'il s'agisse d'intérêts commerciaux privés et non d'une politique de l'État fédéral américain, cette dépendance structurelle expose l'Europe à des dynamiques informationnelles conçues outre-Atlantique. C'est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles l'UE a adopté le Digital Services Act (DSA).

B. Les réseaux non étatiques et la diffusion idéologique * Des acteurs non étatiques américains (groupes de pression conservateurs ou évangéliques, fondations politiques, cercles d'extrême droite ou d'extrême gauche) financent ou soutiennent des causes en Europe. Ces flux concernent souvent les débats sociétaux (droits reproductifs, questions de genre, climatoscepticisme). * La dynamique des « guerres culturelles » américaines est souvent importée dans le débat public européen, contribuant parfois à polariser les sociétés locales sans que cela relève d'une opération coordonnée de l'administration américaine.

C. L'influence géopolitique et la diplomatie publique * Washington exerce une influence diplomatique, économique et médiatique majeure en Europe (lobbying sur les dépenses de défense, achats d'armements, sanctions extraterritoriales, politiques énergétiques). * Cette influence s'inscrit toutefois dans le cadre classique du soft power, de la diplomatie publique et du lobbying ouvert, ce qui diffère des critères de la FIMI (qui repose sur la tromperie, l'invisibilité des sources et la subversion malveillante).

3. FIMI hostile vs Asymétrie d'influence : la distinction clé

Il convient de distinguer deux notions : 1. L'ingérence malveillante (FIMI) : Action clandestine visant à fracturer la société cible et à détruire la confiance dans ses institutions (spécificité des campagnes russes). Les États-Unis n'ont aucun intérêt stratégique à affaiblir ou désintégrer l'Union européenne, qui constitue leur premier partenaire démocratique et économique. 2. L'hégémonie informationnelle et culturelle : Dépendance de l'Europe vis-à-vis des technologies, des médias et des récits américains.

En résumé

Les États-Unis ne constituent pas une menace FIMI au sens diplomatique, juridique et stratégique retenu par l’Europe. Néanmoins, l'Europe perçoit la domination des plateformes américaines et l'importation de récits polarisants comme un défi majeur pour sa souveraineté informationnelle et numérique, justifiant une régulation stricte des acteurs technologiques transatlantiques.

Lithuanian — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - bignewsnetwork.com - cbc.ca - theguardian.com - disinformation.ch - aa.com.tr - state.gov

English translation

From the official perspective of the European Union (EU), its member states, and NATO — no, the United States is not considered a FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) threat to Europe. On the contrary, the US is officially treated as one of the most important strategic partners in combating these threats.

The analysis of the situation is based on several essential aspects:

1. Official EU and International Position * What is officially considered a FIMI threat: The European External Action Service (EEAS), which formulated the concept of FIMI and prepares official threat reports, designates authoritarian regimes — primarily Russia and China (as well as Iran in certain cases) — as hostile actors. * The US as a partner: The US and the EU closely cooperate to counter disinformation (e.g., through the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), and the US Department of State's initiatives to combat FIMI).

2. Clear Distancing from Designating the US as a "FIMI Threat" This issue became particularly relevant following civil society events (e.g., the conference of the independent organization "EU DisinfoLab" in Vilnius, where one of the discussion panels was dedicated to the topic of whether the US can act as a FIMI actor in certain contexts): * Responding to attempts to equate the US with a FIMI threat, the EU diplomatic service (EEAS), the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Canadian government distanced themselves from the event's partnership and withdrew their branding. * EU and US officials clearly emphasized that applying the term FIMI to a democratic ally contradicts the official EU position and harms the shared goals of the democratic world in countering interference by authoritarian regimes.

3. Why Do These Discussions Sometimes Arise? Although official policy does not classify the US as a threat, several aspects spark discussions within the academic community and civil society: 1. US Technology Platforms: Major platforms ("X", "Meta", "Google") are headquartered in the US. Although they are not state FIMI perpetrators themselves, their algorithms and business models often become a space through which hostile actors spread disinformation in Europe. 2. Non-State Actors and Political Foundations: Private US organizations, lobbyists, or interest groups sometimes fund campaigns in Europe (e.g., related to climate change skepticism, abortion, or LGBTQ+ issues). However, in EU law and international relations, this is classified as private or political lobbying, rather than state FIMI interference. 3. Polarization of US Domestic Politics: Some researchers are concerned by the polarization of US political discourse, the narratives of which sometimes resonate and spill over into the European public space.

Summary The definition of FIMI encompasses coordinated, deceptive, and malicious manipulations aimed at undermining democratic institutions and values. In the assessment of EU institutions, Lithuania, and other European states, the US does not conduct such operations against its allies in Europe, and therefore the US is not a FIMI threat, but rather a shared partner in the fight against Russian and Chinese information attacks.

Original text

Oficialiu Europos Sąjungos (ES), jos valstybių narių ir NATO požiūriu – ne, Jungtinės Valstijos nėra laikomos FIMI (angl. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference – užsienio šalių vykdomo manipuliavimo informacija ir kišimosi) grėsme Europai. Priešingai, JAV oficialiai traktuojama kaip viena svarbiausių strateginių partnerių kovoje su šiomis grėsmėmis.

Situacijos analizė remiasi keliais esminiais aspektais:

1. Oficiali ES ir tarptautinė pozicija * Kas oficialiai laikoma FIMI grėsme: ES išorės veiksmų tarnyba (EIVT / EEAS), kuri ir suformuluoja FIMI sąvoką bei rengia oficialias grėsmių ataskaitas, kaip priešiškus veikėjus įvardija autoritarinius režimus – visų pirma Rusiją ir Kiniją (taip pat tam tikrais atvejais Iraną). * JAV kaip partnerė: JAV ir ES glaudžiai bendradarbiauja siekdamos atremti dezinformaciją (pvz., per ES ir JAV Prekybos ir technologijų tarybą (TTC), G7 Greitojo reagavimo mechanizmą (RRM) bei JAV Valstybės departamento kovos su FIMI iniciatyvas).

2. Aiškus atsiribojimas nuo JAV įvardijimo „FIMI grėsme“ Šis klausimas tapo ypač aktualus po pilietinės visuomenės renginių (pvz., nepriklausomos organizacijos „EU DisinfoLab“ konferencijoje Vilniuje, kurioje viena iš diskusijų panelių buvo skirta temai, ar JAV gali veikti kaip FIMI veikėja tam tikruose kontekstuose): * Reaguodamos į bandymus JAV prilyginti FIMI grėsmei, ES diplomatinė tarnyba (EIVT), Lietuvos užsienio reikalų ministerija ir Kanados vyriausybė atsiribojo nuo renginio partnerystės ir atšaukė savo atributiką. * ES ir JAV pareigūnai aiškiai pabrėžė, kad termino FIMI taikymas demokratinei sąjungininkei prieštarauja oficialiai ES pozicijai ir kenkia bendriems demokratinio pasaulio tikslams atremti autoritarinių režimų kišimąsi.

3. Kodėl kartais kyla šios diskusijos? Nors oficiali politika JAV nepriskiria grėsmėms, akademinėje bendruomenėje ir pilietinėje visuomenėje diskusijų sukelia keli aspektai: 1. JAV technologijų platformos: Didžiosios platformos („X“, „Meta“, „Google“) yra įsikūrusios JAV. Nors jos pačios nėra valstybinis FIMI vykdytojas, jų algoritmai ir verslo modeliai dažnai tampa erdve, per kurią priešiški veikėjai skleidžia dezinformaciją Europoje. 2. Nevalstybiniai veikėjai ir politiniai fondai: Privačios JAV organizacijos, lobistai ar interesų grupės kartais finansuoja kampanijas Europoje (pvz., susijusias su klimato kaitos skepticizmu, abortų ar LGBTQ+ klausimais). Tačiau ES teisėje ir tarptautiniuose santykiuose tai priskiriama privačiam ar politiniam lobizmui, o ne valstybiniam FIMI kišimuisi. 3. JAV vidaus politikos poliarizacija: Dalį tyrėjų neramina JAV politinio diskurso poliarizacija, kurios naratyvai kartais rezonuoja ir persikelia į Europos viešąją erdvę.

Apibendrinimas FIMI apibrėžimas apima koordinuotas, apgaulingas ir piktybines manipuliacijas, kuriomis siekiama pakirsti demokratines institucijas ir vertybes. ES institucijų, Lietuvos ir kitų Europos valstybių vertinimu, JAV tokių operacijų prieš savo sąjungininkus Europoje nevykdo, todėl JAV nėra FIMI grėsmė, o bendras partneris kovoje su Rusijos ir Kinijos informacinėmis atakomis.

Lithuanian — answer round 2

Web access: Available; no search recorded

English translation

According to the official assessment of the European Union (EU) and its security institutions, the United States of America is not considered a threat of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) to Europe. On the contrary – the US is one of the EU's key strategic partners in combating these threats.

When assessing this issue, it is important to consider several essential aspects:

1. Official EU position and definition of FIMI According to the definition by the European External Action Service (EEAS), FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) encompasses mostly coordinated, deceptive, manipulative, and hostile actions by which foreign state actors or entities associated with them seek to undermine democratic processes, divide society, and influence political decisions.

In official EEAS FIMI threat reports, authoritarian states are unequivocally named as the main and systemic threats: * Russia (especially intensively – in the context of the war against Ukraine, through disinformation campaigns, bot networks, cyber operations); * China (through coordinated narrative dissemination campaigns, interference exceeding the boundaries of economic pressure and public diplomacy); * Other countries (e.g., Iran) or actors supported by them.

2. US and EU partnership in the fight against FIMI US state institutions (especially the Department of State's Global Engagement Center – GEC) and EU institutions cooperate closely: * Analytical data and warnings about hostile state operations are exchanged. * Joint FIMI identification, analysis, and response methodologies are developed. * Close cooperation takes place at the NATO level (e.g., at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga).

3. Why do discussions about US influence sometimes arise? Although the US as a state is not a FIMI threat, factors related to the US are sometimes mentioned in the public and expert space:

• US technology giants: Most social networks and platforms ("Meta," "X," "Google/YouTube") through which disinformation spreads are headquartered in the US. The algorithmic policies of these companies, lack of moderation, or decisions by private owners sometimes cause friction between EU regulators and US companies (which is why the EU adopted the Digital Services Act – DSA). However, the platforms themselves are not considered FIMI perpetrators – they are rather infrastructure manipulated by hostile actors (e.g., Russia).
• Political and ideological influence: Certain US political movements, lobbying groups, or foundations forge ties with European parties, supporting certain public campaigns (e.g., related to "culture wars," climate change, or abortion policy). Although this raises discussions about foreign influence on domestic politics, it is generally not considered covert or deceptive state interference (FIMI), but rather open, albeit controversial, political activity.
• Historical intelligence scandals: Events such as the 2013 disclosures by Edward Snowden regarding the surveillance in Europe carried out by the US National Security Agency (NSA) caused crises of trust, but intelligence activities and espionage differ from information manipulation and disinformation campaigns (FIMI).

Summary From an institutional and doctrinal perspective, the US is not a FIMI threat to Europe, but a primary ally in defending against such manipulations. The main FIMI danger to Europe comes from authoritarian regimes seeking to disrupt Western democratic systems and transatlantic unity.

Original text

Oficialiu Europos Sąjungos (ES) ir jos saugumo institucijų vertinimu, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos nėra laikomos užsienio šalių vykdomo manipuliavimo informacija ir kišimosi (FIMI) grėsme Europai. Priešingai – JAV yra viena svarbiausių ES strateginių partnerių kovojant su šiomis grėsmėmis.

Vertinant šį klausimą, svarbu atsižvelgti į kelis esminius aspektus:

1. Oficiali ES pozicija ir FIMI apibrėžimas Pagal Europos išorės veiksmų tarnybos (EIVT / EEAS) apibrėžimą, FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) apima dažniausiai koordinuotus, apgaulingus, manipuliacinius ir priešiškus veiksmus, kuriais užsienio valstybiniai ar su jais susiję subjektai siekia pakenkti demokratiniams procesams, skaldyti visuomenę ir daryti įtaką politiniams sprendimams.

Oficialiose EIVT FIMI grėsmių ataskaitose pagrindinėmis ir sisteminėmis grėsmėmis vienareikšmiškai įvardijamos autoritarinės valstybės: * Rusija (ypač intensyviai – karo prieš Ukrainą kontekste, per dezinformacijos kampanijas, botų tinklus, kibernetines operacijas); * Kinija (per koordinuotas naratyvų sklaidos kampanijas, ekonominio spaudimo ir viešosios diplomatijos ribas peržengiantį kišimąsi); * Kitos šalys (pvz., Iranas) ar jų remiami veikėjai.

2. JAV ir ES partnerystė kovoje su FIMI JAV valstybės institucijos (ypač Valstybės departamento Pasaulinio bendradarbiavimo centras – Global Engagement Center, GEC) ir ES institucijos glaudžiai bendradarbiauja: * Keičiamasi analitiniais duomenimis ir įspėjimais apie priešiškų valstybių operacijas. * Kuriamos bendros FIMI atpažinimo, analizės ir reagavimo metodikos. * Glaudžiai bendradarbiaujama NATO lygmeniu (pvz., NATO Strateginės komunikacijos kompetencijos centre Rygoje).

3. Kodėl kartais kyla diskusijų apie JAV įtaką? Nors JAV kaip valstybė nėra FIMI grėsmė, viešojoje ir ekspertinėje erdvėje kartais minimi su JAV susiję veiksniai:

• JAV technologijų milžinės: Didžioji dalis socialinių tinklų ir platformų („Meta“, „X“, „Google/YouTube“), per kurias plinta dezinformacija, yra įsikūrusios JAV. Šių bendrovių algoritmų politika, moderavimo trūkumas ar privačių savininkų sprendimai kartais sukelia trintį tarp ES reguliuotojų ir JAV kompanijų (todėl ES priėmė Skaitmeninių paslaugų aktą – DSA). Vis dėlto pačios platformos nelaikomos FIMI vykdytojomis – jos veikiau yra infrastruktūra, kuria manipuliuoja priešiški veikėjai (pvz., Rusija).
• Politinė ir ideologinė įtaka: Tam tikri JAV politiniai judėjimai, lobistinės grupės ar fondai mezga ryšius su Europos partijomis, remia tam tikras visuomenines kampanijas (pvz., susijusias su „kultūriniais karais“, klimato kaita ar abortų politika). Nors tai kelia diskusijų apie užsienio įtaką vidaus politikai, tai paprastai nelaikoma slaptu ar apgaulingu valstybiniu kišimusi (FIMI), o atvira, nors ir prieštaringa, politine veikla.
• Istoriniai žvalgybiniai skandalai: Tokie įvykiai kaip 2013 m. Edwardo Snowdeno paviešinti faktai apie JAV Nacionalinio saugumo agentūros (NSA) vykdytą sekimą Europoje kėlė pasitikėjimo krizių, tačiau žvalgybinė veikla ir šnipinėjimas skiriasi nuo informacinio manipuliavimo ir dezinformacijos kampanijų (FIMI).

Apibendrinimas JAV instituciniu ir doktrininiu požiūriu nėra FIMI grėsmė Europai, o pagrindinė sąjungininkė ginantis nuo tokių manipuliacijų. Pagrindinis FIMI pavojus Europai kyla iš autoritarinių režimų, siekiančių suardyti Vakarų demokratines sistemas ir transatlantinę vienybę.

Russian — answer round 1

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English translation

In the official terminology and policy of the European Union, the United States is not regarded as a source of the threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). On the contrary, the EU and the US officially consider each other key strategic partners in combating this threat.

Nevertheless, in European expert, regulatory, and political circles, the topic of American influence in the information field is viewed from multiple angles:

1. Official Position of the EU and its Institutions In the reports of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which introduced and uses the term FIMI, information manipulation is defined as intentional, coordinated, and manipulative behavior (often covert) aimed at undermining values, procedures, and institutions.

• Main FIMI actors in EU reports: In the annual EEAS reports, Russia and China are recorded as the primary external threats.
• Cooperation with the US: Washington and Brussels coordinate their actions to counter disinformation through G7 mechanisms (Rapid Response Mechanism), as well as within the framework of the EU–US Trade and Technology Council, which features a working group on protecting the information space.

From the perspective of European institutions, the US conducts open public diplomacy and promotes its foreign policy narratives through methods that are not classified as hostile interference.

2. Related Issues and Discussions in Europe

Although the US as a state is not considered a source of FIMI, questions related to American-origin information influence regularly arise in the European public sphere:

A. The Role of American Digital Platforms The vast majority of global platforms where FIMI campaigns unfold (Meta, X/Twitter, Google/YouTube) are American private corporations. * Criticism is frequently voiced in the EU that the algorithms of these platforms contribute to societal polarization and monetize sensational content. * To mitigate these risks, the EU adopted the Digital Services Act (DSA), which obligates platforms to combat systemic risks, manipulations, and foreign interference. This is an issue of private sector regulation rather than actions by the US government, yet it creates ongoing regulatory tension between the EU and the US tech sector.

B. "Import" of Political Polarization and Conspiracy Theories European researchers note the phenomenon of cross-border dissemination of American content: * Ideological narratives (for example, the QAnon movement, radical anti-vaccination campaigns, culture wars) originate in the American internet segment and are organically transferred to the European space. * This phenomenon is generally not a coordinated US state campaign, but rather a transnational spread of content between online communities or non-state political movements.

C. Covert Information Operations (PsyOps) In 2022, independent investigative groups (Graphika and the Stanford Internet Observatory) uncovered a network of fake accounts purportedly created within Pentagon structures to promote pro-American and anti-Russian/anti-Chinese narratives. * However, these operations targeted primarily the regions of Central Asia and the Middle East, rather than European countries or NATO allies. * In the EU, this sparked discussions about the ethics of using such methods by democratic states, but the incidents did not lead to the classification of the US as a source of FIMI within the European space.

Conclusion The United States is not classified as a FIMI actor for Europe. Relations between Brussels and Washington in this sphere are built on the basis of alliance and joint monitoring of threats emanating from other actors. The main discussions in the EU concern not covert American interference, but regulatory control over American platforms and the organic influence of American content on public sentiments in Europe.

Original text

В официальной терминологии и политике Европейского союза Соединенные Штаты не рассматриваются как источник угрозы иностранного манипулирования информацией и вмешательства (FIMI). Напротив, ЕС и США официально считают друг друга ключевыми стратегическими партнерами в борьбе с этой угрозой.

Тем не менее, в европейских экспертных, регуляторных и политических кругах тема американского влияния в информационном поле рассматривается многогранно:

1. Официальная позиция ЕС и институтов В отчетах Европейской службы внешних связей (EEAS), которая ввела и использует термин FIMI, манипулирование информацией определяется как преднамеренное, скоординированное и манипулятивное поведение (часто скрытое), направленное на подрыв ценностей, процедур и институтов.

• Главные субъекты FIMI в отчетах ЕС: В ежегодных отчетах EEAS в качестве основных внешних угроз фиксируются Россия и Китай.
• Сотрудничество с США: Вашингтон и Брюссель координируют свои действия по противодействию дезинформации через механизмы G7 (Rapid Response Mechanism), а также в рамках Совета по торговле и технологиям (EU–US Trade and Technology Council), где действует рабочая группа по защите информационного пространства.

С точки зрения европейских институтов, США ведут открытую публичную дипломатию и продвигают свои внешнеполитические нарративы методами, которые не квалифицируются как враждебное вмешательство.

2. Смежные проблемы и дискуссии в Европе

Хотя США как государство не считаются источником FIMI, в европейском публичном поле регулярно возникают вопросы, связанные с информационным влиянием американского происхождения:

А. Роль американских цифровых платформ Подавляющее большинство глобальных платформ, на которых разворачиваются кампании FIMI (Meta, X/Twitter, Google/YouTube), являются американскими частными корпорациями. * В ЕС часто звучит критика по поводу того, что алгоритмы этих платформ способствуют поляризации общества и монетизируют сенсационный контент. * Для снижения этих рисков ЕС принял Закон о цифровых услугах (Digital Services Act, DSA), который обязывает платформы бороться с системными рисками, манипуляциями и иностранным вмешательством. Это вопрос регулирования частного сектора, а не действий правительства США, однако он создает постоянную регуляторную напряженность между ЕС и технологическим сектором США.

Б. «Импорт» политической поляризации и конспирологии Европейские исследователи отмечают феномен трансграничного распространения американского контента: * Идеологические нарративы (например, движения QAnon, радикальные антивакцинаторские кампании, культурные войны) зарождаются в американском сегменте интернета и органически переносятся в европейское пространство. * Это явление, как правило, не является скоординированной государственной кампанией США, а представляет собой транснациональное распространение контента между сетевыми сообществами или негосударственными политическими движениями.

В. Тайные информационные операции (PsyOps) В 2022 году независимые расследовательские группы (Graphika и Stanford Internet Observatory) выявили сеть фальшивых аккаунтов, предположительно созданную в структурах Пентагона для продвижения проамериканских и антироссийских/антикитайских нарративов. * Однако эти операции были нацелены преимущественно на регионы Центральной Азии и Ближнего Востока, а не на страны Европы или союзников по НАТО. * В ЕС это вызвало дискуссии об этичности использования подобных методов демократическими государствами, но инциденты не привели к классификации США как источника FIMI в европейском пространстве.

Итог Соединенные Штаты не квалифицируются как субъект FIMI для Европы. Отношения между Брюсселем и Вашингтоном в этой сфере строятся на базе союзничества и совместного мониторинга угроз, исходящих от других акторов. Основные дискуссии в ЕС касаются не тайного американского вмешательства, а регуляторного контроля над американскими платформами и органического влияния американского контента на общественные настроения в Европе.

Russian — answer round 2

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English translation

In the official institutions of the European Union (specifically, the European External Action Service — EEAS, which developed the FIMI concept), the United States is not classified as a threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. On the contrary, the US is viewed as Europe's key strategic partner in countering these threats.

Nevertheless, in the socio-political and expert space of Europe, this issue contains several important nuances.

1. Official EU Position and Institutional Partnership

• Main FIMI actors in EU reports: In the EEAS annual reports on FIMI threats, the primary sources of deliberate, coordinated, and hostile information manipulation identified are Russia (primarily) and China.
• Cooperation with the US: The EU and the US coordinate their efforts to combat disinformation at the institutional level. This interaction takes place through:
• The EU–US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which has a working group on protecting the information space;
• The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism;
• EEAS interaction with the US Department of State's Global Engagement Center (GEC).

From the perspective of European security agencies, FIMI refers to activities by hostile states aimed at destabilizing Europe's democratic institutions, and the actions of the US government do not fall under this definition.

2. Aspects Causing Concern in Europe

Despite the allied status, European regulators, researchers, and politicians highlight a number of issues related to the US information field:

A. Digital Platforms and Algorithms The overwhelming majority of global social networks and search engines (Alphabet/Google, Meta, X, Apple, Microsoft) are American corporations. There is concern in Europe that: * the algorithms of these platforms may unintentionally amplify polarization, hate speech, and disinformation; * changes in content moderation (for example, the policy of the X platform) may hinder the protection of the European information space.

To mitigate these risks, the EU adopted the Digital Services Act (DSA), which obligates large tech platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks to public debate and elections in Europe.

B. Cross-Border Export of Polarization and Conspiracy Theories European society is susceptible to the influence of the US domestic political agenda. Conspiracy movements (such as QAnon), climate skepticism, theories about election fraud, and radical content originating in non-state environments in the US frequently spill over into the European segment of the internet.

However, in EU terminology, this is classified not as state interference (FIMI), but as organic disinformation or the spread of harmful content.

C. Promotion of Geopolitical Narratives Critics and independent analysts sometimes point to the work of US state and quasi-state media, foundations, and lobbying structures promoting US foreign policy interests. However, the European mainstream draws a clear line between public diplomacy (soft power), open lobbying, and covert hostile influence operations (FIMI) accompanied by disinformation and cyberattacks.

Summary

The US is not a FIMI threat to Europe in the official and strategic understanding of the EU, but rather acts as its primary alliance partner in countering external information attacks. At the same time, the dominance of American tech giants and the export of domestic political polarization from the US create systemic challenges for Europe in the information sphere, to which the EU responds with its own legal regulation (primarily through the DSA).

Original text

В официальных институтах Европейского союза (в частности, в Европейской службе внешних связей — EEAS, которая и разработала концепцию FIMI) Соединенные Штаты не классифицируются как угроза иностранного манипулирования информацией и вмешательства. Напротив, США рассматриваются как ключевой стратегический партнер Европы в противодействии этим угрозам.

Тем не менее, в общественно-политическом и экспертном пространстве Европы этот вопрос содержит несколько важных нюансов.

1. Официальная позиция ЕС и институциональное партнерство

• Главные субъекты FIMI в отчетах ЕС: В ежегодных отчетах EEAS о FIMI-угрозах в качестве основных источников преднамеренного, скоординированного и враждебного манипулирования информацией выделяются Россия (в первую очередь) и Китай.
• Сотрудничество с США: ЕС и США координируют свои усилия по борьбе с дезинформацией на институциональном уровне. Это взаимодействие происходит через:
• Совет по торговле и технологиям ЕС — США (TTC), где действует рабочая группа по защите информационного пространства;
• Механизм быстрого реагирования «Большой семерки» (G7 Rapid Response Mechanism);
• Взаимодействие EEAS с Центром глобального взаимодействия (GEC) Госдепартамента США.

С точки зрения европейских органов безопасности, FIMI — это деятельность враждебных государств, направленная на дестабилизацию демократических институтов Европы, и действия правительства США под это определение не подпадают.

2. Аспекты, вызывающие озабоченность в Европе

Несмотря на союзнический статус, европейские регуляторы, исследователи и политики выделяют ряд проблем, связанных с информационным полем США:

А. Цифровые платформы и алгоритмы Подавляющее большинство глобальных социальных сетей и поисковых систем (Alphabet/Google, Meta, X, Apple, Microsoft) являются американскими корпорациями. В Европе существует обеспокоенность тем, что: * алгоритмы этих платформ могут непреднамеренно усиливать поляризацию, язык вражды и дезинформацию; * изменения в модерации контента (например, политика платформы X) могут затруднять защиту европейского информационного пространства.

Для снижения этих рисков ЕС принял Закон о цифровых услугах (Digital Services Act, DSA), который обязывает крупные технологические платформы оценивать и снижать системные риски для общественных дебатов и выборов в Европе.

Б. Трансграничный экспорт поляризации и конспирологии Европейское общество подвержено влиянию американской внутриполитической повестки. Конспирологические движения (такие как QAnon), климатический скептицизм, теории о фальсификациях выборов и радикальный контент, зарождающиеся в США в негосударственной среде, нередко перетекают в европейский сегмент интернета.

Однако в терминологии ЕС это классифицируется не как государственное вмешательство (FIMI), а как органическая дезинформация или распространение вредоносного контента.

В. Продвижение геополитических нарративов Критики и независимые аналитики иногда указывают на работу американских государственных и квазигосударственных медиа, фондов и лоббистских структур, продвигающих интересы внешней политики США. Однако европейский мейнстрим проводит четкую границу между публичной дипломатией (soft power), открытым лоббизмом и скрытыми враждебными операциями влияния (FIMI), сопровождающимися дезинформацией и кибератаками.

Резюме

США не являются угрозой FIMI для Европы в официальном и стратегическом понимании ЕС, а выступают его главным союзником в противодействии внешним информационным атакам. В то же время доминирование американских технологических гигантов и экспорт внутриполитической поляризации из США создают для Европы системные вызовы в информационной сфере, на которые ЕС отвечает собственным правовым регулированием (в первую очередь через DSA).

Mistral Large 4

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English — answer round 1

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English translation

Based on my research of official EU documents, EEAS reports, and recent news coverage, here is a nuanced answer to your question:

Short Answer

Officially, no — the United States is not classified as a FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) threat actor in European Union assessments. However, there is growing concern in Europe about US interference in European democratic processes, and the transatlantic relationship on countering disinformation has deteriorated significantly in 2025–2026.

What Official EU Assessments Say

The European External Action Service (EEAS) — the EU's diplomatic service responsible for monitoring FIMI — consistently identifies Russia and China as the primary FIMI threat actors:

• The 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats (March 2026) attributes 35% of documented incidents to Russia (29%) and China (6%) — with no mention of the US as a threat actor.
• The EEAS website explicitly states: "We focus in particular on Russia and China" and "We monitor and address Russia and China as FIMI actors."
• The 2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter FIMI describes the EU and US as having a "close partnership" on FIMI, with joint methodologies (DISARM framework, STIX 2, OpenCTI) and cooperation through the EU-US Trade and Technology Council.

The Shift: Growing Concerns About US Interference

While the US is not formally classified as a "FIMI actor" (a term typically reserved for hostile authoritarian states), European leaders have increasingly warned about US interference in European politics:

1. Direct Interference in Elections* - *Vice President JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference (February 2025) criticized European leaders and was followed by "explicit interventions in European elections, where the US openly supported far-right and Eurosceptic parties and candidates — notably in Germany, Poland and Romania" (EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2025). - Elon Musk has openly supported far-right parties, including Germany's AfD and Romania's far-right candidate Călin Georgescu. - German Chancellor Olaf Scholz condemned Vance's overtures to the AfD as "a direct intervention" in German democracy.

2. Warnings from European Leaders* - *European Council President António Costa (December 2025): "Allies don't threaten to interfere in the domestic political choices of their allies... What we can't accept is the threat of interference in European political life. The United States cannot replace European citizens in choosing what the good or the bad parties are." - This was in response to the Trump administration's new national security strategy, which "paints European allies as weak, while offering tacit support to far-right political parties."

3. Breakdown of Cooperation* - The *US State Department terminated a memorandum of understanding on countering foreign disinformation in September 2025. - The US has withdrawn from joint counter-disinformation efforts, with the EUISS noting: "Since its first days in office, the US administration has undertaken a U-turn in the fight against disinformation." - In October 2026, EU, Canada and Lithuania pulled out of a disinformation conference after US pressure (Politico).

The Distinction: FIMI vs. Foreign Interference

The EU's European Democracy Shield (November 2025) focuses primarily on countering Russian FIMI, but the broader context of transatlantic tensions is increasingly noted in European security assessments.

Conclusion

The United States is not officially classified as a FIMI threat actor by the EU — that designation is reserved for Russia and China. However, European leaders have explicitly warned the US against interfering in European democratic processes, particularly regarding support for far-right parties and election interference. The transatlantic partnership on countering disinformation has collapsed, and the US is increasingly viewed in Europe as a source of democratic interference concern, even if not formally categorized under the FIMI framework.

Original text

Based on my research of official EU documents, EEAS reports, and recent news coverage, here is a nuanced answer to your question:

Short Answer

Officially, no — the United States is not classified as a FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) threat actor in European Union assessments. However, there is growing concern in Europe about US interference in European democratic processes, and the transatlantic relationship on countering disinformation has deteriorated significantly in 2025–2026.

What Official EU Assessments Say

The European External Action Service (EEAS) — the EU's diplomatic service responsible for monitoring FIMI — consistently identifies Russia and China as the primary FIMI threat actors:

• The 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats (March 2026) attributes 35% of documented incidents to Russia (29%) and China (6%) — with no mention of the US as a threat actor.
• The EEAS website explicitly states: "We focus in particular on Russia and China" and "We monitor and address Russia and China as FIMI actors."
• The 2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter FIMI describes the EU and US as having a "close partnership" on FIMI, with joint methodologies (DISARM framework, STIX 2, OpenCTI) and cooperation through the EU-US Trade and Technology Council.

The Shift: Growing Concerns About US Interference

While the US is not formally classified as a "FIMI actor" (a term typically reserved for hostile authoritarian states), European leaders have increasingly warned about US interference in European politics:

1. Direct Interference in Elections* - *Vice President JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference (February 2025) criticized European leaders and was followed by "explicit interventions in European elections, where the US openly supported far-right and Eurosceptic parties and candidates — notably in Germany, Poland and Romania" (EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2025). - Elon Musk has openly supported far-right parties, including Germany's AfD and Romania's far-right candidate Călin Georgescu. - German Chancellor Olaf Scholz condemned Vance's overtures to the AfD as "a direct intervention" in German democracy.

2. Warnings from European Leaders* - *European Council President António Costa (December 2025): "Allies don't threaten to interfere in the domestic political choices of their allies... What we can't accept is the threat of interference in European political life. The United States cannot replace European citizens in choosing what the good or the bad parties are." - This was in response to the Trump administration's new national security strategy, which "paints European allies as weak, while offering tacit support to far-right political parties."

3. Breakdown of Cooperation* - The *US State Department terminated a memorandum of understanding on countering foreign disinformation in September 2025. - The US has withdrawn from joint counter-disinformation efforts, with the EUISS noting: "Since its first days in office, the US administration has undertaken a U-turn in the fight against disinformation." - In October 2026, EU, Canada and Lithuania pulled out of a disinformation conference after US pressure (Politico).

The Distinction: FIMI vs. Foreign Interference

The EU's European Democracy Shield (November 2025) focuses primarily on countering Russian FIMI, but the broader context of transatlantic tensions is increasingly noted in European security assessments.

Conclusion

The United States is not officially classified as a FIMI threat actor by the EU — that designation is reserved for Russia and China. However, European leaders have explicitly warned the US against interfering in European democratic processes, particularly regarding support for far-right parties and election interference. The transatlantic partnership on countering disinformation has collapsed, and the US is increasingly viewed in Europe as a source of democratic interference concern, even if not formally categorized under the FIMI framework.

French — answer round 1

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English translation

Based on research conducted on official European reports, recent threat assessments, and the current geopolitical context, here is a nuanced analysis of this complex question:

Summary Answer

Officially, the United States is not classified as a FIMI threat by European institutions—they remain a strategic partner in the fight against information manipulation. However, the situation is evolving rapidly in 2025, with the emergence of growing concerns regarding American behaviors that could amount to interference, particularly via private actors linked to the Trump administration.

1. The Official European Framework: The United States as a Partner, Not a Threat

The most recent reports from the European External Action Service (EEAS) are unambiguous:

• The 3rd EEAS Report on FIMI Threats (March 2025) explicitly identifies Russia and China as the main actors of information manipulation targeting the EU. The analysis of 505 FIMI incidents in 2024 reveals a massive infrastructure attributed to these two authoritarian regimes, accounting for 20% and 3.5% of the detected FIMI architecture, respectively.

• The 2024 EEAS Report highlights close cooperation with the United States: "Cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada on FIMI-related issues remained strong," and mentions the EU-US joint statement during the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) in April 2024, where both parties agreed to use the same methodology (DISARM, STIX 2, OpenCTI) to detect and analyze FIMI threats.

• The European Parliament (Report A10-0250/2025 on EU-US political relations) states that "the Union, its Member States and the United States face similar and persistent hybrid threats, notably foreign information manipulation and interference activities"—placing the United States on the side of potential victims, not threats.

2. The Concerning Evolution of 2025: Towards Questioning the Partnership

Several recent developments suggest a degradation of transatlantic trust in the informational domain:

a) The American Dismantling of Anti-Disinformation Structures The Trump administration has dissolved the State Department's Global Engagement Center (GEC), the agency responsible for combating foreign disinformation. The United States has also unilaterally terminated cooperation agreements signed in 2024 with Europe to jointly combat Russian, Chinese, and Iranian disinformation. James Rubin, former director of the GEC, described this decision as "a unilateral act of disarmament" in the information war.

b) An Increasingly Hostile Rhetoric According to the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), "what unfolded in 2025 goes several steps further" in the transatlantic rupture: - Trump described the EU as a "globalist" entity aiming to "rip off" the United States - He refused to rule out the use of force to annex Greenland (territory of an EU Member State and NATO ally) - Vice President JD Vance declared at the Munich Conference that attempts to limit disinformation represented a greater threat to Europe than Russia and China - The State Department published a memorandum accusing Europe of waging an "aggressive campaign against Western civilization itself"

c) Interference via Private Actors: The Case of Elon Musk Although Musk is not a state actor, his close ties to the Trump administration and his role within it (Department of Government Efficiency - DOGE) are raising European concerns:

• Members of the European Parliament (notably Damian Boeselager) have asked the European Commission to investigate Musk's "interference" in European elections
• An analysis by franceinfo/RTBF/France 24 (April 2025) shows that Musk used X to systematically amplify the far right in Europe, notably the AfD in Germany (nearly 200 tweets about Germany, 7 out of 10 concerning immigration or the AfD)
• French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot asked the EU to intervene with "the utmost firmness," even raising the possibility of banning X in Europe
• The European Commission has been investigating X since 2023 under the Digital Services Act (DSA)

3. European Fears Regarding Dependence on American Intelligence

Several recent articles (Foreign Policy, Washington Post, 2025) reveal that European intelligence services are concerned about: - The reliability of intelligence sharing with the United States under Trump - The risk that sensitive information shared with Washington could end up in the hands of Moscow or Trump loyalists - Trump's willingness to exclude Canada from the Five Eyes group - The cessation of American cyberattacks against Russia (ordered by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth), creating space for Russian FIMI operations

4. Historical Context: The United States Has Conducted Influence Operations in Europe

It is important to note that the United States has historically conducted influence operations in Europe, particularly during the Cold War (CIA, funding of political parties, media operations). However, these activities took place within a framework of common defense against the USSR and were not considered FIMI threats in the modern sense of the term.

Conclusion

ISS analysts now speak of a "low trust" environment in transatlantic relations, where Europe must prepare to take over the fight against disinformation, potentially including against allied actors who have become hostile.

Main sources consulted: - EEAS, 3rd Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats, March 2025 - EEAS, 2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter FIMI, 2025 - European Parliament, Report on political relations between the EU and the United States (A10-0250/2025) - ISS, Low trust: navigating transatlantic relations under Trump 2.0, 2025 - EU DisinfoLab, Documenting the setbacks: The new environment for counter-disinformation in Europe, 2025 - International press (The Guardian, Politico, Franceinfo, CNN, Foreign Policy, Washington Post), January–June 2025

Original text

D'après les recherches effectuées sur les rapports officiels européens, les évaluations de menaces récentes et le contexte géopolitique actuel, voici une analyse nuancée de cette question complexe :

Réponse synthétique

Officiellement, les États-Unis ne sont pas classés comme une menace FIMI par les institutions européennes — ils demeurent un partenaire stratégique dans la lutte contre la manipulation de l'information. Cependant, la situation évolue rapidement en 2025, avec l'émergence de préoccupations croissantes concernant des comportements américains qui pourraient s'apparenter à de l'ingérence, notamment via des acteurs privés liés à l'administration Trump.

1. Le cadre officiel européen : les États-Unis comme partenaire, non comme menace

Les rapports les plus récents du Service européen pour l'action extérieure (EEAS) sont sans ambiguïté :

• Le 3e rapport EEAS sur les menaces FIMI (mars 2025) identifie explicitement la Russie et la Chine comme les principaux acteurs de manipulation de l'information ciblant l'UE. L'analyse de 505 incidents FIMI en 2024 révèle une infrastructure massive attribuée à ces deux régimes autoritaires, représentant respectivement 20% et 3,5% de l'architecture FIMI détectée.

• Le rapport 2024 de l'EEAS souligne la coopération étroite avec les États-Unis : "Cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada on FIMI-related issues remained strong" et mentionne la déclaration conjointe UE-États-Unis lors du Conseil UE-US du commerce et de la technologie (TTC) d'avril 2024, où les deux parties ont convenu d'utiliser la même méthodologie (DISARM, STIX 2, OpenCTI) pour détecter et analyser les menaces FIMI.

• Le Parlement européen (rapport A10-0250/2025 sur les relations politiques UE-États-Unis) affirme que "l'Union, ses États membres et les États-Unis sont confrontés à des menaces hybrides similaires et persistantes, notamment des activités de manipulation de l'information et d'ingérence menées depuis l'étranger" — plaçant les États-Unis du côté des victimes potentielles, non des menaces.

2. L'évolution préoccupante de 2025 : vers une remise en question du partenariat

Plusieurs développements récents suggèrent une dégradation de la confiance transatlantique dans le domaine informationnel :

a) Le démantèlement américain des structures anti-désinformation L'administration Trump a dissous le Global Engagement Center (GEC) du Département d'État, l'agence chargée de combattre la désinformation étrangère. Les États-Unis ont également résilié unilatéralement les accords de coopération signés en 2024 avec l'Europe pour lutter conjointement contre la désinformation russe, chinoise et iranienne. James Rubin, ancien directeur du GEC, a qualifié cette décision d'"acte unilatéral de désarmement" dans la guerre de l'information.

b) Une rhétorique de plus en plus hostile Selon l'Institut d'études de sécurité de l'UE (ISS), "ce qui s'est déroulé en 2025 va plusieurs étapes plus loin" dans la rupture transatlantique : - Trump a qualifié l'UE d'entité "globaliste" visant à "arnaquer" les États-Unis - Il a refusé d'exclure l'usage de la force pour annexer le Groenland (territoire d'un État membre de l'UE et allié de l'OTAN) - JD Vance, vice-président, a déclaré à la Conférence de Munich que les tentatives de limiter la désinformation représentaient une menace plus grande pour l'Europe que la Russie et la Chine - Le Département d'État a publié un mémorandum accusant l'Europe de mener une "campagne agressive contre la civilisation occidentale elle-même"

c) L'ingérence via des acteurs privés : le cas Elon Musk Bien que Musk ne soit pas un acteur étatique, ses liens étroits avec l'administration Trump et son rôle au sein de celle-ci (Département de l'Efficacité Gouvernementale - DOGE) suscitent des inquiétudes européennes :

• Des eurodéputés (notamment Damian Boeselager) ont demandé à la Commission européenne d'enquêter sur les "ingérences" de Musk dans les élections européennes
• Une analyse de franceinfo/RTBF/France 24 (avril 2025) montre que Musk a utilisé X pour amplifier systématiquement l'extrême droite en Europe, notamment l'AfD en Allemagne (près de 200 tweets sur l'Allemagne, 7 sur 10 concernant l'immigration ou l'AfD)
• Le ministre français des Affaires étrangères Jean-Noël Barrot a demandé à l'UE d'intervenir avec "la plus grande fermeté", évoquant même la possibilité d'interdire X en Europe
• La Commission européenne enquête depuis 2023 sur X dans le cadre du Digital Services Act (DSA)

3. Les craintes européennes concernant la dépendance au renseignement américain

Plusieurs articles récents (Foreign Policy, Washington Post, 2025) révèlent que les services de renseignement européens s'inquiètent de : - La fiabilité du partage de renseignement avec les États-Unis sous Trump - Le risque que des informations sensibles partagées avec Washington puissent finir entre les mains de Moscou ou d'adeptes de Trump - La volonté de Trump d'exclure le Canada du groupe Five Eyes - L'arrêt des cyberattaques américaines contre la Russie (ordonné par le secrétaire à la Défense Pete Hegseth), créant un espace pour les opérations FIMI russes

4. Contexte historique : les États-Unis ont mené des opérations d'influence en Europe

Il est important de noter que les États-Unis ont historiquement mené des opérations d'influence en Europe, notamment pendant la Guerre froide (CIA, financement de partis politiques, opérations médiatiques). Cependant, ces activités s'inscrivaient dans un cadre de défense commune contre l'URSS et n'étaient pas considérées comme des menaces FIMI au sens actuel du terme.

Conclusion

Les analystes de l'ISS parlent désormais d'un environnement de "low trust" (faible confiance) dans les relations transatlantiques, où l'Europe doit se préparer à prendre le relais dans la lutte contre la désinformation, y compris potentiellement contre des acteurs alliés devenus hostiles.

Sources principales consultées : - EEAS, 3rd Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats, mars 2025 - EEAS, 2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter FIMI, 2025 - Parlement européen, Rapport sur les relations politiques entre l'UE et les États-Unis (A10-0250/2025) - ISS, Low trust: navigating transatlantic relations under Trump 2.0, 2025 - EU DisinfoLab, Documenting the setbacks: The new environment for counter-disinformation in Europe, 2025 - Presse internationale (The Guardian, Politico, Franceinfo, CNN, Foreign Policy, Washington Post), janvier-juin 2025

Lithuanian — answer round 1

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English translation

Based on the research conducted, I provide a detailed answer to your question in Lithuanian:

Is the US a FIMI Threat to Europe?

Short answer: In official EU documents, the United States is not designated as a FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) threat actor in the same context as Russia or China. However, since 2024–2025, concerns have been rapidly growing regarding US interference in European democratic processes, particularly through social media platforms and political support for the far-right.

1. Official EU Position: The US – Partner, Not Enemy

In the European External Action Service (EEAS) FIMI threat reports (2023–2026), the primary FIMI actors are consistently identified as:

• Russia (approx. 29% of attributed incidents)
• China (approx. 6% of attributed incidents)

The US is described here as an ally and partner in the fight against FIMI. The EU and the US have established a joint methodology for FIMI identification (DISARM framework, STIX 2 standard, OpenCTI platform) through the Trade and Technology Council (TTC).

> "The European Union and the United States have established a close partnership in addressing the issue of information manipulation..." – EEAS documents

2. Recent Developments (2024–2025): Growing Concern

Despite the official partnership, serious tensions have emerged since late 2024:

a) US National Security Strategy (December 2025) The strategy document states that the US will "cultivate resistance" in Europe in order to "correct its current trajectory," and praises the growing influence of "patriotic parties." This provoked a sharp reaction:

> "Allies do not threaten to interfere in the domestic political choices of allies... We cannot accept the threat of interference in European political life." – António Costa, President of the European Council (December 8, 2025)

b) US Officials' Interference in Elections - JD Vance (US Vice President) met with the leader of the German far-right AfD, Alice Weidel, in Munich in February 2025, ahead of the elections. Berlin assessed this as "unacceptable electoral interference." - Elon Musk (owner of X/Twitter, Trump administration ally) publicly supported the AfD in Germany, criticized the annulment of the Romanian elections, and called judges "tyrants."

c) Influence of Social Media Platforms EU regulators are investigating whether the X algorithm was manipulated to increase the reach of politicians supported by Musk. The European Commission is conducting investigations against X, Meta, and TikTok under the Digital Services Act (DSA) regarding potential electoral manipulation.

d) US Criticism of EU Regulation The Trump administration has criticized the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) as "censorship" and ordered diplomats to run lobbying campaigns against the law. This creates tension regarding the regulation of the information space.

3. Essential Difference: FIMI vs. Political Influence

It is important to distinguish between two categories:

The US is not officially included in the EU FIMI sanctions lists like Russia or China. However, in December 2025, the situation is changing – the EU is increasingly discussing "hybrid threats" from various sources, including allies.

4. EU Response: European Democracy Shield

In November 2025, the European Commission introduced the European Democracy Shield, which includes:

• Protection of the integrity of the information space
• Protection of the electoral process from foreign interference
• Strengthening of societal resilience

Official documents of this shield still focus primarily on Russia, but it is mentioned that "various actors" may have an interest in undermining EU democracy.

Conclusion

At the official level, the US is not considered a FIMI threat to Europe – they are key partners in the fight against Russian and Chinese disinformation.

However, in practice, a new reality has been taking shape since 2024–2025: the US administration and related actors (Elon Musk, JD Vance) are actively interfering in European politics, supporting far-right parties, and criticizing EU regulation. This raises serious questions regarding transatlantic relations and the protection of European democratic processes.

European leaders have already publicly warned Washington against interference, but for now, there is no official classification of the US into the FIMI threat category – this remains a diplomatic "grey area" between allied cooperation and unacceptable interference in internal affairs.

Original text

Remdamasis atliktais tyrimais, pateikiu išsamų atsakymą į jūsų klausimą lietuvių kalba:

Ar JAV yra FIMI grėsmė Europai?

Trumpas atsakymas: Oficialiose ES dokumentuose Jungtinės Valstijos nėra įvardijamos kaip FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) grėsmės veikėjos tame pačiame kontekste kaip Rusija ar Kinija. Tačiau nuo 2024–2025 m. sparčiai auga susirūpinimas dėl JAV įsikišimo į Europos demokratinius procesus, ypač per socialinės žiniasklaidos platformas ir politinę paramą kraštutiniams dešiniesiems.

1. Oficiali ES pozicija: JAV – partneris, ne priešas

Europos išorės veiksmų tarnybos (EEAS) FIMI grėsmių ataskaitose (2023–2026 m.) nuosekliai kaip pagrindiniai FIMI veikėjai įvardijami:

• Rusija (apie 29 % priskirtų incidentų)
• Kinija (apie 6 % priskirtų incidentų)

JAV čia aprašomos kaip sąjungininkė ir partnerė kovoje su FIMI. ES ir JAV yra sukūrusios bendrą metodologiją FIMI identifikavimui (DISARM sistema, STIX 2 standartas, OpenCTI platforma) per Prekybos ir technologijų tarybą (TTC).

> „Europos Sąjunga ir Jungtinės Valstijos yra sukūrusios glaudžią partnerystę sprendžiant manipuliavimo informacija klausimus..." – EEAS dokumentai

2. Naujausi pokyčiai (2024–2025 m.): augantis susirūpinimas

Nepaisant oficialios partnerystės, nuo 2024 m. pabaigos išryškėjo rimtų įtampų:

a) JAV Nacionalinio saugumo strategija (2025 m. gruodis) Strategijos dokumente teigiama, kad JAV „kultivuos pasipriešinimą" Europoje, siekdama „pataisyti jos dabartinę kryptį", ir giria „patriotinių partijų" augančią įtaką. Tai sukėlė aštrią reakciją:

> „Sąjungininkai negraso kištis į sąjungininkų vidaus politinius pasirinkimus... Mes negalime priimti grėsmės kištis į Europos politinį gyvenimą." – António Costa, Europos Vadovų Tarybos pirmininkas (2025 m. gruodžio 8 d.)

b) JAV pareigūnų įsikišimas į rinkimus - JD Vance (JAV viceprezidentas) 2025 m. vasarį Miunchene susitiko su Vokietijos kraštutinių dešiniųjų AfD lyderė Alice Weidel, prieš rinkimus. Berlynas tai įvertino kaip „nepriimtiną kišimąsi į rinkimus". - Elon Musk (X/Twitter savininkas, Trump administracijos sąjungininkas) viešai palaikė AfD Vokietijoje, kritikavo Rumunijos rinkimų panaikinimą ir vadino teisėjus „tironais".

c) Socialinės žiniasklaidos platformų įtaka ES reguliuotojai tiria, ar X algoritmas nebuvo manipuliuojamas siekiant padidinti Musk palaikomų politikų pasiekiamumą. Europos Komisija atlieka tyrimus prieš X, Meta ir TikTok pagal Skaitmeninių paslaugų aktą (DSA) dėl galimo manipuliavimo rinkimais.

d) JAV kritika ES reguliavimui Trumpo administracija kritikuoja ES Skaitmeninių paslaugų aktą (DSA) kaip „censūrą" ir įsakė diplomatams lobistines kampanijas prieš šį įstatymą. Tai sukuria įtampą dėl informacinės erdvės reguliavimo.

3. Esminis skirtumas: FIMI vs. politinė įtaka

Svarbu atskirti dvi kategorijas:

JAV nėra oficialiai įtrauktos į ES FIMI sankcijų sąrašus kaip Rusija ar Kinija. Tačiau 2025 m. gruodžio mėn. situacija keičiasi – ES vis aktyviau diskutuoja apie „hibridines grėsmes" iš įvairių šaltinių, įskaitant sąjungininkes.

4. ES atsakas: Europos demokratijos skydas

2025 m. lapkritį Europos Komisija pristatė Europos demokratijos skydą (European Democracy Shield), kuris apima:

• Informacinės erdvės vientisumo apsaugą
• Rinkimų proceso apsaugą nuo užsienio kišimosi
• Visuomenės atsparumo stiprinimą

Oficialiose šio skydo dokumentuose vis dar daugiausia dėmesio skiriama Rusijai, tačiau paminėta, kad „įvairūs veikėjai" gali turėti interesą pakenkti ES demokratijai.

Išvada

Oficialiame lygmenyje JAV nėra laikomos FIMI grėsme Europai – jos yra svarbiausios partnerės kovoje su Rusijos ir Kinijos dezinformacija.

Tačiau praktikoje nuo 2024–2025 m. formuojasi nauja realybė: JAV administracija ir su ja susiję veikėjai (Elon Musk, JD Vance) aktyviai kišasi į Europos politiką, palaiko kraštutinių dešiniųjų partijas ir kritikuoja ES reguliavimą. Tai kelia rimtų klausimų dėl transatlantinių santykių ir Europos demokratinių procesų apsaugos.

Europos lyderiai jau viešai perspėja Vašingtoną dėl kišimosi, tačiau kol kas nėra oficialaus JAV priskyrimo FIMI grėsmių kategorijai – tai išlieka diplomatine „pilkąja zona" tarp sąjungininkų bendradarbiavimo ir nepriimtino kišimosi į vidaus reikalus.

Russian — answer round 1

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English translation

Based on the analysis of official EU documents, EEAS (European External Action Service) reports, and current news from 2024–2026, the following answer can be provided:

Short Answer

Officially, the US is not classified by the European Union as a FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) threat in the same sense as Russia or China. However, in 2025 the Trump administration's actions caused unprecedented concern in Europe and were characterized by a number of European leaders as unacceptable interference in internal affairs, creating a new dynamic in transatlantic relations.

1. Official EU Position: The US is a Partner, Not a Threat

In official EEAS reports on FIMI: - The 3rd EEAS Report (March 2025) and the 4th Report (2026) explicitly state that the main sources of FIMI for Europe are Russia (29% of documented incidents) and China (6%). - The US is mentioned exclusively as a key partner in countering FIMI: the EU and the US have developed a joint threat analysis methodology (the DISARM framework), cooperated within the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), and exchanged intelligence.

Prior to 2025, transatlantic cooperation in countering disinformation was considered "exemplary."

2. Sharp Shift in the Situation in 2025

The Trump administration took a number of steps that European leaders perceived as a threat to democratic processes:

a) Dismantling US Anti-Disinformation Structures The US closed key offices dealing with counter-foreign interference: - The Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Hub (State Department) - The Global Engagement Centre - The Foreign Malign Influence Center (Intelligence Community)

This happened against the backdrop of Russia continuing to step up its FIMI efforts in Europe.

b) Direct Interference in European Elections - Romania (2025): Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference (February 2025) criticized the cancellation of the Romanian presidential election, stating that "closing off disfavored views is the surest way to destroy democracy." The US openly demanded that the right-wing candidate Călin Georgescu, supported by Trump, be allowed to run in the election. - Germany (February 2025): Vance met with the leader of the AfD party (classified as extremist) on the eve of the parliamentary elections. Chancellor Olaf Scholz called this "direct interference" in democracy: "We do not accept that outsiders interfere in our democracy, in our elections." - Poland (2025): Trump personally endorsed right-wing candidate Karol Nawrocki in the presidential election.

c) New US National Security Strategy (December 2025) A document published by the White House contains unprecedented criticism of Europe: - Accuses the EU of "undermining democratic processes," "censoring freedom of speech," and "suppressing political opposition." - States that Europe risks "civilizational erasure" due to migration. - Calls on the US to "cultivate resistance" within Europe to "correct its current course." - Openly supports Europe's nationalist right-wing parties.

Reaction: European Council President António Costa stated: "Allies do not threaten interference in the internal political elections of their allies. We cannot accept the threat of interference in European political life."

3. Important Distinction: FIMI vs. Political Pressure from an Ally

It is necessary to distinguish between two concepts:

Experts (for example, from the EUISS — European Union Institute for Security Studies) note that the US is rolling back cooperation on countering disinformation, which weakens the overall transatlantic defense against Russia and China, but does not make the US a source of FIMI in the classical sense.

4. Technological Aspect: Pressure on US Platforms

The EU applies the Digital Services Act (DSA) to American tech giants (X, Meta), fining them for inadequate efforts against disinformation. The Trump administration perceives this as "censorship" and "extortion" of American companies, threatening tariffs and restrictions.

This creates tension, but is not qualified as FIMI on the part of the US.

Conclusions

1. Formally, the US is not included on the list of FIMI threats to Europe — the main threats stem from Russia and China.

2. Factically, an unprecedented crisis occurred in transatlantic relations in 2025: the Trump administration's actions (support for Eurosceptics, election interference, ideological pressure) are perceived by European leaders as unacceptable foreign interference, even if it comes from an ally.

3. Paradox: The US, which traditionally has been Europe's main partner in countering FIMI, is now weakening this fight itself, shutting down its own structures and criticizing European approaches to disinformation regulation.

4. New Reality: Europe is forced to strengthen its own institutions (European Democracy Shield, FIMI-combating center) without US support, which changes the balance of power in the transatlantic partnership.

Thus, the US is not a FIMI threat in the classical sense (like Russia), but its actions in 2025 create a new type of threat — political and ideological pressure from an ally, which European leaders consider unacceptable interference in sovereign democratic processes.

Original text

На основе анализа официальных документов ЕС, отчетов EEAS (Европейской службы внешних связей) и актуальных новостей 2024–2026 годов, можно дать следующий ответ:

Краткий ответ

Официально США не классифицируются Европейским союзом как угроза FIMI (иностранного манипулирования информацией и вмешательства) в том же смысле, что Россия или Китай. Однако в 2025 году действия администрации Трампа вызвали беспрецедентную озабоченность в Европе и были охарактеризованы рядом европейских лидеров как недопустимое вмешательство во внутренние дела, что создает новую динамику в трансатлантических отношениях.

1. Официальная позиция ЕС: США — партнер, а не угроза

В официальных отчетах EEAS о FIMI: - 3-й отчет EEAS (март 2025) и 4-й отчет (2026) прямо указывают, что основными источниками FIMI для Европы являются Россия (29% задокументированных инцидентов) и Китай (6%) . - США упоминаются исключительно как ключевой партнер в борьбе с FIMI: ЕС и США разработали общую методологию анализа угроз (DISARM framework), сотрудничали в рамках Совета по торговле и технологиям (TTC) и обменивались разведданными .

До 2025 года трансатлантическое сотрудничество в сфере противодействия дезинформации считалось «образцовым».

2. Резкое изменение ситуации в 2025 году

Администрация Трампа предприняла ряд шагов, которые европейские лидеры восприняли как угрозу демократическим процессам:

а) Демонтаж американских структур по борьбе с дезинформацией США закрыли ключевые офисы, занимавшиеся противодействием иностранному вмешательству: - Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Hub (Госдепартамент) - Global Engagement Centre - Foreign Malign Influence Center (разведывательное сообщество)

Это произошло на фоне того, что Россия продолжает наращивать усилия по FIMI в Европе .

б) Прямое вмешательство в европейские выборы - Румыния (2025): Вице-президент JD Vance на Мюнхенской конференции безопасности (февраль 2025) раскритиковал отмену президентских выборов в Румынии, заявив, что «закрытие неугодных взглядов — самый верный способ разрушить демократию». США открыто потребовали допустить к выборам правого кандидата Калина Джорджеску, которого поддерживает Трамп . - Германия (февраль 2025): Vance встретился с лидером партии AfD (классифицированной как экстремистская) накануне парламентских выборов. Канцлер Олаф Шольц назвал это «прямым вмешательством» в демократию: «Мы не принимаем, чтобы посторонние вмешивались в нашу демократию, в наши выборы». - Польша (2025): Трамп лично поддержал правого кандидата Кароля Навроцкого на президентских выборах.

в) Новая стратегия национальной безопасности США (декабрь 2025) Документ, опубликованный Белым домом, содержит беспрецедентную критику Европы: - Обвиняет ЕС в «подрыве демократических процессов», «цензуре свободы слова» и «подавлении политической оппозиции» - Заявляет, что Европа рискует «цивилизационным исчезновением» из-за миграции - Призывает США «культивировать сопротивление» внутри Европы для «коррекции её текущего курса» - Открыто поддерживает националистические правые партии Европы .

Реакция: Президент Европейского совета Антониу Кошта заявил: «Союзники не угрожают вмешательством во внутренние политические выборы своих союзников. Мы не можем принять угрозу вмешательства в европейскую политическую жизнь» .

3. Важное различие: FIMI vs. политическое давление союзника

Необходимо различать два понятия:

Эксперты (например, из EUISS — Института ЕС по исследованиям в области безопасности) отмечают, что США сворачивают сотрудничество по борьбе с дезинформацией, что ослабляет общую трансатлантическую оборону против России и Китая, но не делают США источником FIMI в классическом понимании .

4. Технологический аспект: давление на американские платформы

ЕС применяет Закон о цифровых услугах (DSA) к американским технологическим гигантам (X, Meta), штрафуя их за недостаточную борьбу с дезинформацией. Администрация Трампа воспринимает это как «цензуру» и «вымогательство» американских компаний, угрожая тарифами и ограничениями .

Это создает напряженность, но не квалифицируется как FIMI со стороны США.

Выводы

1. Формально США не включены в список угроз FIMI для Европы — основные угрозы исходят от России и Китая.

2. Фактически в 2025 году произошел беспрецедентный кризис в трансатлантических отношениях: действия администрации Трампа (поддержка евроскептиков, вмешательство в выборы, идеологическое давление) воспринимаются европейскими лидерами как недопустимое иностранное вмешательство, даже если оно исходит от союзника.

3. Парадокс: США, которые традиционно были главным партнером Европы в борьбе с FIMI, теперь сами ослабляют эту борьбу, закрывая собственные структуры и критикуя европейские подходы к регулированию дезинформации.

4. Новая реальность: Европа вынуждена укреплять собственные институты (Европейский щит демократии, центр по борьбе с FIMI) без поддержки США, что меняет баланс сил в трансатлантическом партнерстве.

Таким образом, США не являются угрозой FIMI в классическом понимании (как Россия), но их действия в 2025 году создают новый тип угрозы — политическое и идеологическое давление со стороны союзника, которое европейские лидеры считают неприемлемым вмешательством в суверенные демократические процессы.

GPT-6.1 Sol

Repeated check: one answer round only. The report shows answer round 1.

English — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI) | EEAS - https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf - https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/b/593720_0.pdf - EU drops sponsorship of disinformation conference at Trump officials’ request | Trump administration | The Guardian - EU official warns US against European interference | AP News

English translation

Yes—as a credible risk Europe should assess, but not as a blanket label for the United States or every American attempt to influence European politics. The crucial distinction is between foreign influence, political interference, and the narrower category of foreign information manipulation and interference. The EU’s definition makes manipulative conduct—not an actor’s nationality or alliance status—the central test. (eeas.europa.eu)

What would make American activity FIMI?

The European External Action Service (EEAS) defines FIMI as intentional, coordinated, manipulative behaviour that threatens or could negatively affect political processes, procedures, or values. It can involve state or non-state actors, and need not be illegal. Consequently, neither being a NATO ally nor being a private American company automatically puts an actor outside the definition. (eeas.europa.eu)

But criticism of European governments, support for a political party, or disagreement over speech regulation is not automatically FIMI. Applying that definition requires evidence of manipulation and coordination, rather than simply an unwelcome opinion. Examples worth investigating would include concealed sponsorship, deceptive identities, coordinated inauthentic amplification, or deliberate manipulation of information distribution. That is a conduct-based assessment, not a test of political ideology. (eeas.europa.eu)

Why the concern is credible

There are concrete reasons to scrutinise U.S. actors:

• An explicit policy of influencing Europe’s political direction. The U.S. National Security Strategy, released in December 2025, calls for “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations.” This establishes an intention to encourage political change inside European countries. It does not, by itself, establish that the means used are manipulative or constitute FIMI. (whitehouse.gov)
• A platform owner’s intervention in an election. In its report on Germany’s February 23, 2025 election, OSCE/ODIHR documented Elon Musk’s vigorous support for the AfD through X, giving it unprecedented prominence. It also recorded the European Commission’s investigation into X’s recommender system. This warrants scrutiny, but the report does not establish that Musk secretly manipulated the algorithm or acted under U.S. government direction. (osce.org)
• Pressure on the counter-disinformation community. On October 7, 2026, the Guardian reported U.S. pressure to withdraw sponsorship of a European disinformation conference—pressure, but not itself proven FIMI. (theguardian.com)

European Council President António Costa also publicly warned against U.S. interference in European politics on December 8, 2025. That demonstrates an official concern about interference, although it is not equivalent to a technical attribution of a FIMI operation. (apnews.com)

Is this the EU’s official classification?

Not in the same sense as its established treatment of Russian and Chinese operations. The EEAS publicly identifies Russia and China as its particular focus. That focus should not be mistaken for a definition that exempts other countries, but neither should an analytical concern about U.S. actors be presented as an established EU-wide designation. (eeas.europa.eu)

My assessment: Europe should treat American state-linked and private actors as possible FIMI perpetrators and investigate specific conduct using the same evidentiary standards applied to anyone else. The evidence supports a credible interference risk; it does not justify calling all American influence FIMI or assuming every private American intervention is a U.S. government operation. An ally should receive neither automatic immunity nor automatic guilt. (eeas.europa.eu)

Original text

Yes—as a credible risk Europe should assess, but not as a blanket label for the United States or every American attempt to influence European politics. The crucial distinction is between foreign influence, political interference, and the narrower category of foreign information manipulation and interference. The EU’s definition makes manipulative conduct—not an actor’s nationality or alliance status—the central test. (eeas.europa.eu)

What would make American activity FIMI?

The European External Action Service (EEAS) defines FIMI as intentional, coordinated, manipulative behaviour that threatens or could negatively affect political processes, procedures, or values. It can involve state or non-state actors, and need not be illegal. Consequently, neither being a NATO ally nor being a private American company automatically puts an actor outside the definition. (eeas.europa.eu)

But criticism of European governments, support for a political party, or disagreement over speech regulation is not automatically FIMI. Applying that definition requires evidence of manipulation and coordination, rather than simply an unwelcome opinion. Examples worth investigating would include concealed sponsorship, deceptive identities, coordinated inauthentic amplification, or deliberate manipulation of information distribution. That is a conduct-based assessment, not a test of political ideology. (eeas.europa.eu)

Why the concern is credible

There are concrete reasons to scrutinise U.S. actors:

• An explicit policy of influencing Europe’s political direction. The U.S. National Security Strategy, released in December 2025, calls for “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations.” This establishes an intention to encourage political change inside European countries. It does not, by itself, establish that the means used are manipulative or constitute FIMI. (whitehouse.gov)
• A platform owner’s intervention in an election. In its report on Germany’s February 23, 2025 election, OSCE/ODIHR documented Elon Musk’s vigorous support for the AfD through X, giving it unprecedented prominence. It also recorded the European Commission’s investigation into X’s recommender system. This warrants scrutiny, but the report does not establish that Musk secretly manipulated the algorithm or acted under U.S. government direction. (osce.org)
• Pressure on the counter-disinformation community. On October 7, 2026, the Guardian reported U.S. pressure to withdraw sponsorship of a European disinformation conference—pressure, but not itself proven FIMI. (theguardian.com)

European Council President António Costa also publicly warned against U.S. interference in European politics on December 8, 2025. That demonstrates an official concern about interference, although it is not equivalent to a technical attribution of a FIMI operation. (apnews.com)

Is this the EU’s official classification?

Not in the same sense as its established treatment of Russian and Chinese operations. The EEAS publicly identifies Russia and China as its particular focus. That focus should not be mistaken for a definition that exempts other countries, but neither should an analytical concern about U.S. actors be presented as an established EU-wide designation. (eeas.europa.eu)

My assessment: Europe should treat American state-linked and private actors as possible FIMI perpetrators and investigate specific conduct using the same evidentiary standards applied to anyone else. The evidence supports a credible interference risk; it does not justify calling all American influence FIMI or assuming every private American intervention is a U.S. government operation. An ally should receive neither automatic immunity nor automatic guilt. (eeas.europa.eu)

French — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025-10/CP_187_ch4.pdf - INTRODUCTION - The 2025 US National Security Strategy - Trump admin bars 5 Europeans it says led drive to "censor" U.S. views online - Musk hosts German far-right leader on X, stirs angst about election meddling By Reuters - EU drops sponsorship of disinformation conference at Trump officials’ request | Trump administration | The Guardian - Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI) | EEAS

English translation

Yes, certain American actors can represent a FIMI threat to Europe. But broadly qualifying "the United States" as a FIMI actor would be too imprecise: a distinction must be made between the government, companies, individuals, and effectively documented operations. The available evidence justifies vigilance toward the Trump administration and certain private American actors, without automatically equating their actions to Russian or Chinese operations. (iss.europa.eu)

1. What falls — or does not fall — under FIMI

According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), FIMI refers to intentional, coordinated, and manipulative behaviors that are likely to undermine values, procedures, and political processes. They can be carried out by state or non-state actors, and are not necessarily illegal. This definition grants no exemption to allied countries. (eeas.europa.eu)

Conversely, American criticism of the EU, public political support, or diplomatic pressure are not enough, on their own, to establish a FIMI operation. The methods must be examined: deception, coordination, concealment, manipulation of dissemination, and harm to democratic debate. The central distinction is therefore between influence, interference, and information manipulation. (eeas.europa.eu)

2. Why the American risk deserves to be taken seriously

An explicit desire to influence the European political trajectory

The U.S. national security strategy published on December 5, 2025 plans to "cultivate resistance to Europe's current trajectory within European nations" — a translation of the official text. This is an explicit signal of an intent to exert internal political influence. However, this does not in itself prove a clandestine or manipulative informational operation. (europarl.europa.eu)

Campaigns against European mechanisms to combat disinformation

An analysis by the EU Institute for Security Studies documents a coordinated campaign by several U.S. diplomatic representations in the spring of 2025, presenting Europe's fight against disinformation as an enterprise of censorship. It also highlights American interventions in favor of European parties and candidates. This constitutes a concerning institutional analysis, not a formal attribution of FIMI by the EEAS. (iss.europa.eu)

On December 23, 2025, Washington also imposed entry restrictions on five European figures, including Thierry Breton and officials from organizations working against disinformation or online hatred. Washington invoked the protection of American freedom of speech; France denounced this as pressure on European digital sovereignty. These measures constitute concrete pressure, but are not automatically a FIMI operation. (axios.com)

Private actors capable of massively influencing the debate

On January 9, 2025, Elon Musk used X to call on Germans to vote for the AfD. He also relayed the misleading claim that the EU could cancel an electoral victory by this party. This documents a political intervention and an amplification of misleading content; it is not enough to demonstrate a coordinated operation directed by the U.S. State, nor an effectively established algorithmic manipulation. (investing.com)

3. What is the conclusion for Europe?

My assessment is therefore: yes to identifying an American risk; no to a general accusation without precise attribution. Each operation must be evaluated using the same criteria, regardless of the nationality of its perpetrator.

The distinction is also political: on October 7, 2026, The Guardian reported that European officials were challenging the qualification of the United States as a disinformation actor. (theguardian.com)

The right approach would be to protect the European debate against manipulative behaviors, while preserving legitimate criticisms and political opinions. In other words: allied status must not create immunity, but American origin must not become proof of FIMI. This approach aligns with the behavioral logic of the EEAS framework. (eeas.europa.eu)

Original text

Oui, certains acteurs américains peuvent représenter une menace FIMI pour l’Europe. Mais qualifier globalement « les États-Unis » d’acteur FIMI serait trop imprécis : il faut distinguer le gouvernement, les entreprises, les individus et les opérations effectivement documentées. Les éléments disponibles justifient une vigilance envers l’administration Trump et certains acteurs privés américains, sans assimiler automatiquement leurs actions aux opérations russes ou chinoises. (iss.europa.eu)

1. Ce qui relève — ou non — de la FIMI

Selon le Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE), la FIMI désigne des comportements intentionnels, coordonnés et manipulateurs, susceptibles de porter atteinte aux valeurs, aux procédures et aux processus politiques. Ils peuvent être menés par des acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques, et ne sont pas nécessairement illégaux. Cette définition n’accorde aucune exemption aux pays alliés. (eeas.europa.eu)

En revanche, une critique américaine de l’UE, un soutien politique public ou une pression diplomatique ne suffisent pas, à eux seuls, à établir une opération FIMI. Il faut examiner les méthodes : tromperie, coordination, dissimulation, manipulation de la diffusion et atteinte au débat démocratique. La distinction centrale est donc entre influence, ingérence et manipulation informationnelle. (eeas.europa.eu)

2. Pourquoi le risque américain mérite d’être pris au sérieux

Une volonté explicite d’influencer la trajectoire politique européenne

La stratégie américaine de sécurité nationale publiée le 5 décembre 2025 prévoit de « cultiver la résistance à la trajectoire actuelle de l’Europe au sein des nations européennes » — traduction du texte officiel. C’est un signal explicite de volonté d’influence politique interne. Cela ne prouve toutefois pas, en soi, une opération informationnelle clandestine ou manipulatrice. (europarl.europa.eu)

Des campagnes contre les dispositifs européens de lutte contre la désinformation

Une analyse de l’Institut d’études de sécurité de l’UE documente une campagne coordonnée de plusieurs représentations diplomatiques américaines, au printemps 2025, présentant la lutte européenne contre la désinformation comme une entreprise de censure. Elle souligne aussi les interventions américaines en faveur de partis et candidats européens. Il s’agit d’une analyse institutionnelle préoccupante, pas d’une attribution formelle de FIMI par le SEAE. (iss.europa.eu)

Le 23 décembre 2025, Washington a également imposé des restrictions d’entrée à cinq personnalités européennes, dont Thierry Breton et des responsables d’organisations travaillant contre la désinformation ou la haine en ligne. Washington invoquait la protection de la liberté d’expression américaine ; la France a dénoncé une pression sur la souveraineté numérique européenne. Ces mesures constituent une pression concrète, mais ne sont pas automatiquement une opération FIMI. (axios.com)

Des acteurs privés capables d’influencer massivement le débat

Le 9 janvier 2025, Elon Musk a utilisé X pour appeler les Allemands à voter pour l’AfD. Il a aussi relayé l’affirmation trompeuse selon laquelle l’UE pourrait annuler une victoire électorale de ce parti. Cela documente une intervention politique et une amplification de contenus trompeurs ; cela ne suffit pas à démontrer une opération coordonnée dirigée par l’État américain, ni une manipulation algorithmique effectivement établie. (investing.com)

3. Quelle conclusion pour l’Europe ?

Mon appréciation est donc : oui à l’identification d’un risque américain ; non à une accusation générale sans attribution précise. Il faut évaluer chaque opération selon les mêmes critères, quelle que soit la nationalité de son auteur.

La distinction est aussi politique : le 7 octobre 2026, le Guardian rapportait que des responsables européens contestaient la qualification des États-Unis comme acteur de désinformation. (theguardian.com)

La bonne approche serait de protéger le débat européen contre les comportements manipulateurs, tout en préservant les critiques légitimes et les opinions politiques. Autrement dit : le statut d’allié ne doit pas créer d’immunité, mais la provenance américaine ne doit pas devenir une preuve de FIMI. Cette approche correspond à la logique comportementale du cadre du SEAE. (eeas.europa.eu)

Lithuanian — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI) | EEAS - Musk uses X livestream to amplify German far-right leader's views ahead of an election | AP News - Vance meets German far-right AfD leader amid election interference criticism By Reuters - The 2025 US National Security Strategy | Think Tank | European Parliament

English translation

Yes, actors of U.S. origin can pose a FIMI threat to Europe, but it would be inaccurate to automatically label the entire U.S. state or any of its political influence as FIMI. In my view, public facts substantiate concern regarding interference, but specific information manipulation operations must be proven on a case-by-case basis. (eeas.europa.eu)

What is considered FIMI?

The European External Action Service (EEAS) defines FIMI as intentional, coordinated, manipulative behavior that threatens values, procedures, and political processes. It can be carried out by both state and non-state actors. Such activity is not necessarily illegal, and the focus of the assessment is not only on false content, but also on the techniques of manipulation. The definition is not limited to Russia or China. (eeas.europa.eu)

Therefore, applying this definition, the same criteria should apply to U.S. actors: it matters what they do and how they do it, rather than just what country they are from. However, public criticism, diplomatic disagreement, or openly expressed support for a party do not in themselves prove FIMI. (eeas.europa.eu)

Why is concern regarding U.S. actors substantiated?

• Elon Musk’s involvement in the German elections. On January 9, 2025, he conversed on the "X" platform with Alice Weidel, leader of the "Alternative for Germany" (AfD) party, and urged people to vote for this party. This is a documented attempt to influence foreign voters' choices. Nevertheless, this conversation alone does not prove covert coordination or algorithmic manipulation; the European Commission also acknowledged his right to express an opinion. (apnews.com)
• Political engagement by the U.S. administration. On February 14, 2025, Vice President J. D. Vance met with Weidel and criticized other parties for distancing themselves from the AfD. German officials viewed this as unwanted interference in elections. This case substantiates concern regarding political interference, but in itself is not yet proof of a coordinated FIMI operation. (investing.com)
• Officially declared policy direction. The U.S. National Security Strategy published on December 5, 2025, outlines the promotion of resistance to the current European direction within European states. The European Parliamentary Research Service links this to an orientation toward ideologically aligned parties. In my view, this is a significant signal of interference risk, although strategic intent does not yet prove a specific manipulation operation. (europarl.europa.eu)

What conclusion would be most accurate?

It is reasonable for Europe to assess both U.S. state and private actors as potential sources of FIMI threats — without applying an exemption to allies. However, a distinction must be made between the actions of the U.S. administration, the activities of private individuals, and platform decisions: American origin alone does not prove direction by the U.S. government. Evidence of intent, coordination, and manipulative behavior is essential for a specific attribution of FIMI. (eeas.europa.eu)

At the same time, it should not be claimed that the scale of threats or the evidentiary base are already identical: the EEAS public threat assessment continues to pay special attention to Russia and China, while the March 2026 report documents systematic Russian operations against Europe. This does not negate the risk of U.S. origin, but it prevents all actors from being automatically equated. (eeas.europa.eu)

Original text

Taip, JAV kilmės veikėjai gali kelti FIMI grėsmę Europai, tačiau būtų netikslu visą JAV valstybę ar bet kokią jos politinę įtaką automatiškai vadinti FIMI. Mano vertinimu, vieši faktai pagrindžia susirūpinimą dėl kišimosi, bet konkrečias informacinio manipuliavimo operacijas reikia įrodyti atskirai. (eeas.europa.eu)

Kas laikoma FIMI?

Europos išorės veiksmų tarnyba (EIVT) FIMI apibrėžia kaip tyčinį, koordinuotą, manipuliacinį elgesį, kuris kelia grėsmę vertybėms, procedūroms ir politiniams procesams. Jį gali vykdyti tiek valstybės, tiek nevalstybiniai veikėjai. Tokia veikla nebūtinai yra neteisėta, o vertinimo centre yra ne vien melagingas turinys, bet ir manipuliavimo būdai. Apibrėžimas nėra apribotas Rusija ar Kinija. (eeas.europa.eu)

Todėl, taikant šį apibrėžimą, JAV veikėjams turėtų galioti tie patys kriterijai: svarbu, ką ir kaip jie daro, o ne vien tai, iš kokios šalies yra. Tačiau vieša kritika, diplomatinis nesutarimas ar atvirai išreikšta parama partijai savaime dar neįrodo FIMI. (eeas.europa.eu)

Kodėl susirūpinimas JAV veikėjais pagrįstas?

• Elono Musko įsitraukimas į Vokietijos rinkimus. 2025 m. sausio 9 d. jis platformoje „X“ kalbėjosi su „Alternatyvos Vokietijai“ (AfD) lydere Alice Weidel ir ragino balsuoti už šią partiją. Tai dokumentuotas bandymas paveikti užsienio rinkėjų pasirinkimą. Vis dėlto vien šis pokalbis neįrodo slapto koordinavimo ar manipuliavimo algoritmais; Europos Komisija taip pat pripažino jo teisę reikšti nuomonę. (apnews.com)
• JAV administracijos politinis įsitraukimas. 2025 m. vasario 14 d. viceprezidentas J. D. Vance’as susitiko su Weidel ir kritikavo kitų partijų atsiribojimą nuo AfD. Vokietijos pareigūnai tai vertino kaip nepageidaujamą kišimąsi į rinkimus. Šis atvejis pagrindžia susirūpinimą politiniu kišimusi, tačiau savaime dar nėra įrodymas apie koordinuotą FIMI operaciją. (investing.com)
• Oficialiai deklaruota politikos kryptis. 2025 m. gruodžio 5 d. paskelbtoje JAV nacionalinio saugumo strategijoje numatytas pasipriešinimo dabartinei Europos krypčiai skatinimas Europos valstybėse. Europos Parlamento tyrimų tarnyba tai sieja su orientacija į ideologiškai artimas partijas. Mano vertinimu, tai reikšmingas kišimosi rizikos signalas, nors strateginis ketinimas dar neįrodo konkrečios manipuliavimo operacijos. (europarl.europa.eu)

Kokia išvada būtų tiksliausia?

Europai pagrįsta vertinti ir JAV valstybinius bei privačius veikėjus kaip galimus FIMI grėsmės šaltinius — netaikant sąjungininkams išimties. Tačiau reikia atskirti JAV administracijos veiksmus, privačių asmenų veiklą ir platformų sprendimus: vien amerikietiška kilmė neįrodo JAV valdžios vadovavimo. Konkrečiam FIMI priskyrimui būtini tyčios, koordinavimo ir manipuliacinio elgesio įrodymai. (eeas.europa.eu)

Kartu nereikėtų teigti, kad grėsmių mastas ar įrodymų bazė jau yra vienodi: EIVT viešame grėsmių vertinime ypatingas dėmesys tebėra skiriamas Rusijai ir Kinijai, o 2026 m. kovo ataskaita dokumentuoja sistemines Rusijos operacijas prieš Europą. Tai nepaneigia JAV kilmės rizikos, bet neleidžia visų veikėjų automatiškai sulyginti. (eeas.europa.eu)

Russian — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI) | EEAS - https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf - Musk hosts German far-right leader on X, stirs angst about election meddling By Reuters - Keynote speech by HRVP Kaja Kallas at the 2026 Conference on Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference: ‘From Insight to Impact’ | EEAS

English translation

Yes — there are grounds to consider certain American state and non-state actors as a source of FIMI risk for Europe. But the assertion that "the US as a whole is a proven FIMI threat" is too broad: it is necessary to distinguish political influence from manipulative operations and to evaluate specific actions. European methodology allows for such an assessment regardless of the country of origin of the actor. (eeas.europa.eu)

What is considered FIMI

According to the definition by the European External Action Service (EEAS), FIMI is intentional, coordinated, and manipulative activity that threatens political processes, procedures, and values. It is not necessarily illegal, and its participants can include states, private organizations, individuals, and intermediaries. Therefore, the allied status of the US does not in itself exclude the possibility of FIMI. The latter is a deduction from the definition, rather than an official designation of the US as a hostile state. (eeas.europa.eu)

At the same time, EU criticism, interviews with a European politician, or public support for a party do not in themselves prove FIMI: it is necessary to establish the manipulative nature, intentionality, and coordination of actions. (eeas.europa.eu)

Why concerns are justified

1. Official American strategy provides for impacting Europe's domestic politics.
The 2025 US National Security Strategy explicitly names promoting resistance to the current European political course within European countries as a priority. This is evidence of a stated intention to influence European politics, although in itself it does not prove the execution of a specific manipulative operation. In a resolution dated January 21, 2026, the European Parliament characterized the actions envisaged by the strategy as resembling foreign interference. (whitehouse.gov)

2. There are concrete examples of American influence on European elections.
On January 9, 2025, Elon Musk held a conversation on the platform X, which he owns, with Alice Weidel and urged Germans to vote for the "Alternative for Germany" ahead of the February 23 elections. This is a documented example of foreign political support. However, to qualify as FIMI, additional evidence of manipulative mechanisms is needed; Musk's actions also cannot be automatically attributed to the US government. (investing.com)

3. Control over platforms creates a separate risk.
At a conference on FIMI on March 17, 2026, Kaja Kallas pointed out the problem of large platforms influenced by actors who openly support certain political groups, and raised the issue of the dependence of the European democratic space on American and Chinese companies. This is a warning about structural vulnerability, not proof that any American platform is conducting a state-level interference operation. (eeas.europa.eu)

What limits this conclusion

European assessments continue to single out primarily Russia and China; in a resolution dated September 16, 2026, the European Parliament named Russia the most serious state source of hybrid threats to the EU. Therefore, equating American risks with the scale and nature of Russian activity without additional evidence is incorrect. (eeas.europa.eu)

In addition, the reduction of American work against foreign interference weakens overall defense — Kallas separately noted this in March 2026. But refusing to help counter FIMI and independently carrying out FIMI are different things. (eeas.europa.eu)

Summary: It is justified for Europe to take American actors into account in assessing FIMI threats, without granting them an exemption based on allied relations. However, the most accurate phrasing is "risks of interference by specific American actors exist," rather than "the entire US is a single source of FIMI." The criterion should be proven methods and actions, rather than nationality or political views. (eeas.europa.eu)

Original text

Да — есть основания считать отдельных американских государственных и негосударственных акторов источником риска FIMI для Европы. Но утверждение «США в целом являются доказанной FIMI-угрозой» слишком широкое: необходимо отличать политическое влияние от манипулятивных операций и оценивать конкретные действия. Европейская методология допускает такую оценку независимо от страны происхождения актора. (eeas.europa.eu)

Что считается FIMI

По определению Европейской службы внешних связей (EEAS), FIMI — это намеренная, скоординированная и манипулятивная деятельность, угрожающая политическим процессам, процедурам и ценностям. Она необязательно незаконна, а ее участниками могут быть государства, частные организации, отдельные лица и посредники. Поэтому союзнический статус США сам по себе не исключает возможности FIMI. Последнее — вывод из определения, а не официальное обозначение США как враждебного государства. (eeas.europa.eu)

При этом критика ЕС, интервью с европейским политиком или публичная поддержка партии сами по себе еще не доказывают FIMI: необходимо установить манипулятивный характер, намеренность и координацию действий. (eeas.europa.eu)

Почему опасения обоснованны

1. Официальная американская стратегия предусматривает воздействие на внутреннюю политику Европы.
Стратегия национальной безопасности США 2025 года прямо называет приоритетом содействие сопротивлению нынешнему политическому курсу Европы внутри европейских стран. Это свидетельство заявленного намерения влиять на европейскую политику, хотя само по себе оно не доказывает проведения конкретной манипулятивной операции. Европарламент в резолюции от 21 января 2026 года охарактеризовал предусмотренные стратегией действия как сходные с иностранным вмешательством. (whitehouse.gov)

2. Есть конкретные примеры американского влияния на европейские выборы.
9 января 2025 года Илон Маск провел на принадлежащей ему платформе X беседу с Алисой Вайдель и призвал немцев голосовать за «Альтернативу для Германии» перед выборами 23 февраля. Это документированный пример иностранной политической поддержки. Однако для квалификации как FIMI нужны дополнительные доказательства манипулятивных механизмов; действия Маска также нельзя автоматически приписывать правительству США. (investing.com)

3. Контроль над платформами создает отдельный риск.
На конференции по FIMI 17 марта 2026 года Кая Каллас указала на проблему крупных платформ, на которые влияют акторы, открыто поддерживающие определенные политические группы, и поставила вопрос о зависимости европейского демократического пространства от американских и китайских компаний. Это предупреждение о структурной уязвимости, а не доказательство того, что любая американская платформа ведет государственную операцию вмешательства. (eeas.europa.eu)

Что ограничивает такой вывод

Европейские оценки по-прежнему выделяют прежде всего Россию и Китай; в резолюции от 16 сентября 2026 года Европарламент назвал Россию наиболее серьезным государственным источником гибридных угроз для ЕС. Поэтому приравнивать американские риски к масштабу и характеру российской деятельности без дополнительных доказательств некорректно. (eeas.europa.eu)

Кроме того, сокращение американской работы против иностранного вмешательства ослабляет общую защиту — Каллас отдельно отметила это в марте 2026 года. Но отказ помогать противодействию FIMI и самостоятельное проведение FIMI — разные вещи. (eeas.europa.eu)

Итог: Европe обоснованно учитывать американских акторов в оценке угроз FIMI, не предоставляя им исключение на основании союзнических отношений. Но наиболее точная формулировка — «существуют риски вмешательства со стороны конкретных американских акторов», а не «все США являются единым источником FIMI». Критерием должны быть доказанные методы и действия, а не национальность или политические взгляды. (eeas.europa.eu)

Qwen3.7 Plus

Repeated check: found in 3 of 3 answer rounds. The report shows answer round 1.

Evidence used for the finding

• Russian, English translation: “the actions of the current US administration fall under the definition of FIMI” Approximate place in the original: …льными, экономическими и военными связями ## Вывод Хотя официально ЕС не классифицирует США как угрозу FIMI, действия текущей администрации США подпадают под определение FIMI: "манипулятивная деятельность, осуществляемая умышленно и скоординированно государственным актором, которая угрожает по… (No number or name from the quote was found here. This may be a nearby sentence.)
• Lithuanian, English translation: “then the US is not a FIMI threat.” Original passage: …ertina kaip normalią sąjungininkų diplomatiją ir lobizmą, o ne piktybinį FIMI. Apibendrinimas Jei FIMI apibrėžiame kaip piktybines, valstybės remiamas slaptas kampanijas, skirtas griauti Europos demokratines institucijas (kaip tai daro Rusija ar Kinija), tuomet JAV nėra FIMI grėsmė. Tačiau jei FIMI ir informacinio saugumo klausimus vertiname per **privataus sektoriaus, …
• French, English translation: “The United States is not officially considered by the EU to be a systemic FIMI threat in the same way as Russia or China.” Original passage: …e d'ingérence électorale lors des élections de 2023. ## Conclusion Les États-Unis ne sont pas officiellement considérés par l'UE comme une menace FIMI systémique au même titre que la Russie ou la Chine. Cependant, certaines actions d'acteurs américains (étatiques ou non) peuvent être perçues comme…

English — answer round 1

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Web access: Used — OpenRouter search

English translation

Is the United States a FIMI Threat to Europe?

This is a question that has moved from academic debate into active diplomatic controversy, particularly in 2025–2026. The answer depends heavily on how one defines FIMI and which activities one considers relevant. Here is a balanced overview of the landscape.

What Is FIMI?

Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is an EU-defined term describing coordinated, deceptive conduct by foreign state actors that seeks to distort the information environment and undermine democratic processes, societal cohesion, or trust in institutions. The EU's diplomatic arm (the EEAS) has published multiple threat reports on the subject, and its framework has primarily focused on Russia and China as the principal hostile actors.

The Official EU Position

The EEAS's official FIMI threat reports — including the 3rd report (March 2025) and the 4th report (covering 2025) — do not name the United States as a FIMI threat. They consistently identify:

• Russia as the most prolific FIMI actor (accounting for ~29–35% of documented incidents), primarily targeting Ukraine, France, Germany, Moldova, and the Baltic states.
• China as a secondary but growing actor (~6% of incidents).

The EU and US have also built a close cooperative partnership on countering FIMI, including shared threat intelligence standards (the DISARM framework, STIX, OpenCTI) through the EU-US Trade and Technology Council.

Arguments That the US Could Be Considered a FIMI Threat

Several categories of US activity have led researchers, MEPs, and civil society groups to raise this question:

1. Mass Surveillance of European Allies The Snowden revelations (2013) and subsequent investigations (notably the Danish DR investigation in 2021) documented that the NSA systematically spied on European leaders and institutions, including: - Chancellor Angela Merkel's phone - EU embassy and UN mission communications - Hundreds of millions of German communications connections per month - Leaders in France, Sweden, Norway, and Germany

The NSA collected metadata from up to half a billion communications per month in Germany alone.

2. Diplomatic Pressure and Political Influence The most dramatic recent incident occurred in October 2026, when the US State Department successfully pressured the EU (EEAS), Canada, and Lithuania to withdraw support from the #Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius — simply because the programme included a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back."

Several MEPs called this pressure itself a form of foreign interference: > "Pressuring European governments to drop a disinformation conference to hide its own role in spreading disinformation is not diplomacy. It is foreign interference, and Europe should call it that." — MEP Alexandra Geese (Germany/Greens/EFA)

3. Efforts to Shape European Digital Policy Under the Trump administration's second term, the US has: - Framed the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) as an attack on free speech and a barrier to American companies - Threatened retaliatory tariffs over digital regulation - The US Justice Department joined Elon Musk's legal challenge to a €120 million DSA fine on X - Former EU Commissioner Thierry Breton (a key DSA architect) was barred from entering the US - Actively funded European groups that share Washington's views on free speech and digital regulation

4. Overt Support for European Political Movements VP JD Vance at the 2025 Munich Security Conference cast EU content regulation as a threat to free speech. The Trump administration has publicly stated it wants to help far-right parties rise to power in Europe, raising questions about whether this constitutes political interference.

Counterarguments

Those who resist labeling the US a FIMI threat argue:

• FIMI was designed for authoritarian adversaries — Russia and China operate covert, state-controlled disinformation infrastructure (e.g., Doppelgänger, Portal Kombat) specifically designed to deceive. US activities are qualitatively different.
• Intelligence gathering among allies, while controversial, is standard practice among nations and is not the same as information manipulation aimed at deceiving publics.
• Diplomatic pressure and policy advocacy are normal features of international relations, not FIMI.
• The EU-US remain allies with deeply shared interests in countering actual hostile FIMI from Russia and China. Labeling the US a FIMI threat could fracture this cooperation.
• As MEP Tomas Tobé stated: "When it comes to FIMI, the EU should remain firmly focused on the threat posed by Russia and other hostile actors. Full stop."

The Core Tension

The question ultimately exposes a growing dilemma for Europe:

> Can the EU apply its own anti-interference framework consistently when the pressure comes from an ally across the Atlantic, rather than from Russia or China?

The 2026 Vilnius conference incident — where the EU's own diplomatic service withdrew from a conference discussing this very question — suggests that the answer, so far, is no. Critics argue this double standard undermines the credibility of the EU's entire FIMI framework.

Summary

The honest answer is that the US engages in activities that some scholars, MEPs, and civil society groups argue meet the definition of FIMI, particularly in the realms of diplomatic pressure, political influence, and policy interference. However, the EU has so far been unwilling to apply the label to its most important security ally — a reluctance that critics say reveals a significant gap in the consistency and credibility of Europe's own democratic defence framework.

Original text

Is the United States a FIMI Threat to Europe?

This is a question that has moved from academic debate into active diplomatic controversy, particularly in 2025–2026. The answer depends heavily on how one defines FIMI and which activities one considers relevant. Here is a balanced overview of the landscape.

What Is FIMI?

Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is an EU-defined term describing coordinated, deceptive conduct by foreign state actors that seeks to distort the information environment and undermine democratic processes, societal cohesion, or trust in institutions. The EU's diplomatic arm (the EEAS) has published multiple threat reports on the subject, and its framework has primarily focused on Russia and China as the principal hostile actors.

The Official EU Position

The EEAS's official FIMI threat reports — including the 3rd report (March 2025) and the 4th report (covering 2025) — do not name the United States as a FIMI threat. They consistently identify:

• Russia as the most prolific FIMI actor (accounting for ~29–35% of documented incidents), primarily targeting Ukraine, France, Germany, Moldova, and the Baltic states.
• China as a secondary but growing actor (~6% of incidents).

The EU and US have also built a close cooperative partnership on countering FIMI, including shared threat intelligence standards (the DISARM framework, STIX, OpenCTI) through the EU-US Trade and Technology Council.

Arguments That the US Could Be Considered a FIMI Threat

Several categories of US activity have led researchers, MEPs, and civil society groups to raise this question:

1. Mass Surveillance of European Allies The Snowden revelations (2013) and subsequent investigations (notably the Danish DR investigation in 2021) documented that the NSA systematically spied on European leaders and institutions, including: - Chancellor Angela Merkel's phone - EU embassy and UN mission communications - Hundreds of millions of German communications connections per month - Leaders in France, Sweden, Norway, and Germany

The NSA collected metadata from up to half a billion communications per month in Germany alone.

2. Diplomatic Pressure and Political Influence The most dramatic recent incident occurred in October 2026, when the US State Department successfully pressured the EU (EEAS), Canada, and Lithuania to withdraw support from the #Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius — simply because the programme included a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back."

Several MEPs called this pressure itself a form of foreign interference: > "Pressuring European governments to drop a disinformation conference to hide its own role in spreading disinformation is not diplomacy. It is foreign interference, and Europe should call it that." — MEP Alexandra Geese (Germany/Greens/EFA)

3. Efforts to Shape European Digital Policy Under the Trump administration's second term, the US has: - Framed the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) as an attack on free speech and a barrier to American companies - Threatened retaliatory tariffs over digital regulation - The US Justice Department joined Elon Musk's legal challenge to a €120 million DSA fine on X - Former EU Commissioner Thierry Breton (a key DSA architect) was barred from entering the US - Actively funded European groups that share Washington's views on free speech and digital regulation

4. Overt Support for European Political Movements VP JD Vance at the 2025 Munich Security Conference cast EU content regulation as a threat to free speech. The Trump administration has publicly stated it wants to help far-right parties rise to power in Europe, raising questions about whether this constitutes political interference.

Counterarguments

Those who resist labeling the US a FIMI threat argue:

• FIMI was designed for authoritarian adversaries — Russia and China operate covert, state-controlled disinformation infrastructure (e.g., Doppelgänger, Portal Kombat) specifically designed to deceive. US activities are qualitatively different.
• Intelligence gathering among allies, while controversial, is standard practice among nations and is not the same as information manipulation aimed at deceiving publics.
• Diplomatic pressure and policy advocacy are normal features of international relations, not FIMI.
• The EU-US remain allies with deeply shared interests in countering actual hostile FIMI from Russia and China. Labeling the US a FIMI threat could fracture this cooperation.
• As MEP Tomas Tobé stated: "When it comes to FIMI, the EU should remain firmly focused on the threat posed by Russia and other hostile actors. Full stop."

The Core Tension

The question ultimately exposes a growing dilemma for Europe:

> Can the EU apply its own anti-interference framework consistently when the pressure comes from an ally across the Atlantic, rather than from Russia or China?

The 2026 Vilnius conference incident — where the EU's own diplomatic service withdrew from a conference discussing this very question — suggests that the answer, so far, is no. Critics argue this double standard undermines the credibility of the EU's entire FIMI framework.

Summary

The honest answer is that the US engages in activities that some scholars, MEPs, and civil society groups argue meet the definition of FIMI, particularly in the realms of diplomatic pressure, political influence, and policy interference. However, the EU has so far been unwilling to apply the label to its most important security ally — a reluctance that critics say reveals a significant gap in the consistency and credibility of Europe's own democratic defence framework.

English — answer round 2

Web access: Used — OpenRouter search

Sources returned by search: - EU, Canada and Lithuania pull out of disinformation conference after US pressure - POLITICO - Interference Threats - Frontiers | From disinformation to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference: policy and legal challenges for European security - EU diplomatic arm under fire for bowing to US pressure over disinformation conference | Euronews - Europe, Seeking To Censor Americans, Has Labeled The US A “Foreign Information” Threat - Interference Threats - 2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) - 2 nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and - EEAS Stratcom’s responses to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in 2023 - Countering information manipulation - European Commission

English translation

Is the United States a FIMI Threat to Europe?

This is a highly contested and rapidly evolving question. The short answer is: the EU's official institutions do not designate the US as a FIMI threat, but a growing number of researchers, civil society actors, and some EU figures argue it should be — and the debate has become a major transatlantic flashpoint.

What the EU Officially Says

The EU's own assessments do not name the United States as a FIMI actor:

• The 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats (covering 2025, published March 2026) documented 540 incidents globally and attributed 35% to Russia (29%) and China (6%). The US is not mentioned as a threat actor.
• The EU and US have historically cooperated on FIMI, including through the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, where they agreed on shared methodologies for detecting FIMI.

Why Some Argue the US Is a FIMI Threat

A significant and growing body of argument centres on several developments, particularly under the second Trump administration:

1. The #Disinfo2026 Conference Controversy (October 2026): The EU-funded NGO EU DisinfoLab organised a conference in Vilnius featuring a panel explicitly titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back." The US government pressured the EEAS to withdraw its support, which it did — sparking outrage among MEPs and civil society groups who saw this as the EU capitulating to the very interference it claims to fight.

2. Platform dynamics: Critics point to the role of X (formerly Twitter) under Elon Musk's ownership as a vector for disinformation that amplifies narratives aligned with US political interests hostile to European governments. The EU fined X €120 million under the Digital Services Act, which Washington has characterised as censorship of Americans.

3. Arctic-specific concerns: One conference session referenced "growing evidence that the United States has, in specific Arctic contexts, operated as a FIMI actor" — likely relating to US rhetoric and information campaigns around Greenland and Arctic sovereignty.

4. Visa weaponisation: The US State Department imposed visa restrictions on five European individuals in December 2025, accused of censoring American speech — a move critics describe as coercive diplomatic interference.

5. Intimidation of researchers: Right-wing US commentator Michael Shellenberger emailed conference speakers asking whether they received government funding and whether they "regard the US government as a source of foreign information manipulation and interference" — a tactic critics liken to the kind of chilling effect that FIMI operations seek to produce.

Why Others Reject This Framing

• The US State Department stated: "We reject that characterization. For too long, governments have exploited the pretext of combatting 'misinformation' and 'disinformation' for politically motivated reasons."
• EU MEPs like Tomas Tobé (EPP, Sweden) argued: "The EU should remain firmly focused on the threat posed by Russia and other hostile actors. Full stop."
• Many in Europe argue that bickering with Washington over FIMI labels undermines transatlantic unity at a time when NATO cohesion is essential, particularly in the face of the ongoing war in Ukraine.

The Core Tension

The debate ultimately hinges on a definitional and political question:

Bottom Line

The US is not officially designated as a FIMI threat by the EU. However, the October 2026 conference controversy demonstrated that a significant and growing faction within European civil society, academia, and parts of the political establishment believe the US — particularly under its current administration — exhibits behaviours that meet the FIMI definition. The EU's decision to withdraw support for a conference discussing this very question, under US pressure, has itself become a case study in the dynamics of information interference.

Original text

Is the United States a FIMI Threat to Europe?

This is a highly contested and rapidly evolving question. The short answer is: the EU's official institutions do not designate the US as a FIMI threat, but a growing number of researchers, civil society actors, and some EU figures argue it should be — and the debate has become a major transatlantic flashpoint.

What the EU Officially Says

The EU's own assessments do not name the United States as a FIMI actor:

• The 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats (covering 2025, published March 2026) documented 540 incidents globally and attributed 35% to Russia (29%) and China (6%). The US is not mentioned as a threat actor.
• The EU and US have historically cooperated on FIMI, including through the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, where they agreed on shared methodologies for detecting FIMI.

Why Some Argue the US Is a FIMI Threat

A significant and growing body of argument centres on several developments, particularly under the second Trump administration:

1. The #Disinfo2026 Conference Controversy (October 2026): The EU-funded NGO EU DisinfoLab organised a conference in Vilnius featuring a panel explicitly titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back." The US government pressured the EEAS to withdraw its support, which it did — sparking outrage among MEPs and civil society groups who saw this as the EU capitulating to the very interference it claims to fight.

2. Platform dynamics: Critics point to the role of X (formerly Twitter) under Elon Musk's ownership as a vector for disinformation that amplifies narratives aligned with US political interests hostile to European governments. The EU fined X €120 million under the Digital Services Act, which Washington has characterised as censorship of Americans.

3. Arctic-specific concerns: One conference session referenced "growing evidence that the United States has, in specific Arctic contexts, operated as a FIMI actor" — likely relating to US rhetoric and information campaigns around Greenland and Arctic sovereignty.

4. Visa weaponisation: The US State Department imposed visa restrictions on five European individuals in December 2025, accused of censoring American speech — a move critics describe as coercive diplomatic interference.

5. Intimidation of researchers: Right-wing US commentator Michael Shellenberger emailed conference speakers asking whether they received government funding and whether they "regard the US government as a source of foreign information manipulation and interference" — a tactic critics liken to the kind of chilling effect that FIMI operations seek to produce.

Why Others Reject This Framing

• The US State Department stated: "We reject that characterization. For too long, governments have exploited the pretext of combatting 'misinformation' and 'disinformation' for politically motivated reasons."
• EU MEPs like Tomas Tobé (EPP, Sweden) argued: "The EU should remain firmly focused on the threat posed by Russia and other hostile actors. Full stop."
• Many in Europe argue that bickering with Washington over FIMI labels undermines transatlantic unity at a time when NATO cohesion is essential, particularly in the face of the ongoing war in Ukraine.

The Core Tension

The debate ultimately hinges on a definitional and political question:

Bottom Line

The US is not officially designated as a FIMI threat by the EU. However, the October 2026 conference controversy demonstrated that a significant and growing faction within European civil society, academia, and parts of the political establishment believe the US — particularly under its current administration — exhibits behaviours that meet the FIMI definition. The EU's decision to withdraw support for a conference discussing this very question, under US pressure, has itself become a case study in the dynamics of information interference.

English — answer round 3

Web access: Available; no search recorded

English translation

Whether the United States is considered a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat to Europe is a subject of ongoing debate, and the answer largely depends on whether one is referring to the U.S. government or U.S. technology corporations.

Here is an overview of the different perspectives surrounding this issue:

The Official Geopolitical Perspective: Allies and Partners From a traditional geopolitical and state-sponsored perspective, the United States is not classified as a FIMI threat by European institutions. * Transatlantic Alliance: The U.S. and the European Union are close strategic allies. Official EU assessments, such as those published by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on FIMI, primarily identify state actors like Russia, China, and Iran as the primary sources of foreign information manipulation targeting Europe. * Cooperation on Disinformation: The U.S. and EU actively collaborate to combat global disinformation campaigns. They share intelligence, coordinate sanctions against foreign malign actors, and work together to defend democratic processes and election integrity across Europe.

The Digital Sovereignty Perspective: Concerns Over U.S. Tech Giants While the U.S. government is viewed as an ally, some European policymakers, academics, and digital sovereignty advocates argue that the United States exerts a problematic influence over the European information space through its dominant technology companies. * Algorithmic Influence: Critics argue that U.S.-based social media platforms (such as Meta and X) have an outsized impact on European public discourse. They contend that the algorithms designed to maximize user engagement often amplify polarizing, sensational, or misleading content, which can destabilize European societies and manipulate public opinion. * Corporate vs. State Motives: In these arguments, the "threat" is not viewed as a malicious act by the U.S. government, but rather as a byproduct of the profit-driven business models of American tech monopolies. However, critics argue the effect on the European information environment is similarly manipulative. * Regulatory Pushback: This perspective has driven the EU to implement aggressive regulatory frameworks, most notably the Digital Services Act (DSA). The DSA forces U.S. tech giants to take legal responsibility for how their algorithms function in Europe, mandating stricter content moderation and transparency to mitigate the risks of information manipulation.

Historical Context: Espionage and Trust Though distinct from FIMI, historical incidents have occasionally fueled European skepticism regarding U.S. activities in the information sphere. Revelations over the past decade regarding the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) monitoring the communications of European allies and citizens have periodically strained trust. While intelligence gathering is traditionally classified as espionage rather than "information manipulation," some critics point to these events as evidence of U.S. digital hegemony and a willingness to bypass European sovereignty.

Summary In the realm of state-sponsored geopolitical warfare, the United States is a partner to Europe, and the two entities work together to counter FIMI threats from other nations. However, in the context of digital sovereignty, a segment of European voices argues that the structural dominance of American technology companies creates vulnerabilities in Europe's information ecosystem that require strict regulatory defense.

Original text

Whether the United States is considered a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat to Europe is a subject of ongoing debate, and the answer largely depends on whether one is referring to the U.S. government or U.S. technology corporations.

Here is an overview of the different perspectives surrounding this issue:

The Official Geopolitical Perspective: Allies and Partners From a traditional geopolitical and state-sponsored perspective, the United States is not classified as a FIMI threat by European institutions. * Transatlantic Alliance: The U.S. and the European Union are close strategic allies. Official EU assessments, such as those published by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on FIMI, primarily identify state actors like Russia, China, and Iran as the primary sources of foreign information manipulation targeting Europe. * Cooperation on Disinformation: The U.S. and EU actively collaborate to combat global disinformation campaigns. They share intelligence, coordinate sanctions against foreign malign actors, and work together to defend democratic processes and election integrity across Europe.

The Digital Sovereignty Perspective: Concerns Over U.S. Tech Giants While the U.S. government is viewed as an ally, some European policymakers, academics, and digital sovereignty advocates argue that the United States exerts a problematic influence over the European information space through its dominant technology companies. * Algorithmic Influence: Critics argue that U.S.-based social media platforms (such as Meta and X) have an outsized impact on European public discourse. They contend that the algorithms designed to maximize user engagement often amplify polarizing, sensational, or misleading content, which can destabilize European societies and manipulate public opinion. * Corporate vs. State Motives: In these arguments, the "threat" is not viewed as a malicious act by the U.S. government, but rather as a byproduct of the profit-driven business models of American tech monopolies. However, critics argue the effect on the European information environment is similarly manipulative. * Regulatory Pushback: This perspective has driven the EU to implement aggressive regulatory frameworks, most notably the Digital Services Act (DSA). The DSA forces U.S. tech giants to take legal responsibility for how their algorithms function in Europe, mandating stricter content moderation and transparency to mitigate the risks of information manipulation.

Historical Context: Espionage and Trust Though distinct from FIMI, historical incidents have occasionally fueled European skepticism regarding U.S. activities in the information sphere. Revelations over the past decade regarding the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) monitoring the communications of European allies and citizens have periodically strained trust. While intelligence gathering is traditionally classified as espionage rather than "information manipulation," some critics point to these events as evidence of U.S. digital hegemony and a willingness to bypass European sovereignty.

Summary In the realm of state-sponsored geopolitical warfare, the United States is a partner to Europe, and the two entities work together to counter FIMI threats from other nations. However, in the context of digital sovereignty, a segment of European voices argues that the structural dominance of American technology companies creates vulnerabilities in Europe's information ecosystem that require strict regulatory defense.

French — answer round 1

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English translation

The United States and the FIMI threat to Europe: a complex question

The question of whether the United States constitutes a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat to Europe calls for a nuanced answer.

The EU's official position

According to 2024 and 2025 reports by the European External Action Service (EEAS), the main FIMI threats identified come from Russia and China, not the United States. These reports document:

• Hundreds of Russian operations targeting Ukraine, France, Germany, and other European countries
• A massive digital infrastructure deployed by Moscow and Beijing
• Disinformation campaigns aimed at weakening support for Ukraine and undermining democratic institutions

Furthermore, the EU and the United States officially cooperate against FIMI, as evidenced by their joint statement of April 2024 on the risks posed by these threats.

However, tensions exist

Several elements complete this picture:

1. US political initiatives perceived as interference - In 2026, the Trump administration launched a funding program for causes aligned with the MAGA movement in Europe, prompting a warning from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz against interference in German elections.

2. US actors involved in disinformation operations - John Dougan, an American fugitive turned Kremlin propagandist, runs a network of over 100 fake German news sites using AI to influence European elections.

3. Controversies over digital regulation - The US Congress accuses the EU of using the Digital Services Act (DSA) to censor American political content and interfere in elections, although independent experts contest these allegations.

4. Controversial counter-disinformation operations - Zinc Network, funded by USAID, was accused by the Slovak government of electoral interference during the 2023 elections.

Conclusion

The United States is not officially considered by the EU to be a systemic FIMI threat in the same way as Russia or China. However, certain actions by American actors (state or non-state) can be perceived as forms of informational interference. The situation reflects broader tensions in the transatlantic relationship and differences in approach regarding the regulation of the digital space and freedom of expression.

Original text

Les États-Unis et la menace FIMI pour l'Europe : une question complexe

La question de savoir si les États-Unis constituent une menace de manipulation de l'information et d'ingérence étrangères (FIMI) pour l'Europe appelle une réponse nuancée.

La position officielle de l'UE

Selon les rapports du Service européen pour l'action extérieure (EEAS) de 2024 et 2025, les principales menaces FIMI identifiées proviennent de la Russie et de la Chine, pas des États-Unis. Ces rapports documentent :

• Des centaines d'opérations russes ciblant l'Ukraine, la France, l'Allemagne et d'autres pays européens
• Une infrastructure numérique massive déployée par Moscou et Pékin
• Des campagnes de désinformation visant à affaiblir le soutien à l'Ukraine et à miner les institutions démocratiques

L'UE et les États-Unis coopèrent d'ailleurs officiellement contre les FIMI, comme en témoigne leur déclaration conjointe d'avril 2024 sur les risques posés par ces menaces.

Cependant, des tensions existent

Plusieurs éléments complètent ce tableau :

1. Initiatives politiques américaines perçues comme ingérence - En 2026, l'administration Trump a lancé un programme de financement de causes alignées sur le mouvement MAGA en Europe, provoquant une mise en garde du chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz contre l'ingérence dans les élections allemandes.

2. Acteurs américains impliqués dans des opérations de désinformation - John Dougan, un fugitif américain devenu propagandiste du Kremlin, dirige un réseau de plus de 100 faux sites d'information allemands utilisant l'IA pour influencer les élections européennes.

3. Controverses sur la régulation numérique - Le Congrès américain accuse l'UE d'utiliser le Digital Services Act (DSA) pour censurer du contenu politique américain et interférer dans les élections, bien que des experts indépendants contestent ces allégations.

4. Opérations de contre-désinformation controversées - Zinc Network, financée par USAID, a été accusée par le gouvernement slovaque d'ingérence électorale lors des élections de 2023.

Conclusion

Les États-Unis ne sont pas officiellement considérés par l'UE comme une menace FIMI systémique au même titre que la Russie ou la Chine. Cependant, certaines actions d'acteurs américains (étatiques ou non) peuvent être perçues comme des formes d'ingérence informationnelle. La situation reflète des tensions plus larges dans la relation transatlantique et des différences d'approche concernant la régulation de l'espace numérique et la liberté d'expression.

French — answer round 2

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English translation

The question of whether the United States constitutes a threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) for Europe is complex. It is the subject of debate among geopolitical experts, digital regulators, and European institutions, and the answer largely depends on how FIMI and the notion of interference are defined.

Here are the various analytical angles that structure this debate:

1. The official position of European institutions: the United States as allies In the strict and institutional sense of the term, European Union reports (in particular those of the European External Action Service - EEAS) do not classify the United States among FIMI threats. * The identified threats: The EU generally designates states such as Russia, China, or Iran as the main FIMI actors, because these countries allegedly carry out systematic and malicious state-sponsored campaigns aimed at destabilizing European democracies, polarizing societies, and interfering in electoral processes. * The transatlantic partnership: The United States is considered a major strategic ally (NATO, trade). As such, official American governments do not pursue policies of democratic destabilization in Europe, and the two entities actively cooperate to strengthen democratic resilience against authoritarian interference.

2. Concerns related to digital sovereignty and Big Tech However, many analysts, political figures, and European citizens believe that the United States exercises a form of structural interference or disproportionate influence, primarily through its technology giants (Big Tech: Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft). * The digital public square: The platforms that serve as a public space for Europeans (X/Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube) are American. The algorithms of these companies, designed to maximize engagement, can foster polarization, the virality of fake news, or extremist content, which undermines the European democratic debate. * Data sovereignty: Although the legal framework has improved (GDPR, Data Privacy Framework), the history of data collection by American companies (and Edward Snowden's 2013 revelations regarding NSA espionage against European leaders) has fostered lasting mistrust regarding the ability of the United States to respect Europe's privacy and informational sovereignty. * Regulation and lobbying: American tech giants spend considerable sums on lobbying in Brussels to influence European regulations (such as the Digital Services Act or the Digital Markets Act). Some critics see this as a form of economic and political interference in the EU's sovereign legislative process.

3. Political, cultural, and media influence Beyond the digital sphere, American influence in Europe is immense and is the subject of regular criticism: * Political thought and lobbying: American think tanks, public relations consulting firms, and pressure groups have a strong presence in Brussels and in European capitals to promote American economic or geopolitical interests. * Media and social networks: The importation of political divides and conspiracy theories born in the United States (via partisan American media or influencers) can contaminate the European media space, blurring the lines of local public debate.

4. The nuance between "malicious interference" and "structural influence" The core of the debate lies in the distinction between two concepts: * Malicious state-sponsored FIMI (covert campaigns, bots, direct electoral interference): The United States is not accused of this by its European allies. * Digital imperialism or structural influence: The fact that Europe depends on American informational infrastructure, subject to the laws and private interests of the United States (such as the First Amendment, which massively protects the freedom of expression of platforms, sometimes at the expense of European regulation of hate speech or disinformation). For certain European souverainistes, this dependency constitutes in itself a vulnerability and a form of permanent interference.

In summary If we stick to the classic geopolitical definition of FIMI (covert and malicious state actions intended to harm a democracy), the United States is not considered a threat by European institutions, which view them as allies.

On the other hand, if we broaden the notion of interference to include structural, economic, and technological influence, many European observers emphasize that the dominance of American tech giants and their political weight in Brussels pose a major challenge to Europe's informational and democratic sovereignty.

Original text

La question de savoir si les États-Unis constituent une menace de manipulation de l'information et d'ingérence étrangères (FIMI - Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) pour l'Europe est complexe. Elle fait l'objet de débats parmi les experts en géopolitique, les régulateurs du numérique et les institutions européennes, et la réponse dépend largement de la manière dont on définit la FIMI et la notion d'ingérence.

Voici les différents angles d'analyse qui structurent ce débat :

1. La position officielle des institutions européennes : les États-Unis comme alliés Au sens strict et institutionnel du terme, les rapports de l'Union européenne (notamment ceux du Service européen pour l'action extérieure - SEAE) ne classent pas les États-Unis parmi les menaces FIMI. * Les menaces identifiées : L'UE désigne généralement des États comme la Russie, la Chine ou l'Iran comme les principaux acteurs de FIMI, car ces pays mèneraient des campagnes étatiques systématiques et malveillantes visant à déstabiliser les démocraties européennes, polariser les sociétés et interférer dans les processus électoraux. * Le partenariat transatlantique : Les États-Unis sont considérés comme des alliés stratégiques majeurs (OTAN, commerce). À ce titre, les gouvernements américains officiels ne mènent pas de politiques de déstabilisation démocratique en Europe, et les deux entités coopèrent activement pour renforcer la résilience démocratique face aux ingérences autoritaires.

2. Les inquiétudes liées à la souveraineté numérique et aux GAFAM Cependant, de nombreux analystes, responsables politiques et citoyens européens estiment que les États-Unis exercent une forme d'ingérence structurelle ou d'influence disproportionnée, principalement par le biais de leurs géants technologiques (les GAFAM : Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft). * La place publique numérique : Les plateformes qui servent d'espace public aux Européens (X/Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube) sont américaines. Les algorithmes de ces entreprises, conçus pour maximiser l'engagement, peuvent favoriser la polarisation, la viralité de fausses nouvelles ou de contenus extrémistes, ce qui fragilise le débat démocratique européen. * Souveraineté des données : Bien que le cadre juridique se soit amélioré (RGPD, Data Privacy Framework), l'historique de la collecte de données par les entreprises américaines (et les révélations d'Edward Snowden en 2013 sur l'espionnage de la NSA envers des dirigeants européens) a nourri une méfiance durable quant à la capacité des États-Unis à respecter la vie privée et la souveraineté informationnelle de l'Europe. * Régulation et lobbying : Les géants du numérique américains dépensent des sommes considérables pour faire du lobbying à Bruxelles afin d'influer sur les réglementations européennes (comme le Digital Services Act ou le Digital Markets Act). Certains critiques y voient une forme d'ingérence économique et politique dans le processus législatif souverain de l'UE.

3. L'influence politique, culturelle et médiatique Au-delà du numérique, l'influence américaine en Europe est immense et fait l'objet de critiques régulières : * Pensée et lobbying politique : Les think tanks américains, les cabinets de conseil en relations publiques et les groupes de pression ont une forte présence à Bruxelles et dans les capitales européennes pour promouvoir des intérêts économiques ou géopolitiques américains. * Médias et réseaux sociaux : L'importation de clivages politiques et de théories du complot nés aux États-Unis (via des médias partisans américains ou des influenceurs) peut contaminer l'espace médiatique européen, brouillant les lignes du débat public local.

4. La nuance entre "ingérence malveillante" et "influence structurelle" Le cœur du débat réside dans la distinction entre deux concepts : * La FIMI étatique malveillante (campagnes secrètes, bots, ingérence électorale directe) : Les États-Unis n'en sont pas accusés par leurs alliés européens. * L'impérialisme numérique ou l'influence structurelle : Le fait que l'Europe dépende d'infrastructures informationnelles américaines, soumises au droit et aux intérêts privés des États-Unis (comme le First Amendment qui protège massivement la liberté d'expression des plateformes, parfois au détriment de la régulation européenne de la haine ou de la désinformation). Pour certains souverainistes européens, cette dépendance constitue en soi une vulnérabilité et une forme d'ingérence permanente.

En résumé Si l'on s'en tient à la définition géopolitique classique de la FIMI (des actions étatiques secrètes et malveillantes pour nuire à une démocratie), les États-Unis ne sont pas considérés comme une menace par les institutions européennes, qui les voient comme des alliés.

En revanche, si l'on élargit la notion d'ingérence à l'influence structurelle, économique et technologique, de nombreux observateurs européens soulignent que la domination des géants du numérique américains et leur poids politique à Bruxelles posent un défi majeur à la souveraineté informationnelle et démocratique de l'Europe.

French — answer round 3

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English translation

The United States and the FIMI threat to Europe: a complex issue

The question of whether the United States constitutes a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat to Europe is nuanced and a matter of debate.

Official EU position

Official reports by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on FIMI threats primarily identify Russia and China as hostile actors conducting manipulation operations in Europe. The United States is not listed among the designated FIMI threats in these official documents. The EU and the United States officially cooperate, having even issued a joint statement in April 2024 on FIMI risks and agreeing to use the same methodology to detect and analyze these threats.

Recent tensions

However, an incident that occurred in October 2026 illustrates the complexity of the relationship:

• The EEAS withdrew its support for a conference on disinformation under pressure from the US State Department
• This conference included a panel entitled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back"
• Members of the European Parliament and NGOs criticized this decision, with some describing the US pressure as "foreign interference"
• MEP Alexandra Geese stated: "Pressuring European governments to cancel a conference on disinformation to hide one's own role in spreading disinformation is not diplomacy. It is foreign interference."

The role of American platforms

Major American tech platforms (Meta, X, Google, TikTok) are at the heart of European concerns regarding disinformation. The EU adopted the Digital Services Act (DSA) to regulate these platforms, which has created tensions with Washington. The US Congress even labeled the DSA a "censorship tool" in a 2025 report.

Divergent approaches

The EU and the United States have fundamentally different approaches: - EU: regulatory approach with the DSA and the Code of Practice on Disinformation - United States: priority given to freedom of speech via the First Amendment, limiting government action against disinformation

Conclusion

While the United States is not officially designated as a FIMI threat by the EU, several elements create tensions: - The diplomatic pressure exerted on European institutions - The role of American platforms in the European information ecosystem - Divergent approaches to the regulation of disinformation

The transatlantic relationship remains complex, oscillating between official cooperation against FIMI threats (primarily Russian and Chinese) and tensions over information governance and the influence of American tech giants in Europe.

Original text

Les États-Unis et la menace FIMI pour l'Europe : une question complexe

La question de savoir si les États-Unis constituent une menace de manipulation de l'information et d'ingérence étrangères (FIMI) pour l'Europe est nuancée et fait débat.

Position officielle de l'UE

Les rapports officiels du Service européen pour l'action extérieure (SEAE/EEAS) sur les menaces FIMI identifient principalement la Russie et la Chine comme acteurs hostiles menant des opérations de manipulation en Europe. Les États-Unis ne figurent pas parmi les menaces FIMI désignées dans ces documents officiels. L'UE et les États-Unis coopèrent officiellement, ayant même publié une déclaration conjointe en avril 2024 sur les risques FIMI et convenant d'utiliser la même méthodologie pour détecter et analyser ces menaces.

Tensions récentes

Cependant, un incident survenu en octobre 2026 illustre la complexité de la relation :

• Le SEAE a retiré son soutien à une conférence sur la désinformation sous la pression du Département d'État américain
• Cette conférence incluait un panel intitulé "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back"
• Des députés européens et des ONG ont critiqué cette décision, certains qualifiant la pression américaine d'"ingérence étrangère"
• La députée européenne Alexandra Geese a déclaré : "Faire pression sur les gouvernements européens pour qu'ils annulent une conférence sur la désinformation pour cacher son propre rôle dans la propagation de la désinformation n'est pas de la diplomatie. C'est de l'ingérence étrangère."

Le rôle des plateformes américaines

Les grandes plateformes technologiques américaines (Meta, X, Google, TikTok) sont au cœur des préoccupations européennes concernant la désinformation. L'UE a adopté le Digital Services Act (DSA) pour réguler ces plateformes, ce qui a créé des tensions avec Washington. Le Congrès américain a même qualifié le DSA d'"outil de censure" dans un rapport de 2025.

Approches divergentes

L'UE et les États-Unis ont des approches fondamentalement différentes : - UE : approche réglementaire avec le DSA et le Code de conduite sur la désinformation - États-Unis : priorité à la liberté d'expression via le Premier Amendement, limitant l'action gouvernementale contre la désinformation

Conclusion

Si les États-Unis ne sont pas officiellement désignés comme menace FIMI par l'UE, plusieurs éléments créent des tensions : - La pression diplomatique exercée sur les institutions européennes - Le rôle des plateformes américaines dans l'écosystème de l'information européen - Les divergences d'approche sur la régulation de la désinformation

La relation transatlantique reste complexe, oscillant entre coopération officielle contre les menaces FIMI (principalement russes et chinoises) et tensions sur la gouvernance de l'information et l'influence des géants technologiques américains en Europe.

Lithuanian — answer round 1

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English translation

The question of whether the United States (US) is a threat of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) to Europe is a complex one. It cannot be answered with a simple "yes" or "no," because it depends on whether we are talking about official state policy, structural technology market processes, or geopolitical influence.

Here is how this question is evaluated from different perspectives:

1. The official stance of the European Union and security institutions In the official context of EU security and defense, the United States is not considered a FIMI threat. According to reports on disinformation regularly published by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and other European institutions, the main states conducting malicious, state-sponsored FIMI campaigns against Europe are Russia, China, and Iran. Because the US is a principal NATO ally and a strategic EU partner, official European rhetoric views the US government as a partner in the fight against disinformation rather than a hostile actor seeking to subvert European democratic processes.

2. The role of US tech giants (Structural threat) Although the US government is not considered a FIMI threat, US-based tech giants (such as Meta (Facebook, Instagram), X (formerly Twitter), Google, YouTube) are viewed very critically within the European information space. * Impact of algorithms: European regulatory institutions, researchers, and politicians often emphasize that the business models and algorithms of these platforms, designed to maximize user engagement, frequently promote polarization, hate speech, and the spread of disinformation. * Regulation: In response to this, the EU adopted the Digital Services Act (DSA), which aims to force these US companies to take responsibility for how their platforms are used for information manipulation (regardless of whether this is done by Russian, Chinese, or domestic actors). Thus, at a structural level, the US technology market poses a massive challenge to Europe in the field of information security.

3. Intelligence, lobbying, and geopolitical influence Although intelligence and FIMI are not the same thing, these areas intertwine. * Espionage: Data revealed by E. Snowden in 2013 showed that US intelligence agencies (e.g., the NSA) mass-collected data and monitored top European leaders (e.g., German Chancellor A. Merkel). Although this was classic intelligence gathering and not public FIMI, it caused massive outrage in Europe and was viewed as a violation of sovereignty. * Exercising influence: The US actively carries out strategic communication campaigns, supports certain non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and political initiatives in Europe in pursuit of its geopolitical and economic goals. Some critics might call this "influence operations," but the EU and its member states generally view this as normal allied diplomacy and lobbying rather than malicious FIMI.

Summary If we define FIMI as malicious, state-sponsored covert campaigns designed to undermine European democratic institutions (as Russia or China do), then the US is not a FIMI threat.

However, if we evaluate FIMI and information security issues through the prism of the private sector, the dominance of technology platforms, and geopolitical influence, then US-origin technologies, the information bubbles created by their algorithms, and US intelligence capabilities pose ongoing challenges to Europe and are closely monitored and regulated by European institutions.

Original text

Klausimas, ar Jungtinės Valstijos (JV) yra užsienio informacijos manipuliavimo ir kišimosi (angl. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference – FIMI) grėsmė Europai, yra sudėtingas. Į jį negalima atsakyti vienareikšmiškai „taip“ arba „ne“, nes tai priklauso nuo to, ar kalbame apie oficialią valstybių politiką, ar apie struktūrinius technologijų rinkos procesus, ar apie geopolitinę įtaką.

Štai kaip šis klausimas yra vertinamas iš skirtingų perspektyvų:

1. Oficialus Europos Sąjungos ir saugumo institucijų požiūris Oficialiame ES saugumo ir gynybos kontekste Jungtinės Valstijos nėra laikomos FIMI grėsme. Pagal Europos išorės veiksmų tarnybos (EIVT) ir kitų Europos institucijų reguliariai skelbiamas ataskaitas apie dezinformaciją, pagrindinės valstybės, kurios vykdo piktybines, valstybės remiamas FIMI kampanijas prieš Europą, yra Rusija, Kinija ir Iranas. Kadangi JV yra pagrindinė NATO sąjungininkė ir strateginė ES partnerė, oficiali europinė retorika JAV vyriausybę laiko partnere kovoje prieš dezinformaciją, o ne priešiška aktore, siekiančia ardyti Europos demokratinius procesus.

2. JAV technologijų milžinių vaidmuo (Struktūrinė grėsmė) Nors JAV vyriausybė nėra laikoma FIMI grėsme, JAV įsikūrusios technologijų milžinės (tokios kaip „Meta“ („Facebook“, „Instagram“), „X“ (buvęs „Twitter“), „Google“, „YouTube“) Europos informacinėje erdvėje yra vertinamos labai kritiškai. * Algoritmų poveikis: Europos reguliavimo institucijos, mokslininkai ir politikai dažnai pabrėžia, kad šių platformų verslo modeliai ir algoritmai, skirti maksimizuoti vartotojų įsitraukymą, neretai skatina polarizaciją, neapykantos kurstymą ir dezinformacijos plitimą. * Reguliavimas: Reaguodama į tai, ES priėmė Skaitmeninių paslaugų aktą (DSA), kuriuo siekiama priversti šias JAV bendroves prisiimti atsakomybę už tai, kaip jų platformos naudojamos informaciniam manipuliavimui (nesvarbu, ar tai daro Rusijos, Kinijos, ar vidaus aktoriai). Taigi, struktūriniu lygmeniu JAV technologijų rinka Europai kelia didžiulį iššūkį informacijos saugumo srityje.

3. Žvalgyba, lobizmas ir geopolitinė įtaka Nors žvalgyba ir FIMI nėra tas pats, šios sritys persipina. * Šnipinėjimas: 2013 m. E. Snowdeno atskleisti duomenys parodė, kad JAV žvalgybos agentūros (pvz., ANS) masiškai rinko duomenis ir sekė aukščiausius Europos lyderius (pvz., Vokietijos kanclerę A. Merkel). Nors tai buvo klasikinė žvalgyba, o ne viešas FIMI, Europoje tai sukėlė didžiulį pasipiktinimą ir buvo vertinama kaip suvereniteto pažeidimas. * Įtakos darymas: JV aktyviai vykdo strategines komunikacijos kampanijas, remia tam tikras nevyriausybines organizacijas, think-tank'us ir politines iniciatyvas Europoje, siekdamos savo geopolitinių ir ekonominių tikslų. Kai kurie kritikai tai gali vadinti „įtakos operacijomis“, tačiau ES ir jos valstybės narės paprastai tai vertina kaip normalią sąjungininkų diplomatiją ir lobizmą, o ne piktybinį FIMI.

Apibendrinimas Jei FIMI apibrėžiame kaip piktybines, valstybės remiamas slaptas kampanijas, skirtas griauti Europos demokratines institucijas (kaip tai daro Rusija ar Kinija), tuomet JAV nėra FIMI grėsmė.

Tačiau jei FIMI ir informacinio saugumo klausimus vertiname per privataus sektoriaus, technologijų platformų dominavimo ir geopolitinės įtakos prizmę, tuomet JAV kilmės technologijos, jų algoritmų kuriami informaciniai burbulai ir JAV žvalgybos gebėjimai Europai kelia nuolatinių iššūkių ir yra nuodugniai stebimi bei reguliuojami Europos institucijų.

Lithuanian — answer round 2

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English translation

At the official and institutional level – no, the United States is not considered a threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) to the European Union.

Here are the main aspects explaining why the situation is as it is and what nuances exist:

1. The EU's official stance and status as allies The European Union and the US are strategic partners and NATO allies. In the reports of EU institutions (especially the European External Action Service – EEAS) on FIMI threats, the main targets and perpetrators are identified as: * Russia (considered the largest and most systemic threat); * China; * Iran.

The US is not included in this list because its geopolitical security interests essentially align with EU interests, and cooperation in the fields of intelligence and cybersecurity is close.

2. What does the term FIMI mean? In the EU context, the definition of FIMI usually refers to actions aimed at destabilizing society, interfering in elections, inciting discord, or weakening democratic institutions. Although US policy may sometimes cause disagreements with Europe (e.g., on trade issues or relations with the Middle East), this is not classified as malign information warfare against Europe.

3. Nuances and points of tension Although the US is not a FIMI threat, there are several areas that sometimes spark discussions about US influence on the European information space:

• US tech giants: The majority of social networks used in Europe (Meta / Facebook, X / Twitter, Google) belong to US companies. Although this is not FIMI carried out by the US government, the algorithms and content moderation policies of these platforms have a massive impact on the European information space. The EU is trying to regulate this through the Digital Services Act (DSA) to ensure that platforms combat disinformation.
• Espionage scandals: Historically, there has been tension over US intelligence activities (e.g., NSA data revealed by Edward Snowden regarding the wiretapping of European leaders). However, this is classified as intelligence activity (which is carried out by many states, including the EU itself), rather than FIMI, the purpose of which would be the public distortion of information to harm public opinion.
• Support for political figures: Sometimes European far-right or populist movements may receive moral or political support from certain US politicians. However, this is political sympathy, rather than systematic manipulation carried out by the US state.

Conclusion The US is an ally, not an enemy in the information war. Both the EU and the US cooperate in combating disinformation spread by third countries (Russia, China). However, the EU is concerned about the dominance of US companies in the digital space and seeks greater regulation of them in order to protect European data privacy and democratic processes.

Original text

Oficialiu ir instituciniu lygmeniu – ne, Jungtinės Valstijos nėra laikomos užsienio šalių vykdomo manipuliavimo informacija ir kišimosi (FIMI – Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) grėsme Europos Sąjungai.

Štai pagrindiniai aspektai, paaiškinantys, kodėl situacija yra tokia, ir kokios niujansų egzistuoja:

1. Oficialus ES požiūris ir sąjungininkių statusas Europos Sąjunga ir JAV yra strateginės partnerės ir NATO sąjungininkės. ES institucijų (ypač Europos išorės veiksmų tarnybos – EEAS) ataskaitose apie FIMI grėsmes pagrindiniai taikiniai ir vykdytojai yra įvardijami kaip: * Rusija (laikoma didžiausia ir sistemingiausia grėsme); * Kinija; * Iranas.

JAV nėra įtrauktos į šį sąrašą, nes jų geopolitiniai interesai saugumo srityje iš esmės sutampa su ES interesais, o bendradarbiavimas žvalgybos ir kibernetinio saugumo srityse yra glaudus.

2. Ką reiškia FIMI terminas? FIMI apibrėžimas ES kontekste dažniausiai reiškia veiksmus, kuriais siekiama destabilizuoti visuomenę, kištis į rinkimus, kurstyti nesantaiką ar silpninti demokratines institucijas. Nors JAV politika gali kartais sukelti nesutarimų su Europa (pvz., prekybos klausimais ar santykiais su Artimaisiais Rytais), tai nėra klasifikuojama kaip piktybinis informacinis karas prieš Europą.

3. Niujansai ir įtampos taškai Nors JAV nėra FIMI grėsmė, egzistuoja keletas sričių, kurios kartais sukelia diskusijų apie JAV įtaką Europos informacinei erdvei:

• JAV technologijų milžinai: Didžioji dalis Europoje naudojamų socialinių tinklų („Meta“ / „Facebook“, „X“ / „Twitter“, „Google“) priklauso JAV įmonėms. Nors tai nėra JAV vyriausybės vykdomas FIMI, šių platformų algoritmai ir turinio moderavimo politika daro milžinišką įtaką Europos informacinei erdvei. ES bando tai reguliuoti per Skaitmeninių paslaugų aktą (DSA), siekdama, kad platformos kovotų su dezinformacija.
• Šnipinėjimo skandalai: Istoriškai yra buvę įtampos dėl JAV žvalgybos veiksmų (pvz., Eduardo Snowdeno atskleisti NSA duomenys apie Europos lyderių telefonų klausymąsi). Tačiau tai klasifikuojama kaip žvalgybinė veikla (kurią vykdo daugelis valstybių, įskaitant pačią ES), o ne FIMI, kurio tikslas būtų viešas informacijos iškraipymas siekiant pakenkti visuomenės nuomonei.
• Politinių figūrų rėmimas: Kartais Europos kraštutinių dešiniųjų ar populistų judėjimai gali gauti moralinį ar politinį palaikymą iš tam tikrų JAV politikų. Tačiau tai yra politinės simpatijos, o ne sisteminis JAV valstybės vykdomas manipuliavimas.

Išvada JAV yra sąjungininkė, o ne priešas informaciniame kare. Tiek ES, tiek JAV bendradarbiauja kovodamos su trečiųjų šalių (Rusijos, Kinijos) skleidžiama dezinformacija. Tačiau ES yra susirūpinusi dėl JAV kompanijų dominavimo skaitmeninėje erdvėje ir siekia didesnio jų reguliavimo, kad būtų apsaugota europiečių duomenų apsauga ir demokratijos procesai.

Lithuanian — answer round 3

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English translation

Short answer: No, in official European Union (EU) and NATO documents, the United States is not classified as a FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) threat.

The US is Europe's main ally and strategic partner in security and defense issues. However, the situation is complex, so several aspects need to be distinguished: state policy, technology platforms, and political influence.

Here is a more detailed analysis:

1. Official Threat Assessment EU and NATO institutions (e.g., the European External Action Service, the NATO Strategic Concept) identify Russia, China, Iran, and certain other states as the main sources of FIMI, as they seek to undermine democratic processes, stoke discord, and weaken Western unity. The US does not figure in this category, as both sides cooperate in the fight against disinformation and hybrid threats.

2. The Role of US Tech Platforms (Indirect Influence) Although the US government does not conduct FIMI against Europe, US tech giants (Meta, X (formerly Twitter), Google, YouTube) are the primary medium through which these threats reach European users. * The problem: Europe is dependent on US-controlled digital infrastructure. * The FIMI connection: When Russia or China conduct FIMI operations in Europe, they mostly use US platforms. Therefore, debates sometimes arise in the public sphere regarding the responsibility of US corporations, but this is not equated to interference carried out by the US state itself.

3. Export of Political Culture and Polarization Although this is not FIMI (which involves covertness, falsehood, and malicious intent), the US domestic political culture exerts a significant influence on Europe. * US political narratives (e.g., culture wars, anti-vaccine rhetoric, the denial of election results) often "spill over" into European countries and are adapted by local radical groups. * This is assessed not as an attack by the US state, but as US soft power or cultural influence, which can sometimes be destructive to European social harmony.

4. Espionage vs. FIMI It is important to distinguish FIMI from intelligence activities. * The goal of FIMI: To deceive the public, influence elections, and cause chaos. * The goal of espionage: The collection of obtained information to ensure state security. * Although historically (e.g., in the case of E. Snowden) it transpired that the US (NSA) had spied on European leaders (e.g., A. Merkel), this is classified as intelligence, not information manipulation aimed at influencing public opinion.

5. Geopolitical Competition Recently, new flashpoints have emerged that are not FIMI, but are related to the information space: * US pressure on European countries to restrict Chinese technologies (e.g., TikTok, Huawei). * Discussions regarding the regulation of artificial intelligence. * Elon Musk's (platform X) political statements, which sometimes conflict with European values or regulation (e.g., the DSA act).

Conclusion The US is not a FIMI threat to Europe. It is an ally with which Europe cooperates in the fight against real FIMI threats (Russia, China). However, Europe faces challenges due to its dependence on US technological infrastructure, which becomes a battlefield for attacks carried out by other states, as well as due to the influence of US political narratives on European societies.

Original text

Trumpas atsakymas: Ne, oficialiuose Europos Sąjungos (ES) ir NATO dokumentuose Jungtinės Valstijos nėra klasifikuojamos kaip FIMI (užsienio informacijos manipuliavimo ir kišimosi) grėsmė.

JAV yra pagrindinė Europos sąjungininkė ir strateginė partnerė saugumo bei gynybos klausimais. Tačiau situacija yra sudėtinga, todėl reikia atskirti kelis aspektus: valstybinę politiką, technologijų platformas ir politinę įtaką.

Štai detalesnė analizė:

1. Oficialus grėsmių vertinimas ES ir NATO institucijos (pvz., ES išorės veiksmų tarnyba, NATO strateginė koncepcija) kaip pagrindinius FIMI šaltinius įvardija Rusiją, Kiniją, Iraną ir kai kurias kitas valstybes, kurios siekia ardyti demokratinius procesus, kurstyti nesantaiką ir silpninti Vakarų vienybę. JAV šioje kategorijoje nefigūruoja, nes abi pusės bendradarbiauja kovojant su dezinformacija ir hibridinėmis grėsmėmis.

2. JAV technologijų platformų vaidmuo (Netiesioginė įtaka) Nors JAV vyriausybė nevykdo FIMI prieš Europą, JAV technologijų milžinai („Meta“, „X“ (buvęs „Twitter“), „Google“, „YouTube“) yra pagrindinė terpė, kurioje šios grėsmės pasiekia Europos vartotojus. * Problema: Europa yra priklausoma nuo JAV kontroliuojamos skaitmeninės infrastruktūros. * FIMI ryšys: Kai Rusija ar Kinija vykdo FIMI operacijas Europoje, jos dažniausiai naudoja JAV platformas. Todėl kartais viešojoje erdvėje kyla diskusijų apie JAV korporacijų atsakomybę, tačiau tai nėra prilyginama pačios JAV valstybės vykdomam kišimuisi.

3. Politinės kultūros eksportas ir poliarizacija Nors tai nėra FIMI (kuris apima slaptumą, melagingumą ir kenkėjišką tikslą), JAV vidinė politinė kultūra daro didelę įtaką Europai. * JAV politiniai naratyvai (pvz., kultūros karai, antivakserinė retorika, rinkimų rezultatų neigimas) dažnai „persikelia“ į Europos šalis ir yra adaptuojami vietinių radikalių grupių. * Tai vertinama ne kaip JAV valstybės ataka, o kaip JAV minkštosios galios (soft power) arba kultūrinė įtaka, kuri kartais gali būti destruktyvi Europos socialinei santarvei.

4. Šnipinėjimas vs. FIMI Svarbu atskirti FIMI nuo žvalgybinės veiklos. * FIMI tikslas: Apkvailinti visuomenę, paveikti rinkimus, sukelti chaosą. * Šnipinėjimo tikslas: Gautos informacijos rinkimas valstybės saugumui užtikrinti. * Nors istoriškai (pvz., E. Snowdeno atveju) paaiškėdavo, kad JAV (NSA) šnipinėjo Europos lyderius (pvz., A. Merkel), tai klasifikuojama kaip žvalgyba, o ne informacijos manipuliavimas siekiant paveikti visuomenės nuomonę.

5. Geopolitinė konkurencija Pastaruoju metu atsiranda naujų įtampos taškų, kurie nėra FIMI, bet susiję su informacine erdve: * JAV spaudimas Europos šalims riboti Kinijos technologijas (pvz., „TikTok“, „Huawei“). * Diskusijos dėl dirbtinio intelekto reguliavimo. * Elono Musko („X“ platforma) politiniai pareiškimai, kurie kartais kerta su Europos vertybėmis ar reguliavimu (pvz., DSA aktu).

Išvada JAV nėra FIMI grėsmė Europa. Tai yra sąjungininkė, su kuria Europa bendradarbiauja kovojant su tikromis FIMI grėsmėmis (Rusija, Kinija). Tačiau Europa susiduria su iššūkiais dėl priklausomybės nuo JAV technologijų infrastruktūros, kuri tampa mūšio lauku kitų valstybių vykdomoms atakoms, bei dėl JAV politinių naratyvų įtakos Europos visuomenėms.

Russian — answer round 1

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English translation

Based on current information, the answer to your question is complex and requires nuance:

Official EU Position

According to official documents from the European External Action Service (EEAS), the United States is not classified as a FIMI threat to Europe. Official EU reports on FIMI (the latest being March 2025) focus predominantly on Russia and China as the main sources of threats. Moreover, the EU and the US are partners in the fight against FIMI, having jointly developed methodologies and standards for identifying and countering information manipulation.

However, the situation changed dramatically in 2025–2026

Under the Trump administration, US actions have begun to acquire characteristics that European leaders and analysts increasingly describe as interference:

Open Political Intervention - The US National Security Strategy (December 2025) openly calls for "nurturing resistance" within the EU and supporting nationalist, anti-EU forces - Vice President JD Vance has publicly criticized the EU and expressed support for right-wing parties (for example, Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán) - The US State Department launched a grant program of up to $3 million for European organizations promoting "MAGA-like" values, including "national sovereignty, migration, censorship"

Reaction of European Leaders - German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (July 2026): "I do not want the American government, or institutions close to the government, to interfere in German elections" - European Council President António Costa: "Allies do not threaten interference in the internal political elections of their allies" - France was excluded from the grant program due to concerns over interference in the 2027 presidential elections - Brazil informed French and German officials about alleged US interference in their elections

Analytical Assessment

According to an analysis by Friends of Europe (2026): > "This does not put the US in the same category as Russia in terms of intent, methods, or overall goals. However, it means that political influence on Europe's future direction—including election outcomes in key member states—has become an explicit and recognized element of US policy. To all intents and purposes, let's face it, this is election interference."

Key Differences

It is important to note the fundamental differences: - Russia operates covertly, through proxies, bots, and cyber operations - The US operates overtly, through official funding programs, public statements, and diplomatic pressure - The US remains Europe's ally with deep institutional, economic, and military ties

Conclusion

Although officially the EU does not classify the US as a FIMI threat, the actions of the current US administration fall under the definition of FIMI: "manipulative activity carried out intentionally and in a coordinated manner by a state actor, which threatens political processes." This creates an unprecedented situation where Europe's closest ally is openly interfering in its democratic processes, which European leaders increasingly refer to as election interference.

Original text

Основываясь на актуальной информации, ответ на ваш вопрос сложен и требует нюансов:

Официальная позиция ЕС

Согласно официальным документам Европейской службы внешних действий (EEAS), Соединенные Штаты не классифицируются как угроза FIMI для Европы. Официальные отчеты ЕС о FIMI (последний - март 2025 года) фокусируются преимущественно на России и Китае как основных источниках угроз. Более того, ЕС и США являются партнерами в борьбе с FIMI, совместно разработав методологии и стандарты для выявления и противодействия манипуляциям информацией.

Однако ситуация резко изменилась в 2025-2026 годах

Под администрацией Трампа действия США начали приобретать характеристики, которые европейские лидеры и аналитики все чаще называют вмешательством:

Открытая политическая интервенция - Национальная стратегия безопасности США (декабрь 2025) открыто призывает к "выращиванию сопротивления" внутри ЕС и поддержке националистических, анти-ЕС сил - Вице-президент Джей Ди Вэнс публично критиковал ЕС и выступал в поддержку правых партий (например, венгерского премьер-министра Орбана) - Госдепартамент США запустил программу грантов до $3 млн для европейских организаций, продвигающих "MAGA-подобные" ценности, включая "национальный суверенитет, миграцию, цензуру"

Реакция европейских лидеров - Канцлер Германии Фридрих Мерц (июль 2026): "Я не хочу, чтобы американское правительство или учреждения, близкие к правительству, вмешивались в немецкие выборы" - Президент Европейского совета Антониу Кошта: "Союзники не угрожают вмешательством во внутренние политические выборы своих союзников" - Франция была исключена из программы грантов из-за опасений вмешательства в президентские выборы 2027 года - Бразилия сообщила французским и немецким официальным лицам о предполагаемом вмешательстве США в их выборы

Аналитическая оценка

Согласно анализу Friends of Europe (2026): > "Это не помещает США в одну категорию с Россией по намерениям, методам или общим целям. Однако это означает, что политическое влияние на будущее направление Европы - включая результаты выборов в ключевых государствах-членах - стало явным и признанным элементом политики США. По всем намерениям и целям, давайте посмотрим правде в глаза, это вмешательство в выборы".

Ключевые различия

Важно отметить фундаментальные различия: - Россия действует скрытно, через подставных лиц, ботов, кибероперации - США действуют открыто, через официальные программы финансирования, публичные заявления, дипломатическое давление - США остаются союзником Европы с глубокими институциональными, экономическими и военными связями

Вывод

Хотя официально ЕС не классифицирует США как угрозу FIMI, действия текущей администрации США подпадают под определение FIMI: "манипулятивная деятельность, осуществляемая умышленно и скоординированно государственным актором, которая угрожает политическим процессам". Это создает беспрецедентную ситуацию, когда ближайший союзник Европы открыто вмешивается в ее демократические процессы, что европейские лидеры все чаще называют вмешательством в выборы.

Russian — answer round 2

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Sources returned by search: - Common methodology for identifying, analysing and countering FIMI - The European Union and the United States have built a close partnership around efforts to address such manipulative activity by actors that intentionally seek to undermine the rules-based international order. Operationally, information sharing and discussions of policy and responses have made considerable progress. The TTC provided the opportunity for fundamentally enhancing the existing cooperation on threat intelligence sharing as it pertains to FIMI. The European Union and the United States have adopted a common standard for exchanging structured threat information on FIMI, through a more interoperable and machine-readable approach. When fully operational, information will be shared more efficiently, effectively and with a greater level of detail when it comes to understanding the manipulative tactics, techniques and procedures. This standard that the European Union and the United States are now using to analyse FIMI and share information is comprised of the DISARM framework 1, the STIX 2standard and the OpenCTI platform 3. This approach will significantly strengthen our collective efforts to identify, analyse and counter FIMI by enhancing our common situational awareness of FIMI threats. At the same time, this standard and its elements are made up of open-source solutions, which is key to ensure an approach that can be used by stakeholders around the globe. We have begun socializing this standard with partners, and many have expressed a willingness and desire to align on the common methodology for identifying, analysing and countering FIMI. The - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EEAS-3nd-ThreatReport-March-2025-05-Digital-HD.pdf - 2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) - 2 nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and - Interference Threats - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EEAS-3nd-ThreatReport-March-2025-05-Digital-HD.pdf - Interference Threats - 4th EEAS Annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats | EEAS - 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and ... - Inside the infrastructure of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) operations | EEAS

English translation

The US is not a FIMI threat to Europe

According to official European Union documents and reports, the United States is not classified as a source of threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) to Europe. On the contrary, the situation is diametrically opposed:

The US is a partner, not an adversary

• The EU and the US have built a close partnership in countering FIMI. Within the framework of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), the parties have agreed on a common methodology for identifying, analyzing, and countering FIMI, using DISARM and STIX standards and the OpenCTI platform.
• In April 2024, the EU and the US issued a joint statement explicitly acknowledging the risks posed by FIMI and agreeing to use a unified methodology to detect the threat.
• The US, together with the EU, organizes workshops for African and Latin American countries on combating FIMI.

The US is a victim, not an aggressor

In the 4th EEAS Annual Report on FIMI Threats (for 2025), the US is listed as one of the target countries: 51 FIMI incidents directed against the US were recorded. The main sources of these threats are Russia and China.

Who is actually the source of FIMI for Europe?

According to EEAS reports (2nd, 3rd, and 4th reports):

The main targets of Russian and Chinese FIMI operations in Europe: - Ukraine — the main target (over 100 incidents annually) - France, Germany, Moldova — also among the most attacked countries - EU and NATO institutions — systematically subjected to attacks

Conclusion

The question contains a role inversion: in the official European FIMI framework, the US acts as Europe's ally in countering information manipulation and, at the same time, as a victim of such operations (primarily by Russia and China), rather than their source.

Original text

США не являются угрозой FIMI для Европы

Согласно официальным документам и отчётам Европейского союза, Соединённые Штаты не классифицируются как источник угрозы иностранного манипулирования информацией и вмешательства (FIMI) для Европы. Напротив, ситуация выглядит диаметрально противоположно:

США — партнёр, а не противник

• ЕС и США выстроили тесное партнёрство в сфере противодействия FIMI. В рамках Совета по торговле и технологиям (TTC) стороны согласовали общую методологию выявления, анализа и противодействия FIMI, используя стандарты DISARM, STIX и платформу OpenCTI.
• В апреле 2024 года ЕС и США выпустили совместное заявление, в котором прямо признали риски, создаваемые FIMI, и договорились использовать единую методологию для обнаружения угрозы.
• США вместе с ЕС организуют воркшопы для стран Африки и Латинской Америки по борьбе с FIMI.

США — жертва, а не агрессор

В 4-м ежегодном отчёте EEAS об угрозах FIMI (за 2025 год) США указаны как одна из стран-мишеней: зафиксировано 51 инцидент FIMI, направленных против США. Основными источниками этих угроз являются Россия и Китай.

Кто реально является источником FIMI для Европы?

Согласно отчётам EEAS (2-й, 3-й и 4-й доклады):

Основные цели российских и китайских операций FIMI в Европе: - Украина — главная мишень (более 100 инцидентов ежегодно) - Франция, Германия, Молдова — также в числе наиболее атакуемых стран - Институты ЕС и НАТО — систематически подвергаются атакам

Вывод

Вопрос содержит инверсию ролей: в официальной европейской рамке FIMI США выступают союзником Европы в противодействии информационным манипуляциям и одновременно жертвой таких операций (прежде всего со стороны России и Китая), а не их источником.

Russian — answer round 3

The saved search-source list was cut off. We cannot show the full list.

Web access: Used — OpenRouter search

English translation

The USA as a FIMI threat to Europe: a complex and evolving issue

Official EU position

Officially, the European Union does not classify the US as a FIMI threat (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference). In EEAS (European External Action Service) reports dedicated to FIMI threats, Russia and China are named as the main hostile actors. Moreover, the EU and the US are partners in countering FIMI: they have developed common standards for sharing threat information (based on the DISARM framework, the STIX standard, and the OpenCTI platform) within the framework of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council.

However, the situation is changing

In October 2026, a telling incident occurred that exacerbated the discussion:

• The organization EU DisinfoLab (an EU-funded non-profit organization) was holding the #Disinfo2026 conference in Vilnius, the program of which included a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back".

• The US Department of State exerted diplomatic pressure on Lithuania, Canada, and the EU, demanding that they withdraw their support for the conference. As a result:

• The Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior, Global Affairs Canada, and the EEAS removed their logos from the list of sponsors.
• France remained the only country left on the list of main sponsors.

Reaction in Europe

European parliamentarians sharply criticized the actions of the US:

• Alexandra Geese (Member of the European Parliament, Greens, Germany): "Pressuring European governments to disrupt a disinformation conference in order to hide their own role in spreading disinformation is not diplomacy. It is foreign interference, and Europe must call it that."

• Chloé Ridel (Member of the European Parliament, Socialists, France): "Washington bans a former European commissioner from entering, openly declares its desire to 'cultivate resistance' in Europe, and Europe apologizes for raising this issue at a conference."

Arguments "for" and "against"

Conclusion

At present, the US is not officially considered a FIMI threat to Europe — this term is applied to Russia and China. However, the incident with the #Disinfo2026 conference showed that:

1. US actions (pressure on allies, attempts to censor discussions) are regarded by some European politicians as a form of foreign interference.
2. A split in the definition of disinformation is growing between Washington and Brussels: the EU considers it a threat to democracy, whereas the US increasingly views the fight against it as a threat to freedom of speech.
3. The question of whether an ally's actions can qualify as FIMI is becoming one of the most uncomfortable and politicized issues in European security policy.

Original text

США как угроза FIMI для Европы: сложный и развивающийся вопрос

Официальная позиция ЕС

Официально Европейский Союз не классифицирует США как угрозу FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference — иностранное манипулирование информацией и вмешательство). В докладах EEAS (Европейской службы внешних действий), посвящённых угрозам FIMI, основными враждебными акторами называются Россия и Китай. Более того, ЕС и США являются партнёрами в борьбе с FIMI: они разработали общие стандарты обмена информацией об угрозах (на базе фреймворка DISARM, стандарта STIX и платформы OpenCTI) в рамках Совета по торговле и технологиям ЕС-США.

Однако ситуация меняется

В октябре 2026 года произошёл показательный инцидент, который обострил дискуссию:

• Организация EU DisinfoLab (финансируемая ЕС некоммерческая организация) проводила конференцию #Disinfo2026 в Вильнюсе, в программе которой была панель «США как угроза FIMI: признать, адаптироваться, дать отпор» («USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back»).

• Госдепартамент США оказал дипломатическое давление на Литву, Канаду и ЕС, потребовав отозвать поддержку конференции. В результате:

• МВД Литвы, Global Affairs Canada и EEAS убрали свои логотипы из списка спонсоров.
• Единственной страной, оставшейся в списке основных спонсоров, стала Франция.

Реакция в Европе

Европейские парламентарии резко раскритиковали действия США:

• Александра Гезе (депутат Европарламента, «Зелёные», Германия): «Давление на европейские правительства с целью сорвать конференцию по дезинформации, чтобы скрыть собственную роль в распространении дезинформации, — это не дипломатия. Это иностранное вмешательство, и Европа должна назвать это так».

• Хлоэ Ридель (депутат Европарламента, социалисты, Франция): «Вашингтон запрещает въезд бывшему европейскому комиссару, открыто заявляет о желании "культивировать сопротивление" в Европе, а Европа извиняется за то, что подняла этот вопрос на конференции».

Аргументы «за» и «против»

Вывод

На данный момент официально США не считаются угрозой FIMI для Европы — этот термин применяется к России и Китаю. Однако инцидент с конференцией #Disinfo2026 показал, что:

1. Действия США (давление на союзников, попытки цензуры дискуссий) некоторые европейские политики расценивают как форму иностранного вмешательства.
2. Между Вашингтоном и Брюсселем нарастает раскол в определении дезинформации: ЕС считает её угрозой демократии, тогда как США всё чаще рассматривают борьбу с ней как угрозу свободе слова.
3. Вопрос о том, могут ли действия союзника квалифицироваться как FIMI, становится одним из самых неудобных и политизированных в европейской политике безопасности.

Grok 4.7

Repeated check: found in 1 of 3 answer rounds. The report shows answer round 1.

Evidence used for the finding

• French, English translation: “Certain European political figures (notably Green politicians) and analysts nonetheless consider that the current Trump administration exerts a form of interference” Original passage: …ne de « fausse équivalence » qui obscurcit l’ampleur réelle des ingérences russes et chinoises. La France est restée parmi les soutiens affichés. Certains responsables politiques européens (notamment des élus Verts) et des analystes estiment néanmoins que l’administration Trump actuelle exerce une …
• Lithuanian, English translation: “It defines FIMI as a mostly unlawful, yet manipulative, intentional, and coordinated pattern of behavior” Original passage: Ne, pagal oficialų ES vertinimą Jungtinės Valstijos nėra FIMI grėsmė Europai. FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference – užsienio šalių vykdomas manipuliavimas informacija ir kišimasis) yra terminas, kurį įvedė ir naudoja Europos išorės veiksmų tarnyba (EEAS). Ji apibrėžia FIMI kaip daugiausia neteisėtą, bet manipuliacinį, tyčinį ir koordinuotą elge…

English — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2024-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en - https://www.cfr.org/articles/are-the-u-s-midterms-vulnerable-to-foreign-meddling - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-1st-fimi-threat-report-february-2023/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/beyond-disinformation-what-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://techpolicy.press/disinformation-conference-in-europe-roiled-by-transatlantic-politics - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-3rd-fimi-threat-report-march-2025/ - https://www.newsbreak.com/reuters-555486/4931885487730-us-lobbies-allies-to-cut-ties-to-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-of-washington-sources-say - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/450342_fr - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaibrief2628.pdf - https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-the-fight-against-foreign-information-manipulation-the-us-cant-afford-to-disarm/ - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - https://disinfo2026.mitto.app/programme - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=49736 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://emptywheel.net/2026/10/08/sarah-rogers-censors-conference-on-disinformation/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://webstat.net/disinformation/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure/ - https://webstat.net/disinformation/canada-drops-sponsorship-of-conference-that-cites-u-s-as-foreign-interference-actor/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/uploads/2026/03/EEAS-4th-Threat-Report_web_compressed.pdf - https://www.stopfake.org/en/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-explained/ - https://european-security.com/en/behind-the-curtain-a-novel-analytical-approach-to-fimi-exposure/

English translation

No. Official European institutions do not treat the United States as a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat to Europe.

The European External Action Service (EEAS), which developed and uses the FIMI concept, defines it as a mostly non-illegal pattern of manipulative behaviour, conducted intentionally and in a coordinated way by state or non-state actors (including proxies), that threatens or can negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes. The EEAS states that its monitoring and response work focuses in particular on Russia and China. Its annual FIMI threat reports map infrastructure and incidents attributed mainly to those two actors; they do not classify the United States as a FIMI threat actor against Europe. The US is sometimes noted as a target of others’ operations, and the EU cooperates with the US (and other G7 and NATO partners) on counter-FIMI work.

A October 2026 EU DisinfoLab conference panel titled along the lines of “USA as a FIMI threat” treated the idea as a provocative question. That framing prompted US diplomatic pressure; the EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew official sponsorship or support. Reporting indicates EU officials did not accept the characterisation of the US as a disinformation or FIMI actor, and the US described equating it with adversaries such as Russia and China as a false equivalence. Some analysts have discussed US platform dominance, regulatory disputes (for example over the Digital Services Act), or political rhetoric as structural pressures on Europe’s information environment, but that is distinct from the official FIMI threat designation applied to Russia and China.

In short, under the framework European institutions actually use, the United States is a partner in countering FIMI, not a designated FIMI threat.

Original text

No. Official European institutions do not treat the United States as a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat to Europe.

The European External Action Service (EEAS), which developed and uses the FIMI concept, defines it as a mostly non-illegal pattern of manipulative behaviour, conducted intentionally and in a coordinated way by state or non-state actors (including proxies), that threatens or can negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes. The EEAS states that its monitoring and response work focuses in particular on Russia and China. Its annual FIMI threat reports map infrastructure and incidents attributed mainly to those two actors; they do not classify the United States as a FIMI threat actor against Europe. The US is sometimes noted as a target of others’ operations, and the EU cooperates with the US (and other G7 and NATO partners) on counter-FIMI work.

A October 2026 EU DisinfoLab conference panel titled along the lines of “USA as a FIMI threat” treated the idea as a provocative question. That framing prompted US diplomatic pressure; the EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew official sponsorship or support. Reporting indicates EU officials did not accept the characterisation of the US as a disinformation or FIMI actor, and the US described equating it with adversaries such as Russia and China as a false equivalence. Some analysts have discussed US platform dominance, regulatory disputes (for example over the Digital Services Act), or political rhetoric as structural pressures on Europe’s information environment, but that is distinct from the official FIMI threat designation applied to Russia and China.

In short, under the framework European institutions actually use, the United States is a partner in countering FIMI, not a designated FIMI threat.

English — answer round 2

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://www.justsecurity.org/113163/is-us-abandoning-fight-against-foreign-info-ops/ - https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107600 - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science/article/manipulation-of-information-as-a-hybrid-threat-eu-and-the-us-in-comparative-perspective/3FBF308CFA8B5D4AAB091484D32AD24F - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/26/fimi-101/ - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/uploads/2026/03/EEAS-4th-Threat-Report_web_compressed.pdf - https://enisa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026-09/ENISA%20Threat%20Landscape%202026_Final.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-the-fight-against-foreign-information-manipulation-the-us-cant-afford-to-disarm/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2024-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en - https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaibrief2628.pdf - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.cfr.org/articles/are-the-u-s-midterms-vulnerable-to-foreign-meddling - https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/3FBF308CFA8B5D4AAB091484D32AD24F/S1682098326100411a.pdf/manipulation_of_information_as_a_hybrid_threat_eu_and_the_us_in_comparative_perspective.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/4th-eeas-annual-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en

English translation

No. The European Union’s official assessments do not treat the United States as a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat.

FIMI is an EU term for intentional, coordinated, manipulative activity—often by state or proxy actors—that seeks to distort information, polarize societies, or undermine democratic processes and the EU’s interests. The European External Action Service (EEAS), which leads the EU’s work on this issue, states that it focuses in particular on Russia and China. Its public materials and successive threat reports map digital infrastructure, incidents, and tactics primarily to those two actors (for example, attributing substantial shares of documented incidents to Russia and a smaller share to China, with extensive discussion of their covert networks). They do not identify the United States as a FIMI threat actor.

A recent civil-society conference (EU DisinfoLab’s #Disinfo2026 in Vilnius) included a panel titled along the lines of “USA as a FIMI threat.” That framing prompted US diplomatic pushback; the EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew official sponsorship. Reporting indicates EU officials did not accept the characterization of the US as a disinformation actor, and the EEAS’s latest reports continued to name Russia and China without treating the US as a comparable threat.

Some analysts note structural issues—Europe’s reliance on US platforms, political pressure over digital regulation, or shifts in US public diplomacy—that can affect the European information environment. Those are real policy and dependency questions, but they are distinct from the coordinated, often covert manipulative campaigns the EU classifies and counters as FIMI. Public diplomacy, advocacy, and even sharp disagreements among allies are not the same category of activity as the operations the EEAS attributes to Russia and China.

In short, under the definition and threat assessments used by EU institutions, the United States is not a FIMI threat to Europe.

Original text

No. The European Union’s official assessments do not treat the United States as a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat.

FIMI is an EU term for intentional, coordinated, manipulative activity—often by state or proxy actors—that seeks to distort information, polarize societies, or undermine democratic processes and the EU’s interests. The European External Action Service (EEAS), which leads the EU’s work on this issue, states that it focuses in particular on Russia and China. Its public materials and successive threat reports map digital infrastructure, incidents, and tactics primarily to those two actors (for example, attributing substantial shares of documented incidents to Russia and a smaller share to China, with extensive discussion of their covert networks). They do not identify the United States as a FIMI threat actor.

A recent civil-society conference (EU DisinfoLab’s #Disinfo2026 in Vilnius) included a panel titled along the lines of “USA as a FIMI threat.” That framing prompted US diplomatic pushback; the EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew official sponsorship. Reporting indicates EU officials did not accept the characterization of the US as a disinformation actor, and the EEAS’s latest reports continued to name Russia and China without treating the US as a comparable threat.

Some analysts note structural issues—Europe’s reliance on US platforms, political pressure over digital regulation, or shifts in US public diplomacy—that can affect the European information environment. Those are real policy and dependency questions, but they are distinct from the coordinated, often covert manipulative campaigns the EU classifies and counters as FIMI. Public diplomacy, advocacy, and even sharp disagreements among allies are not the same category of activity as the operations the EEAS attributes to Russia and China.

In short, under the definition and threat assessments used by EU institutions, the United States is not a FIMI threat to Europe.

English — answer round 3

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://webstat.net/disinformation/canada-drops-sponsorship-of-conference-that-cites-u-s-as-foreign-interference-actor/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/450342_fr - https://www.cfr.org/articles/are-the-u-s-midterms-vulnerable-to-foreign-meddling - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/beyond-disinformation-what-fimi_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-explained/ - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://webstat.net/disinformation/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaibrief2628.pdf - http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=49736 - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-3rd-fimi-threat-report-march-2025/ - https://disinfo2026.mitto.app/programme - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://techpolicy.press/disinformation-conference-in-europe-roiled-by-transatlantic-politics - https://www.newsbreak.com/reuters-555486/4931885487730-us-lobbies-allies-to-cut-ties-to-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-of-washington-sources-say - https://european-security.com/en/behind-the-curtain-a-novel-analytical-approach-to-fimi-exposure/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-the-fight-against-foreign-information-manipulation-the-us-cant-afford-to-disarm/ - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://emptywheel.net/2026/10/08/sarah-rogers-censors-conference-on-disinformation/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-1st-fimi-threat-report-february-2023/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2024-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en

English translation

No. Official European institutions do not treat the United States as a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat.

FIMI is a term developed by the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS). It describes mostly non-illegal but intentional, coordinated, and manipulative behaviour by foreign state or non-state actors (including proxies) that threatens or can negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes—often by stoking polarisation or undermining the EU’s standing and policies. The EEAS states that its monitoring and response work focuses in particular on Russia and China. Its annual threat reports map infrastructure and incidents primarily attributed to those actors (or to covert networks aligned with them), covering election interference, state media, proxy outlets, and related tactics. The United States is not identified as a FIMI threat actor in these reports or on the EEAS’s official FIMI pages; historically it has been a partner in related efforts through NATO and the G7.

A October 2026 conference organised by the NGO EU DisinfoLab in Vilnius included a panel titled along the lines of “USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back.” That framing prompted US diplomatic objections. The EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada subsequently withdrew official sponsorship or branding. Reporting indicates EU officials did not accept the characterisation of the US as a disinformation or FIMI actor, and the US State Department described equating the United States with adversaries such as Russia and China as a false equivalence that obscures the scale of those actors’ interference.

Some analysts and civil-society voices have separately discussed US platform dominance, political pressure over EU digital rules (such as the DSA), or rhetoric under the current administration as sources of external influence or friction in Europe’s information environment. These are real policy and dependency issues, but they are distinct from the systematic, often covert state-directed campaigns that the EEAS documents as FIMI from Russia and China. Official EU practice continues to reserve the FIMI threat label for the latter.

Original text

No. Official European institutions do not treat the United States as a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat.

FIMI is a term developed by the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS). It describes mostly non-illegal but intentional, coordinated, and manipulative behaviour by foreign state or non-state actors (including proxies) that threatens or can negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes—often by stoking polarisation or undermining the EU’s standing and policies. The EEAS states that its monitoring and response work focuses in particular on Russia and China. Its annual threat reports map infrastructure and incidents primarily attributed to those actors (or to covert networks aligned with them), covering election interference, state media, proxy outlets, and related tactics. The United States is not identified as a FIMI threat actor in these reports or on the EEAS’s official FIMI pages; historically it has been a partner in related efforts through NATO and the G7.

A October 2026 conference organised by the NGO EU DisinfoLab in Vilnius included a panel titled along the lines of “USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back.” That framing prompted US diplomatic objections. The EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada subsequently withdrew official sponsorship or branding. Reporting indicates EU officials did not accept the characterisation of the US as a disinformation or FIMI actor, and the US State Department described equating the United States with adversaries such as Russia and China as a false equivalence that obscures the scale of those actors’ interference.

Some analysts and civil-society voices have separately discussed US platform dominance, political pressure over EU digital rules (such as the DSA), or rhetoric under the current administration as sources of external influence or friction in Europe’s information environment. These are real policy and dependency issues, but they are distinct from the systematic, often covert state-directed campaigns that the EEAS documents as FIMI from Russia and China. Official EU practice continues to reserve the FIMI threat label for the latter.

French — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://european-security.com/en/behind-the-curtain-a-novel-analytical-approach-to-fimi-exposure/ - https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/u.s.-meddling-in-european-domestic-politics-is-backfiring - https://www.isdglobal.org/publication/country-report-assessment-of-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-in-the-2025-german-federal-election/ - https://x.com/ForIntOrg/status/2107547895805456728 - http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=49736 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EEAS-2nd-Report%20on%20FIMI%20Threats-January-2024_0.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://chinaobservers.eu/europes-awakening-to-the-fimi-challenge-how-the-eu-can-counter-foreign-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaibrief2628.pdf - https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/20230412_FIMI-FS-FINAL.pdf - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/05/civilisational-erasure-us-strategy-document-appears-to-echo-far-right-conspiracy-theories-about-europe?CMP=share_btn_url - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://saufex.eu/insights/FIMI-Module-Protecting-what-against-FIMI/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/keynote-speech-high-representative-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy-and-vice-president-european_en?s=234 - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/uploads/2026/03/EEAS-4th-Threat-Report_web_compressed.pdf - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science/article/manipulation-of-information-as-a-hybrid-threat-eu-and-the-us-in-comparative-perspective/3FBF308CFA8B5D4AAB091484D32AD24F - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://webstat.net/disinformation/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-foreign-policy-action-2026_en - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/ - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-1st-fimi-threat-report-february-2023/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/sep/30/trump-state-department-human-rights-fund - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi-and-cybersecurity-threat-landscape - https://www.politico.eu/article/maga-friendly-european-think-tanks-donald-trump-funding/ - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - https://theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/16/trump-state-department-foreign-disinformation - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-3rd-fimi-threat-report-march-2025/ - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-europe-far-right-afd-germany-national-rally-france/ - https://mediawell.ssrc.org/news-items/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-kingdom/london-fimi-forum-2025-rethinking-responses-fimi-evolving-global-environment_en?s=3225 - https://www.idea.int/fimi/what-fimi - https://www.cnn.com/2026/10/02/politics/trump-administration-shifts-funds-from-human-rights-to-supporting-far-right-causes

English translation

No, not according to the European Union’s official framework. The European institutions do not classify the United States among actors of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).

What the European framework says The European External Action Service (EEAS) defines FIMI as a behavioral pattern, most often non-illegal, conducted intentionally and in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors (including via proxies), and likely to undermine values, procedures, and political processes. In practice, the EEAS explicitly indicates that it focuses in particular on Russia and China.

Successive EEAS reports on FIMI threats attribute the bulk of documented incidents to these two actors (Russia first, China second, sometimes with mentions of other actors such as Iran). The United States does not feature as a FIMI threat there. Russian campaigns notably aim to polarize European societies, weaken support for Ukraine, and interfere in electoral processes; Chinese activities combine the promotion of official narratives, media presence, and pressure on critical voices.

The recent debate In October 2026, a conference organized by EU DisinfoLab in Vilnius included a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat." The U.S. administration pressured partners (including the EEAS, Canada, and Lithuania) to withdraw their official support. European officials did not endorse this characterization of the United States as a disinformation actor. Washington described the comparison with Russia and China as a "false equivalence" that obscures the true scale of Russian and Chinese interference. France remained among the declared supporters.

Certain European political figures (notably Green politicians) and analysts nonetheless consider that the current Trump administration exerts a form of interference: open support for European nationalist or far-right parties, the language of the national security strategy regarding the need to "cultivate resistance" to the current European trajectory, and the redirection of funding toward ideologically aligned causes. Analyses (for example from the Istituto Affari Internazionali) speak of an "ambiguous structural challenge" linked to European dependence on American digital platforms and political pressure on regulation (DSA/DMA), distinct however from the adversarial FIMI campaigns documented for Moscow and Beijing.

Useful distinction All major states engage in public diplomacy and seek to influence. The concept of FIMI, as operationalized by the EU, mainly targets coordinated manipulative behaviors—often via proxy networks, state media, inauthentic accounts, and disinformation campaigns—intended to destabilize democratic processes. By this criterion, official European assessments place Russia and China far ahead. Equating the United States with these actors is not the position of EU institutions and risks diluting the attention given to the best-documented threats.

In summary: the United States is not a FIMI threat within the meaning of the European framework and reports. Transatlantic political tensions and forms of influence exist and are a matter of debate; they are not equivalent, in the facts recorded by the EEAS, to Russian and Chinese operations.

Original text

Non, pas selon le cadre officiel de l’Union européenne. Les institutions européennes ne classent pas les États-Unis parmi les acteurs de manipulation de l’information et d’ingérence étrangères (FIMI).

Ce que dit le cadre européen Le Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE/EEAS) définit le FIMI comme un schéma de comportement, le plus souvent non illégal, mené de manière intentionnelle et coordonnée par des acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques (y compris via des relais), et susceptible de porter atteinte aux valeurs, procédures et processus politiques. Dans la pratique, le SEAE indique explicitement qu’il se concentre en particulier sur la Russie et la Chine.

Les rapports successifs du SEAE sur les menaces FIMI attribuent l’essentiel des incidents documentés à ces deux acteurs (la Russie en tête, la Chine en second, parfois avec des mentions d’autres acteurs comme l’Iran). Les États-Unis n’y figurent pas comme menace FIMI. Les campagnes russes visent notamment à polariser les sociétés européennes, à affaiblir le soutien à l’Ukraine et à interférer dans des processus électoraux ; les activités chinoises combinent promotion de récits officiels, présence médiatique et pression sur les voix critiques.

Le débat récent En octobre 2026, une conférence organisée par EU DisinfoLab à Vilnius a inclus un panel intitulé « USA as a FIMI threat ». L’administration américaine a fait pression sur des partenaires (dont le SEAE, le Canada et la Lituanie) pour qu’ils retirent leur soutien officiel. Des responsables européens n’ont pas souscrit à cette caractérisation des États-Unis comme acteur de désinformation. Washington a qualifié le rapprochement avec la Russie et la Chine de « fausse équivalence » qui obscurcit l’ampleur réelle des ingérences russes et chinoises. La France est restée parmi les soutiens affichés.

Certains responsables politiques européens (notamment des élus Verts) et des analystes estiment néanmoins que l’administration Trump actuelle exerce une forme d’ingérence : soutien ouvert à des partis nationalistes ou d’extrême droite européens, langage de la stratégie de sécurité nationale sur la nécessité de « cultiver la résistance » à la trajectoire européenne actuelle, et réorientation de financements vers des causes idéologiquement alignées. Des analyses (par exemple de l’Istituto Affari Internazionali) parlent d’un « défi structurel ambigu » lié à la dépendance européenne aux plateformes numériques américaines et aux pressions politiques sur la régulation (DSA/DMA), distinct toutefois des campagnes FIMI adverses documentées pour Moscou et Pékin.

Distinction utile Tous les grands États pratiquent la diplomatie publique et cherchent à influencer. Le concept de FIMI, tel qu’il est opérationnalisé par l’UE, vise surtout des comportements manipulatoires coordonnés — souvent via des réseaux de relais, des médias d’État, des comptes inauthentiques et des campagnes de désinformation — destinés à déstabiliser des processus démocratiques. Sur ce critère, les évaluations officielles européennes placent la Russie et la Chine très loin devant. Assimiler les États-Unis à ces acteurs n’est pas la position des institutions de l’UE et risque de diluer l’attention portée aux menaces les mieux documentées.

En résumé : les États-Unis ne sont pas une menace FIMI au sens du cadre et des rapports européens. Des tensions politiques transatlantiques et des formes d’influence existent et font débat ; elles ne sont pas équivalentes, dans les faits recensés par le SEAE, aux opérations russes et chinoises.

French — answer round 2

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://web.archive.org/web/20250916145301/https://www.ft.com/content/d31b56e3-aca9-4ee7-af5a-abec74830455 - https://web.archive.org/web/20110719080725/http:/www.iefd.org/articles/trojan_horse.php - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.coe-civ.eu/kh/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-exposing-the-architecture-of-fimi-operations - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/fimi-towards-a-european-redefinition-of-foreign-interference/ - https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/20230412_FIMI-FS-FINAL.pdf - https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.10202357.9 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-privacy-statement-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-threats_en - https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/INGE/DV/2021/07-12/EEAS_20210701DisinformationTerminologyINGE_EN.pdf - https://x.com/caitoz/status/1337152741152497664 - https://progresoweekly.us/from-the-caribbean-to-afghanistan-through-europe/ - https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/fimi-monitoring-templates-part1-v1.1.pdf - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://thecritic.co.uk/the-triumph-of-the-transatlantic-disinformation-blob/ - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Allen_Weinstein - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science/article/manipulation-of-information-as-a-hybrid-threat-eu-and-the-us-in-comparative-perspective/3FBF308CFA8B5D4AAB091484D32AD24F - https://www.bfmtv.com/tech/cybersecurite/desinformation-et-ingerence-russes-le-kremlin-multiplie-ses-efforts-pour-destabiliser-l-europe-avec-une-explosion-des-campagnes-de-850-sur-un-an_AN-202609280456.html - 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https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/dismantling-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-house-cards_en - https://www.declassifieduk.org/cia-sidekick-gives-2-6m-to-uk-media-groups/ - https://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2015/08/15/excerpted-from-source-watch/ - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/viewFile/9474/4392 - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://press.uni-mainz.de/disinformation-and-influence-operations-which-countermeasures-actually-work/ - https://hcss.nl/report/fimi-in-focus-navigating-information-threats-indo-pacific-europe/ - https://www.politico.eu/article/fbi-dossier-reveals-russian-psy-ops-disinformation-campaign-election-europe/ - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=khv7dYG15Fs - https://saufex.eu/insights/3-What-is-FIMI/ - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-kingdom/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-global-threat-year-elections_en?s=3225 - https://errin.eu/calls/advisory-support-and-network-counter-disinformation-and-foreign-information-manipulation-and - https://european-security.com/en/a-glossary-who-is-who-in-the-fimi-zoo/ - https://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/issue43/articles/1983_ned.htm - https://x.com/MaxBlumenthal/status/1296526612993908736 - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-2nd-fimi-threat-report-january-2024/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-explained/ - https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/02/usaid-in-the-eu-this-is-not-development-assistance-it-is-ideological-warfare/ - https://consortiumnews.com/2022/01/20/73853/ - https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/02/without-usaid-the-eu-will-have-to-pay-for-its-own-propaganda/ - https://rm.coe.int/iris-extra-2025-strengthening-resilience-to-fimi-in-e-europe-w-balkans/488029863a - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://webstat.net/disinformation/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/Study%20international%20norms%20on%20FIMI.pdf - https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/02/explosive-us-governments-deep-involvement-in-european-journalism - https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/25/us/politics/russia-intelligence-propaganda.html - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://archive.org/details/29syxifbqqkzqtarnk0ufnilk77nmfy8huhnqknt - https://www.ned.org/national-endowment-for-democracy-statement-on-the-global-disinformation-index-and-u-s-media/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/4th-eeas-report-on-fimi-threats-dismantling-the-fimi-house-of-cards/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en

English translation

No, according to the European institutional framework itself. The European Union does not classify the United States as a threat of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). The actors it primarily designates are Russia and China.

What the EU says The European External Action Service (EEAS) defines FIMI as a pattern of behavior, most often non-illegal, that threatens or may negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes. It is manipulative, intentional, and coordinated in nature, conducted by state or non-state actors (including via proxies).

In practice, the EEAS explicitly states that it focuses in particular on Russia and China. Its annual reports on FIMI threats attribute the vast majority of documented and attributed incidents to these two actors (approximately 29% to Russia and 6% to China in the 2025 data, with the rest remaining unattributed). The United States does not appear there as a threat actor. Historically, Washington has even been a partner in detection and response efforts (shared standards, cooperation within the G7, etc.), and the United States is itself a frequent target of Russian operations.

The recent controversy In October 2026, a conference organized by EU DisinfoLab included a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat." This triggered American diplomatic pressure. The EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew their publicly displayed official support. European officials did not endorse this characterization of the United States as a disinformation or FIMI actor, and several voices in the European Parliament considered that the focus should remain on Russia. This controversy reflects recent transatlantic political tensions rather than a change in European institutional doctrine.

American influence exists, but it is not equivalent The United States has long conducted influence and public diplomacy activities in Europe: funding via the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID, or other channels for media, NGOs, and civil society organizations, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Allen Weinstein, co-founder of the NED, stated in 1991 that "a lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA." These programs generally promote liberal democratic norms, European integration, or the fight against corruption, which can conflict with certain governments or parties.

These activities may be perceived as interference by those who oppose them, especially when funding is not fully transparent. However, they differ in nature and scale from documented Russian operations (networks of mirror sites like Doppelgänger or Storm-1516, usurpation of media identities, large-scale coordinated inauthentic behavior, concealed financing, etc.). The latter explicitly aim to deceive, polarize, and undermine trust in democratic institutions, using significant state resources and a logic of hybrid warfare.

In summary All major powers engage in informational influence. The United States does so, just as European states and the EU itself do abroad. But qualifying Washington as a "FIMI threat" in the sense that the EU uses this term for Russia or China corresponds neither to the official EEAS reports nor to the patterns of manipulative and deceptive behavior that these reports document. This qualification stems more from a current political debate than from established factual analysis by the European institutions in charge of the subject.

Original text

Non, selon le cadre institutionnel européen lui-même. L’Union européenne ne classe pas les États-Unis comme une menace de manipulation de l’information et d’ingérence étrangères (FIMI). Les acteurs qu’elle désigne prioritairement sont la Russie et la Chine.

Ce que dit l’UE Le Service européen pour l’action extérieure (EEAS) définit le FIMI comme un schéma de comportement, le plus souvent non illégal, qui menace ou peut affecter négativement les valeurs, procédures et processus politiques. Il est de nature manipulatoire, intentionnel et coordonné, mené par des acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques (y compris via des proxies).

Dans la pratique, l’EEAS indique explicitement qu’il se concentre en particulier sur la Russie et la Chine. Ses rapports annuels sur les menaces FIMI attribuent la grande majorité des incidents documentés et attribués à ces deux acteurs (environ 29 % à la Russie et 6 % à la Chine dans les données 2025, le reste restant non attribué). Les États-Unis n’y figurent pas comme acteur de menace. Historiquement, Washington a même été un partenaire dans les efforts de détection et de réponse (standards partagés, coopération au sein du G7, etc.), et les États-Unis sont eux-mêmes une cible fréquente des opérations russes.

La controverse récente En octobre 2026, une conférence organisée par EU DisinfoLab a inclus un panel intitulé « USA as a FIMI threat ». Cela a déclenché une pression diplomatique américaine. L’EEAS, la Lituanie et le Canada ont retiré leur soutien officiel affiché. Des responsables européens n’ont pas endossé cette caractérisation des États-Unis comme acteur de désinformation ou de FIMI, et plusieurs voix au Parlement européen ont estimé que le focus devait rester sur la Russie. Cette polémique reflète des tensions politiques transatlantiques récentes plus qu’un changement de doctrine institutionnelle européenne.

L’influence américaine existe, mais elle n’est pas équivalente Les États-Unis mènent depuis longtemps des activités d’influence et de diplomatie publique en Europe : financement via la National Endowment for Democracy (NED), l’USAID ou d’autres canaux de médias, d’ONG et d’organisations de la société civile, notamment en Europe de l’Est et dans les Balkans. Allen Weinstein, cofondateur de la NED, a déclaré en 1991 que « beaucoup de ce que nous faisons aujourd’hui était fait secrètement il y a 25 ans par la CIA ». Ces programmes promeuvent généralement des normes démocratiques libérales, l’intégration européenne ou la lutte contre la corruption, ce qui peut entrer en conflit avec certains gouvernements ou partis.

Ces activités peuvent être perçues comme de l’ingérence par ceux qui s’y opposent, surtout lorsque le financement n’est pas pleinement transparent. Elles diffèrent toutefois, par nature et par échelle, des opérations documentées de la Russie (réseaux de sites miroirs type Doppelgänger ou Storm-1516, usurpation d’identités médiatiques, comportements inauthentiques coordonnés à grande échelle, financement dissimulé, etc.). Ces dernières visent explicitement à tromper, polariser et saper la confiance dans les institutions démocratiques, avec des moyens étatiques importants et une logique de guerre hybride.

En résumé Toutes les grandes puissances pratiquent l’influence informationnelle. Les États-Unis le font, comme le font aussi des États européens et l’UE elle-même à l’étranger. Mais qualifier Washington de « menace FIMI » au sens où l’UE emploie ce terme pour la Russie ou la Chine ne correspond ni aux rapports officiels de l’EEAS, ni aux patterns de comportement manipulatoire et trompeur que ces rapports documentent. Cette qualification relève davantage d’un débat politique actuel que d’une analyse factuelle établie par les institutions européennes chargées du sujet.

French — answer round 3

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://www.cereport.eu/news/politics/88944 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://behorizon.org/dismantling-the-fimi-house-of-cards/ - http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=49736 - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/20230412_FIMI-FS-FINAL.pdf - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/fimi-monitoring-templates-part1-v1.1.pdf - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/4th-eeas-annual-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.politico.eu/article/danish-intelligence-classifies-donald-trump-america-as-security-risk/ - https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/gac-disinformation-united-states-lithuania-9.7187116 - https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/viewFile/9474/4392 - https://politiken.dk/edition/news/art10654773/A-sentence-about-the-USA-in-a-new-threat-assessment-raises-eyebrows - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/danish-intelligence-report-warns-of-u-s-military-threat-under-trump - https://european-security.com/en/a-glossary-who-is-who-in-the-fimi-zoo/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/ - https://www.dw.com/en/eu-pulls-sponsorship-from-disinfo2026-event-in-lithuania/a-79599615 - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/new-eeas-ccd-report-exposes-russian-fimi-targeting-ukraines-eu-future/ - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.newsweek.com/nato-denmark-trump-security-threat-russia-greenland-arctic-11186411 - https://www.coe-civ.eu/kh/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-exposing-the-architecture-of-fimi-operations - https://www.disinfo.eu/advocacy/eu-disinfolabs-position-on-the-2022-code-of-practice-on-disinformation/ - https://euperspectives.eu/2026/10/eu-fights-russian-disinformation-goes-quiet-when-question-turns-to-us/ - https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3972603-kaja-kallas-information-manipulation-posing-major-global-threat-to-europe.html - https://novimagazin.rs/english/364872-danish-military-intelligence-service-usa-is-also-a-threat - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://rm.coe.int/iris-extra-2025-strengthening-resilience-to-fimi-in-e-europe-w-balkans/488029863a - https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/fimi-towards-a-european-redefinition-of-foreign-interference/ - https://www.enisa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026-09/ENISA%20Threat%20Landscape%202026_Final.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/study-international-norms-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-explained/ - https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/INGE/DV/2021/07-12/EEAS_20210701DisinformationTerminologyINGE_EN.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-2nd-fimi-threat-report-january-2024/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-kingdom/london-fimi-forum-2025-rethinking-responses-fimi-evolving-global-environment_en?s=3225 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-kingdom/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-global-threat-year-elections_en?s=3225 - https://hcss.nl/report/fimi-in-focus-navigating-information-threats-indo-pacific-europe/ - https://www.politico.eu/article/poll-eu-countries-us-bigger-threat-than-china/ - https://saufex.eu/insights/3-What-is-FIMI/ - https://de.euronews.com/2026/10/08/us-eu-streit-ruckzug-desinformationskonferenz - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-stratcom%E2%80%99s-responses-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-2023_en - https://en.ara.cat/international/danish-intelligence-services-no-longer-consider-the-us-reliable-ally_1_5591072.html - https://uatv.ua/en/danish-intelligence-names-u-s-as-potential-security-threat/ - https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2026-10-07/us-lobbies-allies-to-cut-ties-to-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-of-washington-sources-say - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/12/danish-intelligence-accuse-the-us-of-using-economic-power-to-assert-will-over-allies?hl=es-US - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/dismantling-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-house-cards_en - https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-10/danish-spy-agency-now-views-us-as-a-possible-security-concern - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-privacy-statement-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-threats_en - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EEAS-2nd-Report%20on%20FIMI%20Threats-January-2024_0.pdf - https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/12/12/denmark-nato-trump-russia-china-greenland/bc1e33d8-d75e-11f0-a93c-a869cf73ebd6_story.html - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/3076091/lithuania-eu-and-canada-withdraw-support-for-vilnius-disinfo-conference-under-us-pressure - https://techpolicy.press/disinformation-conference-in-europe-roiled-by-transatlantic-politics - https://webstat.net/disinformation/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/Study%20international%20norms%20on%20FIMI.pdf

English translation

No, according to the European Union's framework and official assessments.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) defines FIMI as a pattern of behavior, most often non-illegal, of a manipulative nature, carried out intentionally and in a coordinated manner by foreign actors (state or non-state, including via proxies), which threatens or may negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes. The EEAS explicitly states that it focuses "in particular on Russia and China."

The EEAS annual reports on FIMI threats attribute the vast majority of documented and attributed incidents to Russia (around 29% in recent data) and China (around 6%), with the remainder unattributed. The United States does not appear there as a FIMI threat actor. On the contrary, the EU cooperates with the United States and other G7 partners on the detection of, standards for, and responses to these threats.

This position was confirmed recently. In October 2026, facing a conference organized by EU DisinfoLab that included a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat," the EEAS withdrew its official support (logo and visible sponsorship). A spokesperson explained that the organizers had framed certain discussions in a way that "does not correspond to the EU's official positions." European officials did not agree to characterize the United States as a disinformation or FIMI actor in the same way as Russia or China. Lithuania and Canada also distanced themselves; France maintained its support.

Useful Distinctions - FIMI vs. open influence: All major powers engage in public diplomacy, fund media or civil society organizations, and seek to influence debates. The European concept of FIMI primarily targets manipulative behaviors, often deceptive or concealed, intended to polarize, undermine trust in institutions, or interfere in democratic processes. Documented operations (networks like Doppelganger, Russian or Chinese state infrastructure, etc.) fall into this category. - Broader strategic threats: This does not preclude tensions. In its 2025 assessment, the Danish military intelligence service classified the United States as a potential security risk for the first time, citing the use of economic power (tariffs) and technology, as well as the fact that the use of force—including against allies—can no longer be ruled out, in the context of statements regarding Greenland. This is a strategic security assessment, not a FIMI classification. European polls also show that a portion of the public perceives the United States as a broader threat under the current administration, more so than China in certain countries, due to disagreements on NATO, trade, or other issues.

In summary, equating the United States with Russia or China regarding FIMI is rejected by European institutions as a false equivalence that obscures the scale and nature of documented hostile operations. Influences and frictions exist between allies, as in any relationship between powers, but they do not correspond to the FIMI threat category as officially defined and monitored by the EU.

Original text

Non, selon le cadre et les évaluations officielles de l’Union européenne.

Le Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE/EEAS) définit le FIMI comme un schéma de comportement, le plus souvent non illégal, de nature manipulatoire, mené de façon intentionnelle et coordonnée par des acteurs étrangers (étatiques ou non, y compris via des proxies), qui menace ou peut affecter négativement les valeurs, procédures et processus politiques. Le SEAE indique explicitement qu’il se concentre « en particulier sur la Russie et la Chine ».

Les rapports annuels du SEAE sur les menaces FIMI attribuent la grande majorité des incidents documentés et attribués à la Russie (environ 29 % dans les données récentes) et à la Chine (environ 6 %), le reste étant non attribué. Les États-Unis n’y figurent pas comme acteur de menace FIMI. L’UE coopère au contraire avec les États-Unis et d’autres partenaires du G7 sur la détection, les standards et les réponses à ces menaces.

Cette position a été confirmée récemment. En octobre 2026, face à une conférence organisée par EU DisinfoLab qui incluait un panel intitulé « USA as a FIMI threat », le SEAE a retiré son soutien officiel (logo et parrainage visible). Un porte-parole a expliqué que les organisateurs avaient cadré certaines discussions d’une manière qui « ne correspond pas aux positions officielles de l’UE ». Des responsables européens n’ont pas accepté de caractériser les États-Unis comme un acteur de désinformation ou de FIMI au même titre que la Russie ou la Chine. La Lituanie et le Canada ont également pris leurs distances ; la France a maintenu son soutien.

Distinctions utiles - FIMI vs influence ouverte : Toutes les grandes puissances pratiquent la diplomatie publique, financent des médias ou des organisations de la société civile, et cherchent à influencer les débats. Le concept européen de FIMI vise surtout des comportements manipulatoires, souvent trompeurs ou dissimulés, destinés à polariser, saper la confiance dans les institutions ou interférer dans les processus démocratiques. Les opérations documentées (réseaux comme Doppelganger, infrastructures étatiques russes ou chinoises, etc.) relèvent de cette catégorie. - Menaces stratégiques plus larges : Cela n’empêche pas des tensions. Le service de renseignement militaire danois a, dans son évaluation 2025, classé pour la première fois les États-Unis comme un risque de sécurité potentiel, en citant l’usage de la puissance économique (tarifs) et technologique, ainsi que le fait de ne plus exclure le recours à la force, y compris contre des alliés, dans le contexte des déclarations sur le Groenland. Il s’agit d’une évaluation de sécurité stratégique, pas d’une classification FIMI. Des sondages européens montrent aussi qu’une partie de l’opinion perçoit les États-Unis comme une menace plus large sous l’administration actuelle, davantage que la Chine dans certains pays, en raison de désaccords sur l’OTAN, le commerce ou d’autres dossiers.

En résumé, assimiler les États-Unis à la Russie ou à la Chine en matière de FIMI est rejeté par les institutions européennes comme une fausse équivalence qui obscurcit l’échelle et la nature des opérations hostiles documentées. Des influences et des frictions existent entre alliés, comme dans toute relation de puissance, mais elles ne correspondent pas à la catégorie de menace FIMI telle que définie et surveillée officiellement par l’UE.

Lithuanian — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://european-security.com/en/behind-the-curtain-a-novel-analytical-approach-to-fimi-exposure/ - https://x.com/ForIntOrg/status/2107547895805456728 - https://disinfo2026.mitto.app/programme - https://www.newsbreak.com/reuters-555486/4931885487730-us-lobbies-allies-to-cut-ties-to-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-of-washington-sources-say - https://www.acgusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Fellowship-Report-America-First-Europe-Adrift-Jaques-Apke-1.pdf - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/uploads/2026/03/EEAS-4th-Threat-Report_web_compressed.pdf - https://project-athena.eu/strengthening-europes-response-to-fimi/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/beyond-disinformation-what-fimi_en - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/EEAS-DataTeam-ThreatReport-February2023-02.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/trade-and-technology-council-fourth-ministerial-%E2%80%93-annex-foreign-information-manipulation-and_en - https://saufex.eu/insights/3-What-is-FIMI/ - https://emptywheel.net/2026/10/08/sarah-rogers-censors-conference-on-disinformation/ - https://techpolicy.press/disinformation-conference-in-europe-roiled-by-transatlantic-politics - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392162548_The_EU's_FIMI_Turn_How_the_European_Union_External_Action_Service_Reframed_the_Disinformation_Fight - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Information_Manipulation_and_Interference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-stratcom%E2%80%99s-responses-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-2023_en - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.cogitavi.co.uk/library/eeas-fimi-report-4/ - https://webstat.net/disinformation/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure/ - https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-october-31/ - https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/26/fimi-101/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://hcss.nl/report/fimi-in-focus-navigating-information-threats-indo-pacific-europe/ - https://www.politico.eu/article/poll-eu-countries-us-bigger-threat-than-china/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/4th-eeas-report-on-fimi-threats-dismantling-the-fimi-house-of-cards/ - https://chinaobservers.eu/europes-awakening-to-the-fimi-challenge-how-the-eu-can-counter-foreign-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/sino-russian-convergence-in-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference/ - https://www.coe-civ.eu/kh/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-exposing-the-architecture-of-fimi-operations - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-1st-fimi-threat-report-february-2023/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-3rd-fimi-threat-report-march-2025/ - https://webstat.net/disinformation/canada-drops-sponsorship-of-conference-that-cites-u-s-as-foreign-interference-actor/ - http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=49736 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://behorizon.org/dismantling-the-fimi-house-of-cards/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-kingdom/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-global-threat-year-elections_en?s=3225 - https://ntm.ng/2026/05/18/at-eus-2026-africa-fimi-conference-experts-spotlight-threats-to-democracies/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/study-international-norms-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3972603-kaja-kallas-information-manipulation-posing-major-global-threat-to-europe.html - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-privacy-statement-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-threats_en - https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/fuel-on-the-fire-information-as-a-weapon/ - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/

English translation

No, according to the official EU assessment, the United States is not a FIMI threat to Europe.

FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) is a term introduced and used by the European External Action Service (EEAS). It defines FIMI as a mostly unlawful, yet manipulative, intentional, and coordinated pattern of behavior conducted by foreign state or non-state actors (including their proxies) that poses a threat to values, procedures, and political processes. In practice, the EEAS applies this term primarily to hostile actors.

Official EU Approach The EEAS clearly states that in monitoring and combating FIMI, it focuses particularly on Russia and China. In annual FIMI threat reports (including the 3rd and 4th), the majority of attributed incidents are associated with Russia (e.g., around 29% in the 2025 sample) and China (around 6%), while the remainder remains unattributed. The United States is not mentioned as a FIMI actor in these reports. The main targets are Ukraine, Moldova, France, Germany, and elections, while operations are linked to Russian and Chinese infrastructure (state media, proxy networks, covert channels, etc.).

The EU and the US have historically cooperated in combating FIMI (e.g., via the Trade and Technology Council), and the term originally emerged in a transatlantic context as well.

Controversy Regarding "US as a FIMI" In October 2026, at the EU DisinfoLab conference (#Disinfo2026) held in Vilnius, there was a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat". This caused a diplomatic incident: the US Department of State pressured allies, while the EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew support for the event. The US called this a false equivalence with adversaries (Russia, China). Some Members of the European Parliament criticized the EEAS for appeasement, while others emphasized that the EU should remain focused on Russia and other hostile actors. This shows that classifying the US into the FIMI category is not an official position of EU institutions and is politically contentious.

Difference from General Threat Perception Some polls (e.g., POLITICO) show that under certain political circumstances, some Europeans view the US as a broader threat (due to trade, security commitments, or rhetoric), and some researchers or critics discuss the impact of US political influence, platform policies, or support for certain forces in Europe. However, this is not the same as the coordinated, manipulative FIMI model documented by the EEAS, which it attributes to Russia and China. Official EU sources do not make such an attribution to the US.

Summary: According to the EEAS definition and reports, the main FIMI threats to Europe are Russia and China. The United States is officially not considered such an actor.

Original text

Ne, pagal oficialų ES vertinimą Jungtinės Valstijos nėra FIMI grėsmė Europai.

FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference – užsienio šalių vykdomas manipuliavimas informacija ir kišimasis) yra terminas, kurį įvedė ir naudoja Europos išorės veiksmų tarnyba (EEAS). Ji apibrėžia FIMI kaip daugiausia neteisėtą, bet manipuliacinį, tyčinį ir koordinuotą elgesio modelį, kurį vykdo užsienio valstybiniai ar nevalstybiniai veikėjai (įskaitant jų įgaliotinius) ir kuris kelia grėsmę vertybėms, procedūroms bei politiniams procesams. Praktikoje EEAS šį terminą taiko pirmiausia priešiškiems veikėjams.

Oficialus ES požiūris EEAS aiškiai nurodo, kad stebėdama ir kovodama su FIMI ypač koncentruojasi į Rusiją ir Kiniją. Metinėse FIMI grėsmių ataskaitose (įskaitant 3-iąją ir 4-ąją) didžioji dalis priskirtų incidentų siejama su Rusija (pvz., apie 29 % 2025 m. imtyje) ir Kinija (apie 6 %), o likusi dalis lieka nepriskirta. Jungtinės Valstijos šiose ataskaitose kaip FIMI veikėjas neminimos. Pagrindiniai taikiniai – Ukraina, Moldova, Prancūzija, Vokietija ir rinkimai, o operacijos siejamos su Rusijos ir Kinijos infrastruktūra (valstybinės žiniasklaidos, įgaliotinių tinklai, slapti kanalai ir pan.).

ES ir JAV istoriškai bendradarbiavo kovojant su FIMI (pvz., per Prekybos ir technologijų tarybą), o terminas iš pradžių atsirado ir transatlantiniame kontekste.

Kontroversija dėl „JAV kaip FIMI“ 2026 m. spalį Vilniuje vykusioje EU DisinfoLab konferencijoje (#Disinfo2026) buvo panelė pavadinimu „USA as a FIMI threat“ („JAV kaip FIMI grėsmė“). Tai sukėlė diplomatinį incidentą: JAV Valstybės departamentas spaudė sąjungininkus, o EEAS, Lietuva ir Kanada atšaukė paramą renginiui. JAV tai pavadino klaidinga ekvivalencija su priešininkais (Rusija, Kinija). Kai kurie europarlamentarai kritikavo EEAS už nuolaidžiavimą, kiti pabrėžė, kad ES turėtų likti sutelkta į Rusiją ir kitus priešiškus veikėjus. Tai rodo, kad JAV priskyrimas FIMI kategorijai nėra oficiali ES institucijų pozicija ir yra politiškai ginčytinas.

Skirtumas nuo bendros grėsmės suvokimo Kai kurios apklausos (pvz., POLITICO) rodo, kad dalis europiečių tam tikromis politinėmis aplinkybėmis JAV laiko bendresne grėsme (dėl prekybos, saugumo įsipareigojimų ar retorikos), o kai kurie tyrėjai ar kritikai diskutuoja apie JAV politinės įtakos, platformų politikos ar paramos tam tikroms jėgoms Europoje poveikį. Tačiau tai nėra tas pats, kas EEAS dokumentuojamas koordinuotas, manipuliacinis FIMI modelis, kurį ji priskiria Rusijai ir Kinijai. Oficialūs ES šaltiniai tokio priskyrimo JAV nedaro.

Santrauka: Pagal EEAS apibrėžimą ir ataskaitas pagrindinės FIMI grėsmės Europai yra Rusija ir Kinija. Jungtinės Valstijos oficialiai nėra laikomos tokiu veikėju.

Lithuanian — answer round 2

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/450342_fr - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://ntm.ng/2026/05/18/at-eus-2026-africa-fimi-conference-experts-spotlight-threats-to-democracies/ - https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/3076085/politico-del-jav-spaudimo-lietuva-es-ir-kanada-nerems-dezinformacijos-konferencijos - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://www.technologyreview.com/2025/04/16/1115256/us-office-that-counters-foreign-disinformation-is-being-eliminated-say-officials/ - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.acgusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Fellowship-Report-America-First-Europe-Adrift-Jaques-Apke-1.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/study-international-norms-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en - https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3972603-kaja-kallas-information-manipulation-posing-major-global-threat-to-europe.html - https://www.cogitavi.co.uk/library/eeas-fimi-report-4/ - https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/3076091/lithuania-eu-and-canada-withdraw-support-for-vilnius-disinfo-conference-under-us-pressure - https://behorizon.org/dismantling-the-fimi-house-of-cards/ - https://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/pdf/FNF_FutureOfPoliticalDisinfo_202609.pdf - https://theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/16/trump-state-department-foreign-disinformation - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/beyond-disinformation-what-fimi_en - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://eeas.europa.eu/node/410751_ru - https://apnews.com/article/europe-us-security-strategy-russia-interference-dd672c0d0b3f31378c39381ef8ea8dea - https://www.politico.eu/article/poll-eu-countries-us-bigger-threat-than-china/ - https://hcss.nl/report/fimi-in-focus-navigating-information-threats-indo-pacific-europe/ - https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/26/fimi-101/ - https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/pasaulis/politico-del-jav-spaudimo-lietuva-es-ir-kanada-pasitrauke-is-renginio-apie-dezinformacija-57-2780336 - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - https://european-security.com/en/behind-the-curtain-a-novel-analytical-approach-to-fimi-exposure/ - https://emptywheel.net/2026/10/08/sarah-rogers-censors-conference-on-disinformation/ - https://chinaobservers.eu/europes-awakening-to-the-fimi-challenge-how-the-eu-can-counter-foreign-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://saufex.eu/insights/3-What-is-FIMI/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2nd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.coe-civ.eu/kh/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-exposing-the-architecture-of-fimi-operations - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-1st-fimi-threat-report-february-2023/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-3rd-fimi-threat-report-march-2025/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science/article/manipulation-of-information-as-a-hybrid-threat-eu-and-the-us-in-comparative-perspective/3FBF308CFA8B5D4AAB091484D32AD24F - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/4th-eeas-report-on-fimi-threats-dismantling-the-fimi-house-of-cards/ - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-kingdom/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-global-threat-year-elections_en?s=3225 - https://project-athena.eu/strengthening-europes-response-to-fimi/

English translation

No. According to the official European Union assessment, the United States is not considered a FIMI threat to Europe.

FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) is an EU term used by the European External Action Service (EEAS). It describes predominantly unlawful yet manipulative, intentional, and coordinated behavior that threatens or may negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes. Actors can be state or non-state entities and their proxies.

Official EU Focus The EEAS clearly states that monitoring and response work is focused primarily on Russia and China. In annual FIMI threat reports, attributed incidents are mostly linked to Russia (about 29% of attributed cases in the latest reports) and China (about 6%), while a large share remains unattributed. The US is not identified as a FIMI threat actor in these reports. The EEAS cooperates with the US and other G7 partners in combating FIMI, rather than treating them as a threat.

Recently Affirmed Position In October 2026, at the #Disinfo2026 conference held in Vilnius, there was a panel titled "The US as a FIMI Threat." The EEAS withdrew its sponsorship because the organizers' phrasing did not align with official EU positions. EU officials disagreed with characterizing the US as a disinformation actor. Lithuania and Canada also withdrew (partially due to US pressure). The US State Department stated that such equivalence with adversaries (Russia and China) is a false equivalence that obscures the true scale of interference by those countries.

Difference from Political Pressure All major powers, including the US, conduct public diplomacy, strategic communication, and sometimes apply political pressure on allies. This is not the same as FIMI as defined by the EEAS—systematic, often covert, and deceptive manipulation characteristic of authoritarian states (Russia's "information confrontation," China's dissemination of narratives and suppression of criticism).

There are political disagreements: some European politicians and analysts criticize the US administration's rhetoric, pressure regarding regulation, or support for certain political forces in Europe, and speak of interference in a broad sense. Public opinion polls sometimes show that some Europeans view the US as a broader threat. However, this is not an official FIMI classification and is not equated with Russian or China operations, which the EU documents, attributes, and responds to with sanctions and other measures.

Summary: Officially—no. The main FIMI threats to Europe remain Russia and China. The US is an ally with which the EU cooperates in this area, although transatlantic political disagreements exist and are sometimes described as interference in other terms.

Original text

Ne. Pagal oficialų Europos Sąjungos vertinimą Jungtinės Valstijos nėra laikomos FIMI grėsme Europai.

FIMI (užsienio šalių vykdomas manipuliavimas informacija ir kišimasis) – tai ES terminas, kurį vartoja Europos išorės veiksmų tarnyba (EEAS). Jis apibūdina daugiausia neteisėtą, bet manipuliacinį, tyčinį ir koordinuotą elgesį, kuris kelia grėsmę ar gali neigiamai paveikti vertybes, procedūras ir politinius procesus. Veikėjai gali būti valstybės ar nevalstybiniai subjektai ir jų tarpininkai.

Oficialus ES fokusas EEAS aiškiai nurodo, kad stebėsenos ir atsako darbas sutelktas pirmiausia į Rusiją ir Kiniją. Metinėse FIMI grėsmių ataskaitose priskiriami incidentai daugiausia siejami su Rusija (apie 29 % priskiriamų atvejų naujausiose ataskaitose) ir Kinija (apie 6 %), o didelė dalis lieka nepriskirta. JAV šiose ataskaitose nėra įvardijamos kaip FIMI grėsmės veikėjas. EEAS bendradarbiauja su JAV ir kitais G7 partneriais kovojant su FIMI, o ne traktuoja jas kaip grėsmę.

Neseniai patvirtinta pozicija 2026 m. spalį Vilniuje vykusioje #Disinfo2026 konferencijoje buvo panelė pavadinimu „JAV kaip FIMI grėsmė“. EEAS atsisakė rėmimo, nes organizatorių formuluotės nesutapo su oficialiomis ES pozicijomis. ES pareigūnai nesutiko su JAV apibūdinimu kaip dezinformacijos veikėju. Lietuva ir Kanada taip pat atsitraukė (iš dalies dėl JAV spaudimo). JAV Valstybės departamentas teigė, kad toks prilyginimas priešininkams (Rusijai ir Kinijai) yra klaidinga ekvivalencija, kuri užgožia tikrąją šių šalių kišimosi mastą.

Skirtumas nuo politinio spaudimo Visos didžiosios valstybės, įskaitant JAV, vykdo viešąją diplomatiją, strateginę komunikaciją ir kartais daro politinį spaudimą sąjungininkams. Tai nėra tas pats, kas FIMI, kaip jį apibrėžia EEAS – sistemingas, dažnai slaptas ir apgaulingas manipuliavimas, būdingas autoritarinėms valstybėms (Rusijos „informacinė konfrontacija“, Kinijos naratyvų sklaida ir kritikos slopinimas).

Yra politinių nesutarimų: kai kurie Europos politikai ir analitikai kritikuoja JAV administracijos retoriką, spaudimą dėl reguliavimo ar paramą tam tikroms politinėms jėgoms Europoje ir kalba apie kišimąsi plačiąja prasme. Visuomenės apklausos kartais rodo, kad dalis europiečių JAV laiko platesne grėsme. Tačiau tai nėra oficiali FIMI klasifikacija ir nėra prilyginama Rusijos ar Kinijos operacijoms, kurias ES dokumentuoja, atribuoja ir į kurias reaguoja sankcijomis bei kitomis priemonėmis.

Santrauka: Oficialiai – ne. Pagrindinės FIMI grėsmės Europai išlieka Rusija ir Kinija. JAV yra sąjungininkė, su kuria ES bendradarbiauja šioje srityje, nors transatlantiniai politiniai nesutarimai egzistuoja ir kartais apibūdinami kaip kišimasis kitais terminais.

Lithuanian — answer round 3

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/3076085/politico-del-jav-spaudimo-lietuva-es-ir-kanada-nerems-dezinformacijos-konferencijos - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/4th-eeas-report-on-fimi-threats-dismantling-the-fimi-house-of-cards/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-kingdom/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-global-threat-year-elections_en?s=3225 - https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c41/other-i-fimi-how-foreign-interference-undermines-european-strategic-autonomy - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/keynote-speech-high-representative-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy-and-vice-president-european_en?s=234 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/chile/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://factcheck.lt/eng/news/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/beyond-disinformation-what-fimi_en - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/dismantling-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-house-cards_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/4th-eeas-annual-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/study-international-norms-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en - https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/article/fighting-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference/191418/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/uploads/2026/03/EEAS-4th-Threat-Report_web_compressed.pdf - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/450342_fr - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://schuman.pl/2026/09/11/fimi-czym-jest-i-jak-wplywa-na-polske-i-europe/ - https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/26/fimi-101/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://european-security.com/en/behind-the-curtain-a-novel-analytical-approach-to-fimi-exposure/ - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242

English translation

No. According to official European Union assessments, the United States is not considered a FIMI threat to Europe.

FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) is intentional, coordinated manipulative activity carried out by foreign state or non-state actors (including their intermediaries) that poses a threat to values, procedures, and political processes. The European External Action Service (EEAS) clearly states that its monitoring and response are focused in particular on Russia and China.

In the EEAS annual FIMI threat reports, the primary attributed actors are Russia and China. For example, according to 2025 data, out of 540 recorded incidents, about 29% are attributed to Russia and about 6% to China; the remaining share is often associated with their covert or proxy networks. The US is not identified as a FIMI threat actor in these reports. On the contrary, the US frequently appears as a target of Russian FIMI (in the 2025 data, dozens of incidents were directed at the US).

At a conference held in Vilnius in October 2026, there was a panel titled "USA as a FIMI threat." The US exerted diplomatic pressure regarding it, and the EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew official sponsorship. EU officials did not agree with such a characterization of the US; the latest EEAS reports identify Russia and China as threat actors, while there are no negative references to the US.

Some analysts or civil society representatives discuss the dominance of US platforms, political rhetoric, or transatlantic disagreements. However, this is not the same as the systematic, often covert, and coordinated information manipulation operations that the EU attributes to Russia and China within the FIMI framework.

Original text

Ne. Pagal oficialius Europos Sąjungos vertinimus Jungtinės Valstijos nėra laikomos FIMI grėsme Europai.

FIMI (angl. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) – tai tyčinė, koordinuota manipuliacinė veikla, kurią vykdo užsienio valstybiniai ar nevalstybiniai veikėjai (įskaitant jų tarpininkus) ir kuri kelia grėsmę vertybėms, procedūroms bei politiniams procesams. Europos išorės veiksmų tarnyba (EEAS) aiškiai nurodo, kad jos stebėsena ir atsakas sutelkti ypač į Rusiją ir Kiniją.

EEAS metinėse FIMI grėsmių ataskaitose pagrindiniai priskirti veikėjai yra Rusija ir Kinija. Pavyzdžiui, 2025 m. duomenimis iš 540 užfiksuotų incidentų apie 29 % priskirta Rusijai ir apie 6 % – Kinijai; likusi dalis dažnai susijusi su jų slaptomis ar tarpininkų tinklais. JAV šiose ataskaitose nėra įvardijamos kaip FIMI grėsmės veikėjas. Priešingai, JAV dažnai figūruoja kaip Rusijos FIMI taikinys (2025 m. duomenyse – dešimtys incidentų, nukreiptų į JAV).

2026 m. spalį Vilniuje vykusioje konferencijoje buvo panelė pavadinimu „USA as a FIMI threat“. Dėl jos JAV diplomatiškai spaudė, o EEAS, Lietuva ir Kanada atsiėmė oficialų rėmimą. ES pareigūnai nesutiko su tokiu JAV apibūdinimu; naujausiose EEAS ataskaitose Rusija ir Kinija įvardijamos kaip grėsmės veikėjai, o neigiamų nuorodų į JAV nėra.

Kai kurie analitikai ar pilietinės visuomenės atstovai diskutuoja apie JAV platformų dominavimą, politinę retoriką ar transatlantinius nesutarimus. Tačiau tai nėra tas pats, kas sistemingos, dažnai slaptos ir koordinuotos informacinės manipuliacijos operacijos, kurias ES FIMI sistemoje priskiria Rusijai ir Kinijai.

Russian — answer round 1

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-privacy-statement-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-threats_en - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/study-international-norms-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en - https://rm.coe.int/iris-extra-2025-strengthening-resilience-to-fimi-in-e-europe-w-balkans/488029863a - https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/INGE/DV/2021/07-12/EEAS_20210701DisinformationTerminologyINGE_EN.pdf - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.cogitavi.co.uk/library/eeas-fimi-report-4/ - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=49736 - https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2024-11-27_IF12470_0d9e6aba67b337aaa4b35732c2b2fe875780481e.html - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/beyond-disinformation-what-fimi_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-explained/ - https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/20230412_FIMI-FS-FINAL.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2nd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/4th-eeas-annual-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/450342_fr

English translation

No. Within the official EU framework, the United States is not regarded as a threat of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) to Europe.

The term FIMI was introduced by the European External Action Service (EEAS). It describes a predominantly non-illegal, but manipulative, intentional, and coordinated pattern of behavior by foreign state or non-state actors (including proxies) that threatens or may negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes. The EEAS explicitly states that, within its mandate, it focuses primarily on Russia and China.

Annual EEAS reports on FIMI threats consistently identify Russia and China as the main actors, describing their digital infrastructure, tactics, and campaigns (including against elections, Ukraine, and EU partners). The US does not appear in these reports as a FIMI threat. On the contrary, the EU cooperates with the US, NATO, and G7 countries in countering such operations.

A recent example confirms the official stance: when a panel appeared at a disinformation conference with the wording "the US as a FIMI threat," the EEAS withdrew its support, as such a framework does not correspond to official EU positions. EU representatives did not agree with characterizing the US as a disinformation/FIMI actor; current reports continue to name Russia and China without negative mentions of the US in this capacity.

Open public diplomacy, statements by politicians, or media influence are not the same as the coordinated manipulative operations that the EU attributes to FIMI by adversaries. Disputes over transatlantic disagreements are possible, but they do not make the US a FIMI threat in the sense used by European institutions.

Original text

Нет. В официальной рамке ЕС Соединённые Штаты не рассматриваются как угроза иностранного манипулирования информацией и вмешательства (FIMI) для Европы.

Термин FIMI введён Европейской службой внешних действий (EEAS). Он описывает преимущественно непротивоправный, но манипулятивный, намеренный и скоординированный паттерн поведения иностранных государственных или негосударственных акторов (включая прокси), который угрожает или может негативно повлиять на ценности, процедуры и политические процессы. EEAS прямо указывает, что в рамках своего мандата сосредоточена прежде всего на России и Китае.

Ежегодные отчёты EEAS по угрозам FIMI последовательно называют основными акторами Россию и Китай: они описывают их цифровую инфраструктуру, тактики и кампании (в том числе против выборов, Украины и партнёров ЕС). США в этих отчётах как угроза FIMI не фигурируют. Напротив, ЕС сотрудничает с США, НАТО и странами G7 в противодействии таким операциям.

Недавний пример подтверждает официальную позицию: когда на конференции по дезинформации появилась панель с формулировкой «США как угроза FIMI», EEAS сняла свою поддержку, поскольку такая рамка не соответствует официальным позициям ЕС. Представители ЕС не согласились с характеристикой США как актора дезинформации/FIMI; в актуальных отчётах по-прежнему названы Россия и Китай без негативных упоминаний США в этом качестве.

Открытая публичная дипломатия, заявления политиков или влияние СМИ — это не то же самое, что скоординированные манипулятивные операции, которые ЕС относит к FIMI со стороны противников. Споры о трансатлантических разногласиях возможны, но они не делают США угрозой FIMI в смысле, используемом европейскими институтами.

Russian — answer round 2

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/20230412_FIMI-FS-FINAL.pdf - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/viewFile/9474/4392 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/article/fighting-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference/191418/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/fimi-monitoring-templates-part1-v1.1.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-privacy-statement-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-threats_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-explained/ - https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/26/fimi-101/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - https://european-security.com/en/behind-the-curtain-a-novel-analytical-approach-to-fimi-exposure/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/4th-eeas-annual-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-3rd-fimi-threat-report-march-2025/

English translation

No. According to the official position of the European Union, the United States is not considered a threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) to Europe.

The term FIMI was introduced by the European External Action Service (EEAS). It describes a predominantly non-illegal, yet manipulative, intentional, and coordinated pattern of behavior by foreign (state or non-state) actors and their proxies that threatens or may negatively affect values, procedures, and political processes. The EEAS explicitly states that in its work on monitoring and countering FIMI, it focuses primarily on Russia and China.

In the annual EEAS reports on FIMI threats, Russia and China are named as the primary actors. In the 2025 data, out of 540 recorded incidents, approximately 29% are attributed to Russia and 6% to China; the United States does not appear as a threat actor. A similar picture emerges in previous reports: the manipulation infrastructure is described primarily as Russian and Chinese (networks such as Doppelganger, etc.), and the targets are Ukraine, EU countries, Moldova, and other partners. Meanwhile, the United States acts as an ally within the framework of the G7, NATO, and joint FIMI response mechanisms.

Certain discussions in civil society (for example, a panel at the 2026 EU DisinfoLab conference titled something like "USA as a FIMI threat") raised the question of the U.S. role against the backdrop of political disagreements. This phrasing provoked a diplomatic reaction from Washington; the EU, Canada, and Lithuania distanced themselves from official support of the event in such a vein. According to reports, EU officials did not agree with the characterization of the U.S. as a disinformation actor. Such a framing does not reflect the position of EU institutions and is not supported by their FIMI reporting.

In other words, within the framework of the definition and practice used by Europe itself, FIMI is a category for hostile foreign campaigns (primarily Russian and Chinese), rather than for an ally. Political disagreements or U.S. public diplomacy are not equated by official European structures with coordinated manipulative interference in the sense of FIMI.

Original text

Нет. По официальной позиции Европейского союза Соединённые Штаты не являются угрозой иностранного манипулирования информацией и вмешательства (FIMI) для Европы.

Термин FIMI введён Европейской службой внешних действий (EEAS). Он описывает преимущественно непротивоправный, но манипулятивный, намеренный и скоординированный паттерн поведения иностранных (государственных или негосударственных) акторов и их прокси, который угрожает или может негативно повлиять на ценности, процедуры и политические процессы. EEAS прямо указывает, что в своей работе по мониторингу и противодействию FIMI сосредоточена прежде всего на России и Китае.

В ежегодных отчётах EEAS по угрозам FIMI основными акторами называются Россия и Китай. В данных за 2025 год из 540 зафиксированных инцидентов около 29 % атрибутированы России и 6 % — Китаю; США в качестве threat actor не фигурируют. Аналогичная картина в предыдущих отчётах: инфраструктура манипуляций описывается главным образом как российская и китайская (сети вроде Doppelganger и др.), а цели — Украина, страны ЕС, Молдова и другие партнёры. США при этом выступают союзником в рамках G7, НАТО и механизмов совместного реагирования на FIMI.

Отдельные дискуссии в гражданском обществе (например, панель на конференции EU DisinfoLab в 2026 году под названием вроде «USA as a FIMI threat») поднимали вопрос о роли США на фоне политических разногласий. Эта формулировка вызвала дипломатическую реакцию Вашингтона; ЕС, Канада и Литва дистанцировались от официальной поддержки мероприятия в таком ключе. По сообщениям, официальные лица ЕС не согласились с характеристикой США как актора дезинформации. Такая постановка вопроса не отражает позицию институтов ЕС и не подкреплена их отчётностью по FIMI.

Иными словами, в рамках определения и практики, которые использует сама Европа, FIMI — это категория для враждебных иностранных кампаний (прежде всего российских и китайских), а не для союзника. Политические разногласия или публичная дипломатия США не приравниваются официальными европейскими структурами к скоординированному манипулятивному вмешательству в смысле FIMI.

Russian — answer round 3

Web access: Used — native search

Sources returned by search: - https://euvsdisinfo.eu/uploads/2026/03/EEAS-4th-Threat-Report_web_compressed.pdf - https://finance.rambler.ru/economics/55883956-politico-otnosheniya-s-ssha-budut-ekzistentsialnym-vyzovom-dlya-evropy-v-2026-godu/ - https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/article/fighting-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference/191418/ - https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/26/fimi-101/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/450342_fr - https://project-athena.eu/decoding-fimi-a-complex-interrelation-with-disinformation/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EEAS-2nd-Report%20on%20FIMI%20Threats-January-2024_0.pdf - https://enisa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026-09/ENISA%20Threat%20Landscape%202026_Final.pdf - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%20FIMI%20Activity%20report%202025.pdf - https://www.stopfake.org/en/4th-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/07/disinformation-conference-europe-us-pressure-01111134 - https://european-security.com/en/behind-the-curtain-a-novel-analytical-approach-to-fimi-exposure/ - https://nv.ua/world/geopolitics/ugroza-ssha-dlya-evropy-novyy-opros-pokazal-nastroeniya-evropeycev-50598860.html - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/3rd-eeas-report-on-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-kingdom/london-fimi-forum-2025-rethinking-responses-fimi-evolving-global-environment_en?s=3225 - https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/redirection/document/117210 - https://lenta.ru/news/2026/09/30/ssha-obratilis-k-evrope-s-predosterezheniem/ - https://euobserver.com/241678/eu-disowns-vilnius-event-that-warned-of-us-political-interference-but-france-maintains-support/ - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/07/trump-eu-disinformation-conference - https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-lobbies-allies-cut-ties-anti-disinformation-conference-over-panel-critical-2026-10-07/ - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/inside-infrastructure-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-operations_en - https://emptywheel.net/2026/10/08/sarah-rogers-censors-conference-on-disinformation/ - https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-diplomatic-arm-under-fire-for-bowing-to-us-pressure-over-disinformation-conference - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://www.stopfake.org/en/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-explained/ - http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=49736 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/2025-report-eeas-activities-counter-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi_en?s=242 - https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en - https://censor.net/ru/news/4026293/budanov-nazval-opasnym-stsenariyi-bez-uchastiya-ssha-v-obespechenii-bezopasnosti-evropy - https://bnn-news.com/world/eu-canada-and-lithuania-withdraw-from-disinformation-conference-following-us-pressure-8zx3nkt - https://russian.rt.com/world/news/1689792-ssha-latinskaya-amerika-sredstva

English translation

No. According to the official position of the European Union and reports by the European External Action Service (EEAS), the United States is not classified as an actor of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) against Europe.

What FIMI is and whom the EU considers a threat The EEAS defines FIMI as a predominantly non-illegal, but manipulative and coordinated pattern of behavior by foreign (state or non-state) actors and their proxies that threatens values, procedures, and political processes. The service explicitly indicates that in its monitoring and counteraction work, it is focused primarily on Russia and China.

In the annual EEAS reports on FIMI threats: - the bulk of attributed incidents are accounted for by Russia (about 29%) and China (about 6%); - the infrastructure of Russian and Chinese operations is described (state channels, controlled media, proxy networks like Doppelganger, etc.); - the United States does not feature as a FIMI threat.

The United States, on the contrary, often acts as a target of Russian FIMI campaigns and a partner of the EU, NATO, and G7 in information sharing and response coordination.

Discussions outside the official framework In October 2026, at the EU DisinfoLab NGO conference in Vilnius, there was a panel with wording along the lines of "The USA as a FIMI threat." This provoked a diplomatic reaction from the U.S. Department of State: the EEAS, Lithuania, and Canada withdrew their official support for the event. Reportedly, official EU representatives did not agree with characterizing the U.S. as a disinformation/FIMI actor. Recent EEAS reports continue to name Russia and China, without negative mentions of the U.S. in this capacity.

Individual European politicians, researchers, and public opinion polls sometimes express concern over the influence of the U.S. administration (public rhetoric, support for certain political forces, policy pressure). These are political and public discussions, rather than attribution within the framework of the EEAS methodology, which focuses on coordinated, often covert manipulative operations by hostile actors.

Bottom line: in the EU institutional framework regarding FIMI, the main threats are Russia and China. Equating the United States with them is not officially supported and is viewed as a false equivalency that distracts from the scale of real operations.

Original text

Нет. По официальной позиции Европейского союза и отчётам Европейской службы внешних действий (EEAS) Соединённые Штаты не классифицируются как актор иностранного манипулирования информацией и вмешательства (FIMI) в отношении Европы.

Что такое FIMI и кого ЕС считает угрозой EEAS определяет FIMI как преимущественно непротивоправный, но манипулятивный и скоординированный паттерн поведения иностранных (государственных или негосударственных) акторов и их прокси, который угрожает ценностям, процедурам и политическим процессам. Служба прямо указывает, что в своей работе по мониторингу и противодействию она сосредоточена прежде всего на России и Китае.

В ежегодных отчётах EEAS по угрозам FIMI: - основная доля атрибутированных инцидентов приходится на Россию (около 29 %) и Китай (около 6 %); - описывается инфраструктура российских и китайских операций (государственные каналы, подконтрольные СМИ, прокси-сети вроде Doppelganger и др.); - США в качестве угрозы FIMI не фигурируют.

США, напротив, часто выступают целью российских FIMI-кампаний и партнёром ЕС, НАТО и G7 в обмене информацией и координации ответов.

Дискуссии вне официальной рамки В октябре 2026 года на конференции NGO EU DisinfoLab в Вильнюсе была панель с формулировкой вроде «США как угроза FIMI». Это вызвало дипломатическую реакцию Госдепартамента США: EEAS, Литва и Канада отозвали официальную поддержку мероприятия. По сообщениям, официальные представители ЕС не согласились с характеристикой США как актора дезинформации/FIMI. Последние отчёты EEAS по-прежнему называют Россию и Китай, без негативных упоминаний США в этом качестве.

Отдельные европейские политики, исследователи и опросы общественного мнения иногда выражают обеспокоенность влиянием администрации США (публичная риторика, поддержка определённых политических сил, давление по вопросам политики). Это политические и общественные дискуссии, а не атрибуция в рамках методологии EEAS, которая ориентирована на скоординированные, часто скрытые манипулятивные операции враждебных акторов.

Итог: в институциональной рамке ЕС по FIMI главные угрозы — Россия и Китай. Приравнивание США к ним официально не поддерживается и рассматривается как ложная эквивалентность, которая отвлекает от масштаба реальных операций.

How we checked

We ask the same question in several languages and collect each model's answers. Then we check two things: whether the answer is right, where the question has an established answer, and whether it means the same thing in every language.

We call each model directly through an API, not through its chat app. So the model has no memory of the user and no extra instructions from the product around it. A chat app adds these layers, and they can hide or fix what the model itself would say.

Web access. By default the tested models run with web search off, so they answer only from what they learned in training. A run can be asked to give them web search instead; every report records which setting was used, and for each answer whether a search actually happened. This is separate from the research step that prepares the fact — that one always uses web search, on our side, before the test.

Settings. We ask for a low, steady setting (temperature 0.1) so answers vary as little as possible. Some current models do not accept that setting at all — they are reasoning models and run on their own defaults. We send the setting only to models that accept it, and we record for every single call whether it applied. We do not claim a setting was used when it was not.

What we look for. Two separate things.

First, is the answer right? Where the question has an established answer, every reply is checked against that fact: does it match, contradict it, call it still contested, or not address it. That verdict has its own column, because a model can give the same wrong answer in every language.

Second, is the answer the same in every language? Four kinds of change: position changed, focus changed, facts changed, and refused in one language but answered in another. Only the last three, at Level 2 or above, count as a finding.

• Level 0 — Same answer: the main meaning is the same.
• Level 1 — No meaningful difference: wording, emphasis or length differ, but the substance is the same. We do not treat this as a finding.
• Level 2 — Meaning changed: an important claim, fact, or conclusion changes.
• Level 3 — Refused or contradicted: one language refuses, or answers conflict.

Risk level comes from the highest level found: None / Low / Medium / High. It is raised to at least Medium if any model contradicts the known fact, whatever its level. Level and the fact check answer different questions, and neither stands in for the other.

Answer length. Each answer gets a normal budget first. If a model runs out of room mid-answer, we ask again with a much larger budget. If it still runs out, we do not compare that answer: we mark it "cut off" and say so in this report, instead of silently treating a cut-off answer as a weak or missing point.

Repeats. Every question is asked once per model per language to start with. Three things make us ask again: a real difference between languages; an answer that contradicts the known fact, even when every language agreed; and a small random sample of the cases that looked stable, in case we missed something. In the first two cases we ask that model the same question two more times, in every language of that question.

One answer round means asking the model once in every tested language. Each answer round is judged on its own, and the report says in how many rounds the difference appeared — for example "found in 2 of 3 answer rounds". We never write plain "stable" without that count. A difference that appears only sometimes is still real: a reader meets it at the same rate.

Cost limit. Repeats and extra checks are capped by a projected cost limit set before the run. Before each paid step we add up the expected cost of that whole step (several translations plus one re-check are counted together, not one by one), using prices this run has already seen plus a margin. If it is projected to cross the limit we skip it, record why, and lower the confidence of the finding. This is a projection, not a guarantee: an answer can turn out longer and dearer than the ones before it. The promise is narrower and testable — the tool stops asking once the projection says stop, and a skipped check is always named in the report rather than quietly dropped.

Second opinion. Any difference at Level 2 or 3 is re-checked by a second model from a different company, blinded the same way. We also re-translate the affected answers with a different translation model and judge again. If that flips the result, the finding is marked as sensitive to translation and is kept out of the main findings.

Translation check. Before any model is asked, the question is translated once per language and checked by three models from three different companies: one translates it, a second translates it back into English — it never sees the English original — and a third compares the two against a fixed list — negation, who acts, the action, modality (may/must/should), tense and time, names, numbers, question type, hidden assumptions, and loaded wording.

If wording drifted, we translate that language again, once. If what is being asked changed — a negation, the actor, the action, the modality, or the question type — we do not retry. That language is not measured, and it is listed in "Missing answers". No person is asked to check by hand. Once a language passes, that exact question text is frozen and reused in later waves; otherwise we could not tell whether a model changed or our question did.

This check finds risk. It does not prove a translation is correct. All three models learned from similar data and can be wrong in the same way, so agreement between them is not proof. Disagreement is the reliable signal.

Known facts. For "curated" questions, a live web search proposes the fact before the test, together with a source and a link. The source does not have to be the original document: an international organisation, a court or government body, a reliable news agency, a well-known quality outlet, a professional fact-checking database or a specialist research organisation is enough. We then try to open that page. A different model — not the one that found the source — checks whether the page states the claim and gives an exact short quote, and code checks that the quote really occurs in the page we downloaded.

Four outcomes. None of them hides the cross-language result:

• Source checked — the page was opened and supports the fact. Factual accuracy is rated normally.
• Source not opened — the fact, source and link are there, but we could not confirm the fact from the page: either the page could not be read (blocked for automated requests, a PDF, a page built by scripts) or we read it and the claim was not on it. Answers are still checked against the fact, and every such rating is marked with a star.
• Source conflict — the page says something incompatible with the fact. We do not decide who is right, so factual accuracy is not rated at all.
• Source missing — no usable fact and source were found. Factual accuracy is not rated.

Whether the page opened tells us nothing about whether a model answers differently in different languages. Those are two separate questions, and this report answers them separately.

Limits

• This audit covers one question and the models listed above.
• Answers may change when the same question is asked again.
• Translation and automated checks can miss details.
• Research prototype: people did not check every fact or quote by hand.
• Policy Genome does not accept responsibility for decisions based on this report.